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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Better Off Dead: Suicide in Plato’s Philosophy 
by 
Anna Christensen 
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2017 
Professor Eric Brown, Chair 
In Better Off Dead: Suicide in Plato’s Philosophy, I argue that Plato thinks Socrates 
committed suicide, and show how this thesis coheres a rich set of Platonic views about the 
permissibility of suicide, about living a good life, and about responsible and intentional action.  An 
ancient philosophical tradition portrays Socrates’ death as a virtuous suicide, but contemporary 
scholars tend to focus on the fact that Socrates’ death occurred as a result of execution.  They think 
that Plato does not portray Socrates as committing suicide, largely because some textual evidence 
suggests that Plato considers suicide to be ethically wrong (Phd. 61c; Laws IX.873c).  I argue that 
this interpretation is too narrow.  Instead, carefully examining Plato’s discussions of suicide 
reveals that Plato has a consistent account of suicide according to which suicide is sometimes both 
ethically permissible and in the agent’s best interest.  Socrates, I argue, embodies such 
circumstances in Plato’s dialogues.  In addition, I argue that Plato’s account of responsibility and 
intentional action allows that suicide and execution are mutually compatible explanations of 
Socrates’ death.  According to Plato’s account, Socrates was at least as responsible for his death 
as the city was, and Socrates committed suicide. 
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Preface 
 
In Jacques-Louis David’s painting, La Mort de Socrate (The Death of Socrates), Socrates 
is portrayed as a resolute old man dressed in white, one hand gesturing up to heaven as his other 
extends over the cup of poison he is about to drink.  Other men surround him, their palpable distress 
at Socrates’ approaching death appearing in stark contrast to Socrates’ own demeanor.  Socrates 
is calm, seemingly unmoved by his friends’ anguish, as he uses his death scene to impart final 
words to those he leaves behind. 
 
Illustration 1: The Death of Socrates1 
 
The image illustrates the significance that both philosophy and history have accorded to 
this event.  Socrates gained as much immortal acclaim by the way he died, as he did by how he 
lived.  He died by drinking poison hemlock, after an Athenian law court convicted him of 
corrupting the youth and teaching about strange new gods.  Many scholars today view this death 
as martyrdom2, execution3, or murder4 – the unlucky price Socrates had to pay for his 
uncompromising devotion to his philosophical beliefs.   
                                                          
1  David (1787). 
2  Bradatan (2015), Doherty (1923). 
3  Rowe (1993). 
4  Watson (2007). 
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Yet a rich ancient tradition tells a different story.  Socrates committed suicide, it says, rather 
than continue to live on in circumstances where life would not be worth living.  Moreover, the 
ancient tradition reveres Socrates for this choice.  In his Memorabilia, Xenophon presents Socrates 
as choosing to die and consequently winning eternal glory.5  He commends Socrates’ fortitude, 
declaring that Socrates’ death displayed his strength of soul: “for having once decided that death 
was better for him than longer life, he did not weaken in the presence of death, just as he had never 
set his face against any other thing, either, that was for his good, but was cheerful not only in the 
expectation of death but also in carrying it out” (Xen. Ap. 33).  Elsewhere, Xenophon professes 
that “there is no record of death more nobly borne” than Socrates’ (Mem. IV.vii.8).  The attitude 
is one shared by another biographer, Diogenes Laërtius, who writes that a god himself called 
Socrates “wise” when he took the hemlock from the Athenians.6  
The Stoics maintained this attitude regarding Socrates’ death.7  When Stoicism’s founder, 
Zeno of Citium, committed suicide, his followers referenced Socrates’ words in Plato’s Phaedo to 
vindicate his action.8  The Roman Stoic philosopher, Seneca, explicitly tried to model his own 
suicide after Socrates’.9 The epigrams of Callimachus note that another philosopher, Cleombrotus, 
read the Phaedo and decided to follow Socrates’ example by throwing himself into the sea.10  Such 
                                                          
5  See Mem. IV.vii.8, IV.viii.8; cf. Xen. Ap. 6-7. 
6  “Drink then, being in Zeus’ home, Socrates; for truly did a god call you wise, being wisdom himself; for 
when you simply took the hemlock from the Athenians, they themselves drank it as it passed your lips” (πῖνέ νυν ἐν 
Διὸς ὤν, ὦ Σώκρατες: ἦ σε γὰρ ὄντως καὶ σοφὸν εἶπε θεός, καὶ θεὸς ἡ σοφίη. πρὸς γὰρ Ἀθηναίων κώνειον ἁπλῶς σὺ 
ἐδέξω: αὐτοὶ δ᾽ ἐξέπιον τοῦτο τεῷ στόματι, D.L. II.46). 
7  See Cooper (1999), Griffin (1986), and Rist (1969). 
8  Zeno tripped over a stone and broke a toe.  He took this as a “sign from god” that it was necessary for him to 
die, so he committed suicide (D.L. VII.28).  The reference is to Plato’s Phaedo (62c).  See also Warren (2001). 
9  Seneca took poison such as the Greeks gave those condemned to die (i.e., hemlock).  That action alone failed, 
so he also cut his wrists and suffocated himself in a bath.  See Tacitus (Annals XV.64). 
10  “There is a certain epigram of Callimachus about Cleombrotus of Ambracia, who [Callimachus] says, 
although nothing awful had happened to him, threw himself from a wall in the sea, after having read Plato’s book” 
(Callimachi quidem epigramma in Ambraciotam Theombrotum est, quem ait, cum ei nihil accidisset adversi, e muro 
se in mare abiecisee, lecto Platonis libro; Cicero [Tusc. Disp. I.84]).  Augustine writes of the same case, making special 
note that the “book” in question was indeed the Phaedo (Civ. Dei I.22). 
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stories indicate that Socrates’ final act was not only viewed as a suicide, but also as a suicide 
worthy of esteem, praise, and even occasional imitation by any who would consider themselves 
philosophers. 
It is not difficult to see why the ancients would conceive of Socrates’ death as a suicide.  
On the final page of Plato’s Phaedo, Socrates takes the cup of poison himself (117c), having 
already refused the opportunity to escape prison (98e-99a; cf. Crit. 54d-e) and announced that he 
wants to die (Phd. 63b-c; cf. Ap. 40c ff.).  He then drinks the poison, requiring neither restraints 
(Phd. 116c), nor to be told to drink a second time (116e-117a).  Earlier in the same dialogue, Plato 
even had Socrates characterize his imminent death as a suicide.  Socrates says that suicide is 
impermissible (οὐ . . . θεμιτόν, 61c10) except when “a god sends some necessity, such as the one 
that has now come before us” (62c6-9).11  The fact that he refers to his own case as one for which 
a god has provided some necessity indicates that he views it as a suicide requiring such permission.  
Most modern readers ignore12 or dismiss13 the characterization of Socrates as committing 
suicide.   A few scholars have considered the question,14 but unfortunately these scholars have 
concentrated on what it means to qualify a death as “suicide.”  Yet more is at stake here than a 
merely semantic definition.  Indeed, if we grant that Plato really characterizes Socrates as a suicide 
at the Phaedo’s conclusion, three further puzzles follow from that characterization.  Each puzzle 
appears in attenuated form within the same passage, and each has ramifications for our 
understanding of Platonic philosophy more generally.   
                                                          
11  πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἡμῖν παροῦσαν. 
12  See Ahrensdorf (1995: 10, 17, 19), Archer-Hind (1973: 9),  Bluck (1955: 1), Bostock (1986: 20),  Burnet 
(1911: 149),  Brickhouse & Smith (1989: passim), Burger (1984: 9, 21, 33), Doherty (19), Geddes (1885: 224), Stern 
(1993: 31), van Hooff (2000: 52), White (1989: 27, 30), and Woozley (1979: 9).  
13  Rowe (1993: 7, 125) accepts a limited sense in which Socrates committed suicide – because he takes the 
poison from the warder and drinks it (130) – but otherwise dismisses the appellation by referring to Socrates as 
“executed.”   
14  See especially Cholbi (2011: 36), Eckstein (1981: 8-9), Frey (1978: 106-108), Gallop (1975: 85), and 
Hackforth (1955: 36, n.4).   
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First, the last page of the Phaedo also characterizes Socrates as especially just (δικαιότατος, 
118a).  Thus, if Plato thinks Socrates committed suicide, Plato must also think that Socrates’ 
suicide is permissible, consistent with Socrates’ being just.  As we have seen, Plato has Socrates 
himself suggest that his suicide is permissible (62c).  But how can this assessment be correct?   
Second, the last page of the Phaedo also characterizes Socrates as especially wise 
(φρονιμώτατος, 118a).  So Plato must have thought that Socrates’ committing suicide was 
consistent with Socrates’ being wise.  For this to be the case, Socrates must have had a good reason 
to commit suicide.  But what good reason could Socrates possibly have had?  Notice that this 
question is particularly pointed if we think that Plato is a eudaimonist, on the grounds that Plato’s 
Socrates elsewhere suggests that good reasons for action must culminate in the goal of eudaimonia 
(happiness, success, or well-being).15  How can it serve Socrates’ eudaimonia to kill himself, and 
what might this answer suggest more generally about the wisdom and rationality of other suicides? 
Third, the Phaedo also characterizes Socrates’ death as a punishment mandated by Athens 
(98d-e; 116c).  But how is Socrates’ death as punishment compatible with Socrates’ death being a 
suicide?  After all, if Athens executes Socrates, then it may seem that Athens – and Athens alone 
– is responsible for killing Socrates.  Consequently, it seems difficult to think that Socrates could 
be responsible for his death or have intended to die in any meaningful way.  Notice that this 
question is not merely a semantic concern.  Rather it concerns what it means to act as a responsible 
and intentional agent.  
My dissertation addresses these three puzzles, one per chapter.  I defend the thesis that 
Plato thought Socrates committed suicide by showing how this notion coheres with a consistent 
                                                          
15  See Euthd. 278e, 280b; Grg. 468b-d; Laws 864a; Meno 77c-78b; Prt. 352b-358e; Rep. IV.443e. 
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set of Platonic views about suicide’s permissibility, about the grounds for wise action, and about 
responsible and intentional action.  A more detailed synopsis of the chapters follows. 
In Chapter 1, “As the God Leads: The Ethics of Platonic Suicide,” I consider the internal 
consistency of Plato’s account of suicide and how Socrates can be viewed as a permissible suicide.  
Disparities between the Phaedo and the Laws have led some scholars16 to question whether his 
texts can provide us with a coherent view of suicide.  While Plato expresses his arguments in 
predominantly religious terms in the Phaedo, he expresses his reasons on legal or practical grounds 
in the Laws, without citing theological commitments.  Moreover, he appears to endorse a much 
broader set of conditions permitting suicide in the Laws.   
I argue for a coherent account of suicide between the two dialogues.  I show that the same 
theological and philosophical grounds prohibiting suicide can be found in both texts, and that the 
Phaedo’s exception is broad enough to include the Laws’ longer list of exceptions.  In addition, I 
argue that Plato can consistently hold Socrates as a permissible suicide by both the Phaedo’s and 
the Laws’ reasons. 
In Chapter 2, “The Wisest Death: Wisdom and Suicide in Platonic Ethics,” I argue that 
Plato’s account of suicide is consistent with eudaimonism,17 and that Socrates’ suicide is consistent 
with his being wise.  We have two worries about suicide in his ethics: 1) that his account is too 
permissive, and 2) that his account is too exclusive.   
                                                          
16  See especially Cooper (1999), Geddes (1885), and Rowe (1993). 
17  I accept the assumption that Plato is some kind of eudaimonist on the grounds that Socrates often says the 
good is the reason that people act.  Many scholars accept this assumption, including Annas (1999: 31-51), Bobonich 
(2011), Brickhouse & Smith (1994: 73-136), Irwin (1995: 248), Price (2011: 9), Vasiliou (2008), Vlastos (1991: 200-
232), and Warren (2001).  Some scholars argue against this position.  See, for example, White (2002: 45-81) and 
Moore (1903: 97-105).   
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Assuming that eudaimonia is virtuous activity,18 the first point is troublesome because 
choosing to commit suicide cuts life short.  A person cannot perform any activity if she is dead!19  
But Plato allows suicide in cases of extreme pain, misery, and shame.  I show that these cases 
signify when opportunities for achieving eudaimonia by performing virtuous activity are severely 
impeded or impossible.  At that time, a person is better off dead.  I argue that Socrates’ suicide is 
itself an example of such a case.  So we need not worry that Plato’s account is too permissive.   
However, we might worry that Plato’s account could be too exclusive, because he does not 
unconditionally allow suicide to all people who might seem to be benefitted by death (Phd. 61d).  
I argue that Plato’s answer is found in his insistence that only when a soul has been properly 
prepared to die is it beneficial to separate the soul completely from the body.  Suicide under 
ordinary conditions will only hinder her eudaimonia, both because it will cause death to occur 
before the agent is ready to be benefitted (Phd. 67a; Phdr. 242d-243a) and because it will be 
impermissible and vicious (cf. Phd. 62c).  If we grant that acting virtuously is required to obtain 
eudaimonia, committing suicide impermissibly could never help the agent achieve eudaimonia.  
In Chapter 3, “The Suicidal Philosopher: Plato’s Socrates,” I consider what role Plato 
thinks Socrates played in his own death.  Citing the Phaedo’s prohibition against suicide and 
Socrates’ devotion to justice, many scholars claim Socrates could neither have been responsible 
for nor have intended his own death, and therefore his death could not be a suicide.20  This is no 
mere semantic quibble about the word “suicide.”  Rather, the question turns on Plato's account of 
                                                          
18  The assumption is supported by several Platonic texts, including Charm., 171e-172a, Crit. 48b, Grg. 507b-
c, and Rep. I.352e-354a. 
19  The argument picks up on some of Kant’s arguments against suicide, in particular this claim: “[Suicide] 
transcends all limits on the use of free choice, for the latter is only possible insofar as the subject exists” (Lectures 
27:370). 
20  See, especially, Brickhouse & Smith (1989), Burger (1984), Geddes (1885), and Woozley (1979). 
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responsible and intentional action.  On this account, I argue, Socrates is responsible for killing 
himself.   
I first provide an account of Plato’s view of responsibility as it appears in the Phaedo and 
is more thoroughly presented in the Gorgias.  Then I apply those views to the question of who is 
responsible for Socrates’ death, by Plato’s lights.  I use evidence from the Phaedo (98e-99a) to 
show that Plato thinks the city and Socrates share joint responsibility for Socrates’ death, because 
both agents share the goal that Socrates die.21 
This discussion opens the second question of whether Plato thinks Socrates intended his 
death.  Drawing on the Gorgias (468b), I argue that Plato recognizes instances when an agent has 
joint intentions, and that Socrates has joint intentions.  He kills himself because justice requires it.  
But he also kills himself because he simultaneously wants to die. Thus he intends to die, and he 
commits suicide. 
 
  
                                                          
21  For this chapter, I am indebted to modern discussions of responsibility and shared intention, especially 
Bratman (1999: 93-141) and (2014).  See also, Gilbert (2008: 483–514) and (2009: 167-187), Velleman (2000: 200-
220). 
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Note to Readers 
 
My goal in this dissertation is to understand Plato’s thoughts on suicide throughout his 
career while presenting an A) maximally charitable and B) consistent view that C) illuminates and 
coheres with other of Plato’s views on the value of life.  Naturally, this goal requires making 
assumptions about his texts.   
Scholars often divide the Platonic dialogues into groups on the basis of a presumed order 
of their composition (viz. into “early,” “middle,” and “late” periods), and then use this proposed 
order to track developments in Plato’s views.  The attempt to so organize Plato’s compositions is 
complicated by the fact that some scholars mark “transitional” works between the proposed 
periods.22  Moreover, scholars are not in perfect agreement about which dialogues belong to which 
groups.23   
Since very little of what I argue rests on any particular order of Plato’s dialogues, I do not 
pay special attention to it except in one case.  Insofar as Plato only explicitly addresses suicide in 
two texts, the Laws and the Phaedo, I consider how those two texts cohere.  Most scholars believe 
that the Laws was Plato’s final composition,24 and some scholars have indicated that that later text 
appears to disagree with the Phaedo’s earlier account of suicide.25  I argue in Chapter 1 of this 
dissertation that the Laws and the Phaedo provide a consistent set of Plato’s views, regardless of 
whether or not they were written at different points in Plato’s career.   
                                                          
22  Vlastos (1991: 46-47). 
23  See Cooper (1997: xii) for a discussion, although Cooper himself does not hold to this division.  The belief 
that there even is a division between these groups has been undermined by recent scholarship.  See Thesleff (1982 and 
1989), Howland (1991), and Nails (1995). 
24  The text is rougher than Plato’s other dialogues, suggesting that Plato left it unfinished when he died.  
Diogenes Laërtius suggests that Plato left the Laws unpublished when he died, since he claims that the text was left 
inscribed on “wax tablets.”  Inscribing on wax tablets was normal for drafting texts in the ancient world (III.37).  
However, this might not indicate that the Laws was Plato’s last composition as much as it indicates that Plato simply 
did not think it was yet publishable.   
25  See especially Cooper (521) and Geddes (224, n. 2). 
  
xviii 
 
Another concern stems from the fact that Plato never wrote in his own voice.  Rather, he 
wrote through the medium of dialogues, a philosophical drama in which several characters have 
points to contribute.  As a result, it is difficult to say what Plato’s views are.  Scholars often locate 
Plato’s voice in that of an authoritative speaker (e.g., “Socrates” in many dialogues, the “Stranger” 
in the Laws26).  The view goes back to antiquity,27 but recent scholarship has become suspicious 
of the view.28  
I assume that it is necessary to keep the dialogues’ artistic medium in mind.  However, the 
fact remains that it is Plato as author, rather than the characters he creates in his dialogues, who is 
reaching out to us as readers.  So when we consider a character in a Platonic dialogue, we do not 
only consider what that character is saying, but also what Plato as author is trying to have us think 
through what he has his characters do.  In this dissertation, I try to construct plausible Platonic 
views and see how those views fit together.  Because these views are expressed through characters 
in a drama, we cannot know for certain that they are Plato’s views.  However, I assume that their 
inclusion informs us that they are views Plato took seriously, and it is at least possible that Plato 
endorsed them.   
 All translations of ancient texts from the Greek and Latin are my own unless otherwise 
indicated.  For Platonic texts, I used the new OCT (Duke et al., eds.).  For the Phaedo, I consulted 
both Strachan’s text in the new OCT and Burnet’s text in the old OCT. 
                                                          
26  The Athenian Stranger is never named in the Laws.  Pangle (1988: 511–512n.2) notes speculation about who 
he is.  Cicero (Lg. I.5.15) thinks the Stranger represents Plato, while Aristotle (Pol. II.1265a) thinks it is Socrates.   
27  Aristotle suggests Plato’s views were positions taken by Socrates or the leading speakers in the dialogues.  
These passages are discussed in Cherniss (1944).  Diogenes Laërtius wrote that Plato’s views are expounded by four 
persons – Socrates, Timaeus, the Athenian Stranger, and the Eleatic Stranger.  He writes: “Even when Socrates and 
Timaeus are the speakers, it is Plato’s doctrines that are laid down” (III.52).   
28  For an overview of developments in Platonic scholarship about this matter, see Press, ed. (2000). 
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 Readers familiar with Ancient Greek may wonder at my using the term “suicide” so freely.  
For one thing, the language does not have a single exclusive word meaning “suicide,” but instead 
makes do with a series of euphemisms and expressions denoting the action.  For another, the 
concept of “suicide” itself may be open to any number of possible interpretations.  I avoid the latter 
issue entirely, since I bypass semantic entanglements regarding whether this or that action counts 
as “suicide.”  Let the following suffice for a definition: “suicide” is “intentional self-killing.”  This 
definition should remain uncontested.  It recognizes the principal point that suicide must be an 
intentional action.  It also excludes cases of accidental self-killing, such as when a person fatally 
electrocutes herself by touching a live wire that she erroneously assumes is dead.  However, some 
questions will remain regarding whether this or that self-killing is truly “intentional.”  I address 
such a case in Chapter 3.  
The former concern is not nearly so problematic.  Even English did not include a word for 
suicide until fairly recently in its history, and instead used a number of phrases and euphemisms 
to denote an action of intentional self-killing.29  Ancient Greek likewise refers to the action with 
an extensive list of phrases and euphemisms.30  
Plato’s own language choices for the action are largely unambiguous, and include the 
following: “to kill oneself” (“ἑαυτον . . . κτείνῃ” in Laws IX.873c3-4, and “αὑτὸν ἀποκτεινύναι” 
in Phd. 62c7, cf. c2-3, 61e6), and a couple that refer more obliquely to “leaving, setting oneself 
free from” or “running from” life (“ἀπαλάττου τοῦ βίου” in Laws IX.854c5-6, and “ἑαυτὸν ἐκ 
ταύτης λύειν οὐδ’ ἀποδιδράσκειν” in Phd. 62b5).  Plato also refers to doing violence against 
                                                          
29  The word “suicide” in English apparently dates from the 1650s, while the explicit definition of “one who 
kills oneself deliberately” dates from 1728.  On this, see Battin (1993), Cholbi, and Cooper. 
30  The most familiar of these is the word ἐξαγωγή used by the Stoics, which literally means “exit” or “going 
out.”  The word is typical of Greek words denoting suicidal action in that it is not exclusive for suicide, but also refers 
to an actor’s leaving the stage in the theatre.  Anton J. L. van Hooff provides a lengthy list of the many expressions 
ancient Greeks and Romans used to refer to suicide (243-250).   
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oneself (βιάσεται αὑτόν, Phd. 61c10), a phrase which may refer to any instance of self-harm, and 
not only killing.  I have translated the texts literally to make clear where this occurs. 
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“Say these things to Evenus, Cebes: bid him farewell, and tell him, 
if he is wise, to follow me as quickly as possible.” 
 
ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Κέβης, Εὐήνῳ φράζε, καὶ ἐρρῶσθαι καί, ἂν σωφρονῇ, 
ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα.  
 
– Plato, Phaedo 61b
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Chapter 1 
 
As the God Leads: 
The Ethics of Platonic Suicide 
 
1.1 The Question 
 
In the Phaedo’s final pages, Plato portrays Socrates’ death as a suicide.  The evidence for 
my claim is substantial.  Plato shows Socrates taking the cup of fatal poison (117c), after having 
already refused the opportunity to escape prison and death (98e-99a; cf. Crit. 54d-e) and 
announced that he wants to die (Phd. 63b-c; cf. Ap. 40c ff.).  He then drinks the poison, requiring 
neither restraints (Phd. 116c), nor to be told to drink a second time (116e-117a).  In the most telling 
evidence, Plato has even had Socrates characterize his imminent death as a suicide.  Socrates says 
that suicide is impermissible (οὐ . . . θεμιτόν, 61c10) except when “a god sends some necessity, 
such as the case that has now come before us.”1  The fact that Socrates refers to his own case as 
one for which a god provides necessity shows he views it as a suicide requiring such permission.   
The thesis that Plato presents Socrates’ death as a suicide is puzzling for an ethical reason.2  
In both texts where Plato discusses suicide, the Phaedo and the Laws, the action is said to be 
vicious and generally incompatible with living a virtuous life (Phd. 62c; Laws IX.873c).  Yet the 
final words Plato writes in the Phaedo characterize Socrates as especially just (δικαιότατος, 118a).  
                                                          
1  πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἡμῖν παροῦσαν (Phd. 62c7-9).  Recognizing Socrates’ 
death as suicide has the additional benefit of eliminating the worry that Socrates’ introduction of suicide in the Phaedo 
is outside the dialogue’s interests.  See Archer-Hind (1894: 9).  If Socrates’ death is suicide, the introduction of suicide 
in the dialogue makes sense.  Socrates will be most interested in ascertaining that his own death is permissible. 
2  Socrates’ suicide is also puzzling for pragmatic reasons.  In particular, we may wonder 1) how Socrates could 
be wise if he committed suicide, and 2) how Socrates could possibly have been responsible for his death or intended 
to die, given that his death also occurred at the city’s behest.  I address these other concerns about Socrates’ suicide 
in subsequent chapters of this dissertation. 
  
3 
 
Thus, if Plato thinks Socrates committed suicide, Plato must also think that Socrates’ suicide is 
permissible, that is, consistent with Socrates’ being just.  As we have seen, Plato has had Socrates 
himself suggest that his suicide is exculpated (62c).  But can this assessment be correct?   
To answer this question, we must first determine what Plato’s account of suicide3 is.  This 
task would comprise a worthy endeavor on its own.  For, as some scholars have noted, Plato’s two 
texts appear to disagree about the grounds for the prohibition and the conditions of permissible 
suicide.4  Plato expresses his reasons in religious terms in the Phaedo, but on legal grounds in the 
Laws.  He also appears to endorse a much broader set of permissive conditions in the Laws than 
he does in the Phaedo.5  How, then, are we to have a coherent account of Plato’s view of suicide 
so that Socrates’ suicide can consistently count as permissible?   
In this chapter, I argue that Plato has a consistent account of suicide, one that also permits 
Socrates’ suicide.  After explicating the key texts (Sections 1.2 and 1.3), I show that the same 
theological and philosophical grounds prohibiting suicide can be found in both texts (Section 1.4), 
and that the Phaedo’s condition is broad enough to include the Laws’ longer list of conditions 
(Section 1.5).  Finally, I show how Plato can consistently hold Socrates as a permissible suicide 
by both the Phaedo’s and the Laws’ reasons (Sections 1.6 and 1.7). 
 
                                                          
3  Although ancient Greeks did not have a single word that can be translated “suicide,” the concept of killing 
oneself was anything but unknown to them, as seen by the wealth of expressions they used to talk about self-killing 
(van Hoof [2000: 243-246]; Cooper [1999: 515]).  Plato makes do with several expressions for the act, including 
various phrases interpreted “to kill oneself” (ἑαυτον . . . κτείνῃ, Laws IX.873c3-4; αὑτὸν ἀποκτεινύναι, Phd. 62c7, cf. 
c2-3, 61e6), and a couple that euphemistically refer to “leaving” or “setting oneself free from” life (ἀπαλάττου τοῦ 
βίου, Laws IX.854c5-6; ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ’ ἀποδιδράσκειν, Phd. 62b5).   
4  For scholars who raise this puzzle, see Burnet (1911: 24); Cooper (1999); Frey (1978); Geddes (1885: 224, 
n. 2); Rowe (1993: 130); and Woozley (1979: 58). 
5  Suicide in order to avoid doing injustice (Laws IX.854a), under state command, under extreme misfortune, 
and from extreme disgrace (873c), compared to the Phaedo’s single exception, when “a god sends some necessity” 
(πρὶν ἂν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, Phd. 62c).   
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1.2 The Phaedo’s Religious Prohibition 
 
In the Phaedo, Plato has Socrates express sympathy for a blanket prohibition against 
suicide on the grounds that committing suicide is not right (θεμιτόν, 61c10).  He attempts to explain 
this condemnation by using two analogies and providing one exception to the prohibition. 
 The first analogy is that, just as condemned prisoners are not allowed to leave their 
imprisonment, so human beings are not allowed to leave their bodies. 
“So this explanation is said about these things in secret: that we human beings are 
in some prison, and that one must neither free oneself nor escape from this prison.  
And this explanation seems to me to be something both great and not easy to 
understand” (62b2-6).6 
 
A condemned prisoner cannot rightly leave jail until a lawful authority releases her.  Any other 
escape involves unjust evasion of punishment.  So, fleeing prison without permission is unjust.  
Analogously, we can say that human beings are imprisoned in their bodies, and they cannot leave 
until they are permissibly released.7  Suicide is wrong for the same reasons that a convict’s 
escaping prison is wrong.  It involves unjustly evading incarceration.8   
 Socrates calls the argument against suicide “great” or “important” (μέγας, 62b5), which 
may suggest that it merits approval.9  However, he does not adopt the argument on its own as the 
                                                          
6  ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ 
ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ᾽ ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιος διιδεῖν: 
7  The Cratylus advances a similar notion of the soul’s imprisonment in the body, claiming that “the body is an 
enclosure or prison in which the soul is securely kept” (400c, Reeve’s translation).  Note, however, that the word used 
in the Cratylus, δεσμωτήριον, is not the same as the Phaedo’s φρουρά.   
8  Commentators have noted that φρουρά, which I have translated “prison,” is ambiguous, and may mean 
“prison” or “guard-post.  See Burger (1984: 32); Cooper (522); Rowe (128).  The fact that the Phaedo takes place in 
prison makes the former more likely, and the Cratylus reinforces that belief (400c; see previous note).  But whatever 
definition we take will not much affect how the argument is supposed to function.  If we take “guard-post,” the 
argument means humans are stationed as soldiers on duty, and cannot leave their posts.  One might prefer this reading 
because Plato has Socrates speak about maintaining his post (Ap. 28d-e; Crit. 51b-c).  Leaving one’s post is unjust 
evasion of duty (Crit. 51c; Laws IX.854c).  Either way we interpret the passage, suicide is prohibited as unjust.   
9  The statement may also suggest that Socrates is being tongue in cheek or ironical.  However, I think from 
what follows in the text that we are to think Socrates approves of the explanation.  He simply realizes that that more 
needs to be said to unpack that explanation.  After all, he does not condemn the view, but merely says it is difficult to 
understand.   
  
5 
 
definitive word on suicide.  Instead, he says the analogy is “not easy to understand” (οὐ ῥᾴδιος 
διιδεῖν, 62b6), and moves on to provide a second analogy.  The obvious reason for this abrupt shift 
is that the first analogy has left too much unexplained.10  If the analogy is correct that humans are 
held as prisoners in their own bodies, then we should have several significant questions.  The 
questions include: 
1) Why are we imprisoned? 
2) What obligation do we have to remain imprisoned? 
3) Who (or what) enforces that imprisonment? 
4) What constitutes permissible release? 11 
The way Socrates has articulated the analogy leaves these questions open, which would 
certainly explain why the argument could be difficult to understand.  Of course, we could 
reconstruct reasons to make passable responses to some of these questions.  A similar argument in 
Plato’s Cratylus suggests an answer to the first question, asserting that a human’s imprisonment 
in her body is punishment for some ethical failing she had in a previous life (400c).12  Under this 
interpretation, a human being’s imprisonment in her body will be punishment for misdeeds she 
performed in a previous life.  Virtuous persons will be freed from their earthly bodies “as from a 
prison” when they die (echoing a sentiment in Phd. 114c).  However, this explanation still says 
nothing about who or what punishes humans with imprisonment.  It is unclear how suicide could 
possibly be unjust without that enforcing authority – someone against whom committing suicide 
is an injustice.   
                                                          
10  In this response, I concur with Warren (2001). 
11  Similar worries beset the alternate interpretation of φρουρά, “guard-post”: 1) What are we guarding? 2) Why 
are we obligated to remain at our post? 3) Who (or what) requires us to remain at that post?  4) How can we be freed 
from that duty? 
12  Hackforth appears to suggest this as a possible interpretation (1955: 38).  
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More troubling is that this prohibition does not do anything to explain Socrates’ death.  It 
does not mention how an individual could be granted release, and it contains no exception to the 
prohibition.  If a person’s primary duty is not to run away from the prison of life, then every person 
should do all she can to remain in that position and to evade death.  She should certainly never 
commit suicide.  But if this is the case, we should expect Socrates to have fled his Athenian prison 
cell at Crito’s behest (Crit. 45e-46a; Phd. 98e-99a), rather than remain to drink the poison and 
die.13  A better explanation for the prohibition is needed – one that will provide enforcement and, 
at the same time, explain the permissibility of Socrates’ own death. 
Socrates is aware that the first analogy has left many questions unanswered, so he provides 
a second analogy to fill in the gaps.   
 “However, Cebes, this seems to me to be well said, that the gods are our care-takers 
and we human beings are among the gods’ possessions.  Or does it not seem so to 
you?” “Indeed,” said Cebes.  “And so, would you not be angry if one of your 
possessions were to kill himself, when you had not signified that you wished him 
to die, and if you had some punishment you could exact, you would exact it?” 
“Absolutely!” he said.  “Then perhaps because of this it is not unreasonable to say 
that a person must not kill himself until a god sends some necessity upon him, such 
as the one that has now come before us” (62b6-c9).14 
 
The analogy assumes that humans are the gods’ property and that the gods care for their human 
property.  Socrates asks his interlocutor, Cebes, if he would be angry if one of his slaves were to 
kill himself without Cebes’ permission.  Cebes agrees, and swears he would punish his slave if he 
could.  Socrates analogizes that the gods would likewise be angry with their human possessions if 
                                                          
13  Which he did.  See Crit. 54e; Phd. 98e-99a, 117c ff.   
14  οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς 
τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἓν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι. ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως; ἔμοιγε, φησὶν ὁ Κέβης. οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, καὶ 
σὺ ἂν τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων εἴ τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἀποκτεινύοι, μὴ σημήναντός σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνοις 
ἂν αὐτῷ καί, εἴ τινα ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖο ἄν; πάνυ γ᾽, ἔφη. ἴσως τοίνυν ταύτῃ οὐκ ἄλογον μὴ πρότερον αὑτὸν 
ἀποκτεινύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἡμῖν παροῦσαν. 
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they were to kill themselves without the gods’ permission.  The gods might exact retribution, 
presumably by punishing the suicide in the afterlife (62b7-c9).15   
The analogy discourages suicide on pragmatic and ethical grounds.  If a person believes 
that the gods will punish her, she will have a strong disincentive against committing suicide.  Later, 
we are told that the gods are “good” caretakers of humanity (63b), which provides additional 
deterrent.  No one should sensibly want to leave the good situation they have under the gods’ 
guardianship.  Suicide would be irrational, because it would entail the agent’s willfully leaving 
such a happy condition.  Moreover, since relations between gods and humans resemble relations 
between human masters and their slaves, stealing one’s life from the gods would be vicious.  It 
would be unjust in the same way that stealing a fellow human’s property is unjust, and impious 
because one commits the theft against the gods.   
This second analogy builds on the foundation provided by the first.  Like the first, this 
second analogy grounds a prohibition against suicide in the claim that suicide is vicious.  But the 
argument adds additional practical discouragement (viz., the threat of divine retribution and the 
idiocy of fleeing the gods’ good care), and an explicit appeal to an enforcing authority (the gods).  
However, while the first analogy is silent about the possibility that some suicides may be 
permissible, the second analogy leaves the possibility available.16  Plato has Socrates state that 
Cebes will be angry with his slave for committing suicide only if Cebes has not given some sign 
to the slave that he wishes him to die.  So, if Cebes signifies that he wants his slave to die, the 
slave may kill himself without angering Cebes.  In the same way, a human may also kill herself if 
a god gives her some sign of necessity to die (61c6-9).  Thus, unlike the previous analogy, this 
                                                          
15  No specific punishments are related for impermissible suicides in the Phaedo’s closing myth, although they 
would likely have been included among “wrongful acts of killing” (113e, cf. Rep. X.615c), and punished accordingly.  
16  Contra Geddes, who claims the Phaedo is “a condemnation of suicide in every circumstance and form” (224).  
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second analogy allows an exception to the prohibition, and it is the only exception that makes 
sense given the gods’ commands.  Suicide cannot be a crime against the gods when a god allows 
it.17   
The text is largely silent about what the sign indicating divine necessity to die is, but 
Socrates provides one example: “the one that has now come before us” (τὴν νῦν ἡμῖν παροῦσαν, 
62c9), that is, Socrates’ case.  The act that a person must not perform without divine necessity is 
kill himself.  So, when Plato has Socrates indicate that the case before them is one for which god 
has provided some necessity, Plato has Socrates characterize his death as suicide.18  Moreover, it 
is clear that Socrates thinks his suicide is permissible.  We will consider later how Socrates’ suicide 
fulfills that condition.19  
 
1.3 The Laws’ Legal Prohibition 
 
The arguments presented about suicide in the Laws appear very different from those in the 
Phaedo.  The first striking difference is that the Laws’ arguments are provided in the form of legal 
codes rather than enigmatic analogies.  Plato’s Athenian Stranger20 says that the most serious 
crimes a human can commit are “impious deeds destructive to the state’s condition” (IX.854c6-
7).21  Suicide is among these crimes because it constitutes the worst kind of murder.22  As such, 
                                                          
17  This assumes that the gods are good and just, as Plato has Socrates claim (Phd. 63b).  They cannot be the 
fickle deities of the Greek pantheon, who appear to revel in creating paradoxical situations for humans to address. 
18  Gallop (1975: 85) provides a similar interpretation. 
19  See below, Section 1.6. 
20  The Athenian Stranger is never named in the Laws.  Pangle (1988: 511-512, n.2) notes speculation about who 
he is.  The debate was active even in Antiquity.  Cicero (Lg. I.5.15) thinks the Stranger represents Plato, while Aristotle 
(Pol. II.1265a) thinks it is Socrates. 
21  ἀνόσια ἔργα καὶ πολιτοφθόρα - The exact range of crimes under this heading is unclear, though the list 
definitely includes temple robbery, treason, and murder (854a).   
22  Suicide is listed among murderous crimes after (in order of appearance) accidental killings, non-accidental 
killings, murders of slaves, murders of fellow citizens, and murders of kin.  Notice that the severity of the crime seems 
to increase as the list continues.  Suicide’s placement as last on the list suggests it may be considered the worst of the 
murder cases.  Consider, also, IX.873c, where it is said that suicide kills one’s own “nearest and dearest.”   
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the action must be punished by dishonorable burial: the suicide’s corpse is buried alone, in 
deserted, nameless places, without headstone or other marker (873d).23   From the ancient 
perspective, the penalty was significant because it involved symbolically severing all connections 
between the suicide agent and her state and kin.  Such burial constituted a kind of posthumous 
exile.24   
It will strike many people as strange that the Laws prohibits suicide as a crime against the 
state.25  In contemporary ethics, we tend to think that suicide is a personal choice, one completely 
up to an individual.26  We do not often consider that suicide can have far-ranging effects on society 
as a whole.  As a result, we might wonder how a person’s autonomous choice to kill herself could 
possibly be considered harmful to the state. 
Although Plato does not directly address this concern, the text offers clues for an 
explanation.  Consider the following passage: 
“I mean the fellow who kills himself, robbing himself of his allotted part in life, 
when it is not legally ordered by the state, when he is not forced to it by the 
occurrence of an excruciating and unavoidable misfortune, when he has not fallen 
into some irremediable and unbearable disgrace, and imposes this unjust judgment 
on himself in laziness and in unmanly cowardice” (IX.873c2-8).27 
 
Plato has the Stranger clarify what he means by impermissible self-killing.  The Stranger says the 
person who kills himself imposes an “unjust judgement on himself.”  The qualification is 
illuminating, for it suggests that the suicide agent judges himself worthy of death.  Normally, we 
would only encounter such language in a legal context when the state condemns a person to death.  
                                                          
23  Such penalties as exclusion from burial were common for suicide in the ancient world.  Aeschines (Contr. 
Ctesiph. 88, 38) notes an Athenian law that the hand of the suicide was to be buried apart from the body it had slain.  
24  Morrow (1960: 492).  The Laws also refuses burial on native soil to temple robbers, traitors, and murderers 
of kin.  See IX.854e-855a, 856b, 856e-857a, 873a-b.   
25  Aristotle expresses a similar sentiment, E.N. V.8. 
26  This view is common, but see Battin (1993: 193); Cholbi (2011: 88-89); Seneca (Ep. LXX, LXXVII). 
27  λέγω δὲ ὃς ἑαυτὸν κτείνῃ, τὴν τῆς εἱμαρμένης βίᾳ ἀποστερῶν μοῖραν, μήτε πόλεως ταξάσης δίκῃ, μήτε 
περιωδύνῳ ἀφύκτῳ προσπεσούσῃ τύχῃ ἀναγκασθείς, μηδὲ αἰσχύνης τινὸς ἀπόρου καὶ ἀβίου μεταλαχών, ἀργίᾳ δὲ καὶ 
ἀνανδρίας δειλίᾳ ἑαυτῷ δίκην ἄδικον ἐπιθῇ. 
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The phrasing here indicates that when the individual, instead of the state, takes it upon himself to 
provide self-condemnation and execution, he acts unjustly.   
The passage does not specify why such an action is unjust.  However, a reasonable 
assumption is that it is because only the city has the authority to pronounce the death sentence 
upon its citizens.28  Plato finds rational order for society in law.  Law makes it possible for human 
beings to live together and to achieve their common good (IV.715e-716a, IX.875a-b).  Much of 
the surrounding context in Laws IX makes it clear that law governs even the execution of citizens 
(854e-855c, 869c, 874b).29  Thus, if an individual commits suicide, she has done what only the 
state and its appointed courts should be allowed to do.  She has executed herself and, since 
execution only justly occurs under the state’s authority, she has killed herself unjustly.  So the act 
undermines the state’s authority, which in turn undermines the state’s law and order.   
This point suggests another way that Plato may think suicide harms the state.  In the Laws, 
the Stranger repeatedly emphasizes that the goal of legislation is to promote virtue in citizens 
(I.630d-631a; VI.770c-d).30  But the Stranger remarks that the suicide agent treats himself and the 
state unjustly, and exhibits laziness and cowardice.31  So suicide is vicious.  For this reason, suicide 
can be seen as at odds with the state’s goal to promote virtue in its citizens.  If so, it is no wonder 
that suicide is categorized as a crime against the state. 
Nevertheless, the Laws’ prohibition against suicide is not absolute.  Plato has the Stranger 
list four exceptions to the prohibition.  The passage above shows that suicide is permissible when 
                                                          
28  Cooper (525) agrees with this view.   
29  See Morrow (267-270) for the importance of legal proceedings in Plato’s Laws.  
30  For discussion, see Annas in Bobonich, ed. (2010: 71-91); Stalley (1983: 35-37).  Of course, a puzzle exists 
about how legislated virtue can really constitute “virtue.”  For an argument to that effect, see Hunt (2014). 
31  Presumably, if a person kills herself merely to avoid a difficult situation, she has demonstrated a reprehensible 
tendency to flee life’s difficulties rather than try to address them.  Elsewhere, Plato has Socrates remark that cowards 
are unsuited to philosophy (Rep. VI.486b; cf. V.467a).  The Laws suggests that laziness is linked with cowardice 
(X.900e).  The view that suicide exhibits cowardice is not unique to Plato.  See Aristotle, E.N. 1116a13-15.   
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the city commands it, or when an individual suffers extreme misfortune or disgrace.  Elsewhere, 
and for a different case, suicide is not only permitted, it is prescribed.  Plato has the Stranger ask 
us to consider a fellow who is constantly driven to commit a heinously vicious act, such as temple 
robbery (854a).32  Those persons are admonished to try to rid themselves of their desires to commit 
such crimes (854b) and to try to purify themselves by performing mystic rites, worshipping the 
gods, and emulating virtuous people.  If these activities fail to eliminate their vicious desires, they 
are told that death is the preferable alternative: “Looking at death as nobler, rid yourself of life” 
(854c).33  The passage suggests that suicide is justified – even recommended – when a person’s 
character is so irremediably bad that she cannot overcome the impulse to commit vicious deeds.  
Her death, the Stranger remarks, is preferable both for the individual and the state.34 
 
1.4 The Consistent Grounds for Prohibiting Suicide 
 
Scholars have been puzzled about how to obtain a consistent account of Plato’s views on 
suicide.35  We have seen that the Phaedo maintains a general religious prohibition on the grounds 
                                                          
32  We have no reason to think that the following account applies only to actual deed specified in the passage, 
temple robbery.  Other instantiations of what Laws IX calls the most serious crimes will apply just as well (853a; 
854a).  The Stranger goes on to discuss treason and murder.  Temple robbery is simply his first order of business.   
33  καλλίω θάνατον σκεψάμενος ἀπαλλάττου τοῦ βίου. 
34  See Chapter 2 for a discussion of how the act may benefit both the individual and the state.  It may be 
questioned how this case relates to the Phaedo.  The Phaedo prohibits suicide as theft from the gods, while this passage 
in the Laws recommends self-killing rather than stealing a holy object from the gods.   But isn’t this just comparing 
apples to apples – theft from gods to avoid theft from gods?  The answer lies in the Stranger’s claim that it is the best 
thing for people driven to commit evil actions if they cease to live – best for society, but also “best even for themselves” 
(IX.862e-863a).   The Stranger says that such persons are “beyond cure.”  Note that, in the event that the individual is 
unable to expunge her base desires, she will likely succumb to her urge to commit a crime that requires her execution 
(854e).  Presumably, stealing a holy object from the gods and then getting executed would be worse for her than 
simply taking herself from the gods by executing herself.  If “A” is bad and “B” is bad, “A + B” will most assuredly 
be worse than “A.”  But I think it is also likely that something about the individual’s desire to rid herself of her 
incessant vicious temptations by any means necessary could exculpate her suicide.  I discuss this more in Chapter 2. 
35  The puzzle is noted in Burnet (1911: 24); Cooper (1999); Frey (1978); Geddes (1885: 224, n. 2); Rowe (1993: 
130); and Woozley (58).  Only Cooper and Geddes devote much attention to solving the puzzle.  Geddes thinks that 
the Phaedo presents the basic ethical grounds of a prohibition, while the Laws presents the legal enforcement behind 
that prohibition.  However, his solution oversimplifies the issue.  The Laws does not merely provide the means to 
enforce a prohibition against suicide.  The dialogue also has plenty of its own to say about why suicide is wrong, and 
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that suicide is irrational, impious, and unjust.  Suicide is permitted only when a god grants some 
necessity (62c).  But the Laws’ grounds for a prohibition are phrased in legal rather than theological 
terms (IX.873c-d).  The Laws also appears to endorse more permissions to suicide than the Phaedo, 
excusing suicide in four circumstances compared to the Phaedo’s single case.  How, then, are we 
to reconcile the texts?  
In what follows, I argue that Plato’s account in the Laws is consistent with that he expresses 
in the Phaedo.  The same theological and philosophical grounds prohibiting suicide are found in 
both texts, and the Laws’ exceptions to the prohibition can be viewed as more explicit conditions 
of the Phaedo’s “necessity from god.”36 
To make this case, it is necessary first to understand something of how Plato treats the gods 
in the Laws.  The first word in the Laws is “god” (θεός, I.624a1), and the question establishing the 
dialogue’s whole premise is whether law comes from a god or humankind (I.624a1-3).  The 
existence and nature of the gods thus has central importance in the dialogue.  Even as he begins 
founding the city of Magnesia, the Stranger prays to a god to “attend the foundation of the state” 
and help to settle the laws in the best way (IV.712b).  He claims that “a god controls everything, 
and chance and occasion cooperate with god in guiding human things” (IV.709b).  The details are 
left vague.37  He does not clarify which god this is, or how that god controls all human things.  
                                                          
one may worry (as Cooper does) whether the reasons provided in the texts are consistent.  Cooper is sympathetic to 
the notion that the Phaedo represents Pythagorean views of suicide while the Laws represents Plato’s own views (521-
522).  But this interpretation is undermined by the textual evidence.  Plato has Socrates provide positive affirmation 
for the views expressed in the Phaedo by calling the first analogy “great” (μέγας, 62b5) and the second analogy “well 
said” (εὖ λέγεσθαι, 62b7-8).  So it is at least possible that Plato endorses both the Pythagorean views Socrates touts in 
the Phaedo and the views the Stranger expresses in the Laws.   
36  Note that people in Antiquity would have had no trouble conceiving that theological grounds and legal 
grounds could constitute the same thing.  Contemporary scholars’ concerns about the grounds of Plato’s prohibition 
may be a modern conceit, influenced by history and the genuine concern to keep government and religion separate in 
a free society.   
37  This vagueness is perhaps intentional.  See Mayhew (2010). 
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Even so, he makes it clear that the deity is intimately connected with the city’s foundation and its 
laws. 
The “Myth of Kronos” in Book IV helps show how the god and the city’s laws can be 
interrelated. 
“Kronos knew, as we have explained, that human nature is never able to take 
control of all human affairs without being filled with pride and injustice.  So, 
thinking on this, he set up then kings and rulers for our cities – not men, but beings 
godlike and superior: spirits.  We do the same now for our sheep and other 
domesticated animals.  We don’t put cattle as rulers over cattle, or goats over goats, 
but we control them ourselves, because we are a better species than they are.  And 
so the god, who is a friend to humanity, did the same.  He put over us spirits who 
were better than we, who ruled in a way that provided much ease for them and for 
us, caring for us, providing peace and respect, good laws, and justice to the full, 
and a state of happiness and harmony among all peoples.  And now what this 
account means, using truth, is that wherever the ruler of a city is not a god but a 
mortal, there is no rest for people from evils and labors.  But it is necessary for us 
to imitate in every way what life was said to be like under Kronos; and in obedience 
to whatever in us partakes of immortality, we should run our public and private life, 
our homes and cities, and dignify the edict of reason by naming it ‘law’ ” (IV.713c-
714a).38  
 
In brief, the myth professes that in the past, the god Kronos, out of concern for humankind, set 
benevolent rulers over humanity.  Under Kronos’ divine law and guardianship, humanity 
flourished.  Recognizing this good history, humans now should live under law.   
Two other Platonic dialogues also refer to the myth of Kronos, and what they say about the 
myth may help to illuminate its use in the Laws.  The Cratylus provides the etymology of the name 
                                                          
38  γιγνώσκων ὁ Κρόνος ἄρα, καθάπερ ἡμεῖς διεληλύθαμεν, ὡς ἀνθρωπεία φύσις οὐδεμία ἱκανὴ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα 
διοικοῦσα αὐτοκράτωρ πάντα, μὴ οὐχ ὕβρεώς τε καὶ ἀδικίας μεστοῦσθαι, ταῦτ᾽ οὖν διανοούμενος ἐφίστη τότε 
βασιλέας τε καὶ ἄρχοντας ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡμῶν, οὐκ ἀνθρώπους ἀλλὰ γένους θειοτέρου τε καὶ ἀμείνονος, δαίμονας, οἷον 
νῦν ἡμεῖς δρῶμεν τοῖς ποιμνίοις καὶ ὅσων ἥμεροί εἰσιν ἀγέλαι: οὐ βοῦς βοῶν οὐδὲ αἶγας αἰγῶν ἄρχοντας ποιοῦμεν 
αὐτοῖσί τινας, ἀλλ᾽ ἡμεῖς αὐτῶν δεσπόζομεν, ἄμεινον ἐκείνων γένος. ταὐτὸν δὴ καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἄρα καὶ φιλάνθρωπος ὤν, 
τὸ γένος ἄμεινον ἡμῶν ἐφίστη τὸ τῶν δαιμόνων, ὃ διὰ πολλῆς μὲν αὐτοῖς ῥᾳστώνης,  πολλῆς δ᾽ ἡμῖν, ἐπιμελούμενον 
ἡμῶν, εἰρήνην τε καὶ αἰδῶ καὶ εὐνομίαν καὶ ἀφθονίαν δίκης παρεχόμενον, ἀστασίαστα καὶ εὐδαίμονα τὰ τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων ἀπηργάζετο γένη. λέγει δὴ καὶ νῦν οὗτος ὁ λόγος, ἀληθείᾳ χρώμενος, ὡς ὅσων ἂν πόλεων μὴ θεὸς ἀλλά 
τις ἄρχῃ θνητός, οὐκ ἔστιν κακῶν αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ πόνων ἀνάφυξις: ἀλλὰ μιμεῖσθαι δεῖν ἡμᾶς οἴεται πάσῃ μηχανῇ τὸν ἐπὶ 
τοῦ Κρόνου λεγόμενον βίον, καὶ ὅσον ἐν ἡμῖν ἀθανασίας ἔνεστι, τούτῳ πειθομένους δημοσίᾳ καὶ ἰδίᾳ τάς τ᾽ οἰκήσεις 
καὶ τὰς πόλεις διοικεῖν, τὴν τοῦ νοῦ διανομὴν ἐπονομάζοντας νόμον.  
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“Kronos.”  “Kronos,” is said to derive from καθαρός (“pure”) and νοῦς (“reason”), and thus means 
“pure reason” (396b).  This etymology suggests a reason why Kronos’ rule could have been good 
for humanity, namely, that humans were ruled by a god who somehow embodied pure reason.  In 
the Statesman, the Eleatic Stranger’s presentation of the myth underscores this interpretation.  He 
says Kronos possessed the knowledge to rule justly and well, so his rule was characterized by 
perfect peace and prosperity (271e).  But now humans rule, and humans lack knowledge of the 
political art.  As a result, humans cannot rule as well as Kronos.  Humans must compensate for 
their innate imperfections by making written laws that imitate as well as possible the best rule that 
humanity had under Kronos (301e).  So legislators write laws with the goal to approximate the 
excellent life that humanity enjoyed under Kronos’ governance.  These laws are mere “imitations 
of the truth” (300b-c), and are thus inferior to Kronos’ divine rule.39 
If we take identities in the Cratylus to explain what is happening in the Laws, we will see 
that the Laws also holds that Kronos’ rule was good because humans were ruled by a god who 
somehow embodied pure reason.  Kronos could rule justly and well because he knew how to rule.  
The Athenian Stranger indicates that “law” (νόμος) is etymologically connected with reason 
(νοῦς).40  Accordingly, living under law is how humans may imitate Kronos’ good, rational divine 
rule, and how they may approximate the happy condition they had under Kronos’ governance.41  
Like the Statesman, the Laws frequently describes the arrangement of living under law as second-
best (793a, e, 807b, 875d).  But it is as close as human beings can come to the divine rule of 
Kronos.  The Laws’ use of the Kronos story thus establishes relationships between reason, divinity, 
                                                          
39  This interpretation of the Statesman’s myth agrees with Kahn (2009). 
40  Bobonich (2002: 94). 
41  Plato thinks humans should want to emulate Kronos’ good rule because their time under Kronos was good, 
peaceful, and happy.  See also Sedley (2003: 38, 91). 
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and law.  It implies that living under the rationally developed law is as close to living under a god’s 
rule as is humanly possible. 
This connection between divinity and law is reinforced soon after, when the Stranger 
proposes how he would address the new settlers of Magnesia.  He claims: 
“There is a god who holds in his hands the beginning and end and middle of all 
beings, who going about accomplishes immediacy in accordance with nature; and 
following him always is Justice – avenger of those who abandon the divine law – 
whom the one who is going to be successful (eudaimōn) follows in humility and 
orderliness” (IV.715e-716a).42  
 
A god is in charge of “all beings” (cf. X.891e).43  Justice is another god, following the first god, 
and she takes vengeance on transgressors against the divine law.  Since Justice can take vengeance 
on transgressors against “divine law,” it follows that a divine law must exist.  This law presumably 
owes its origin to the first god listed in the passage, the god who holds all beings.  So it appears 
that following the law is associated with following the gods.   
Plato later makes the link between following the laws and following the gods even more 
explicit, when he has the Stranger claim that “being a slave to the laws first is how to be a slave to 
the gods” (VI.762e).44  Considering the earlier passages that identify divinity with reason and law, 
this statement suggests two points.  First and most obviously, it suggests that following the law 
entails serving the gods.  A person cannot serve the gods when she transgresses the city’s law.  If 
Plato identifies service to the gods with piety (as at least one text might suggest, Euthyp. 12e-13a, 
13d), then following the laws will be pious, while not following the laws will be impious.45  
                                                          
42  ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ ’μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔχων, εὐθείᾳ 
περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος: τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ συνέπεται δίκη τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός, ἧς ὁ 
μὲν εὐδαιμονήσειν μέλλων ἐχόμενος συνέπεται.  
43  Cf. Mayhew (199-202). 
44  πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, ὡς ταύτην τοῖς θεοῖς οὖσαν δουλείαν.  I thank Nich Baima for pointing out this 
passage to me. 
45  This point also appears in another early dialogue, the Crito, suggesting that a link between piety and justice 
carries through Plato’s philosophical career.  In the Crito, Socrates relates that one’s relationship with the laws to 
one’s relationship with one’s parents.  If violence against one’s parents is unjust, then it is even more impious to do 
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Second, the passage suggests that, insofar as law manifests divine reason (from IV.714a), 
following law is also an exercise of reason.  An agent’s failure to obey the law will be irrational. 
The evidence suggests that when Plato has the Stranger establish Magnesia’s laws, he does 
not do so apart from theological considerations.  Just law, the law we want in a good society and 
that will promote the common good (IV.713c-714a), is divine law.46  This may mean only that the 
law originates in reason, but since reason itself is ultimately divine, the Stranger uses theological 
language.  A god rules if reason rules, and reason rules if the state employs just law (cf. VIII.835e).  
Individual mortals can be eudaimōn, and act rationally, piously, and justly only if they follow the 
just law originating in divine rule, that is, reason. 
Further evidence for these points exists even when the Stranger discusses injustice against 
the state.  He says that deeds that lead to the state’s destruction are impious (ἀνόσια, IX.854c6-7).  
Since the Stranger has identified law with divinity and reason, this otherwise obscure statement 
has an explanation.  The Stranger correlates injustice against the state with impiety because he 
thinks that breaking the city’s laws not only harms the city, but also disrespects the divinity who 
brought the city’s laws to be (viz., Justice and the god she follows, from IV.715e-716a).  Because 
the law is divine – or at least grounded in reason, which is something divine – it is possible to act 
against both the city and the deity together.  So, if a person commits injustice against the city, she 
also necessarily commits impiety against the deity.47  Any such act is also irrational, insofar as the 
act transgresses law, which is the manifestation of reason. 
                                                          
violence to one’s country: “but in war and in court and everywhere, you must do whatever the state, your country, 
commands, or must show her by persuasion what is really right, but that it is impious [οὐχ ὅσιον] to use violence 
against either your father or your mother, and much more impious to use it against your country” (51b-c). 
46  See Annas (2010: 89-91). 
47  See also Zuckert (2013: 176). 
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These considerations influence how we understand Plato’s account of suicide in the Laws.  
We will recall that Plato has the Stranger categorize suicide among the impious deeds that destroy 
the state’s condition (IX.854c ff.).  It follows that, when he prohibits suicide as unjust to the city, 
he also prohibits suicide as irrational and impious.  Any suicide that transgresses the law will be 
seen as not only harming the city, but also as offending the divinity who formulated the city’s law 
(IV.715e-716a).  Moreover, because law is grounded in reason, that particular suicide will also be 
irrational.  So, although it is never said outright that suicide is impious and irrational, suicide will 
be viewed as impious and irrational by default.  It will also constitute injustice against the gods, 
insofar as impiety involves treating the gods unjustly.   
Thus, the Laws’ prohibition against suicide is not merely legal, as it first appeared.  Once 
we recognize how the text identifies law with reason and divinity, we see that the Laws also 
prohibits suicide as irrational, and as unjust and impious against the gods.  These grounds are the 
same grounds that we see Plato employ in the Phaedo.  Thus, Plato’s two texts share the same 
grounds for prohibiting suicide. 
 
1.4.1 Objection 1 
 
It may be objected that even if the texts share the same grounds for the prohibition, the 
texts still may not share the same reasons for these grounds.  This objection can be pressed in either 
of two ways:  
1) The Phaedo’s reasons for the grounds are absent from the reasons provided in 
the Laws.   
 
2) The Laws’ reasons for the grounds are absent from the reasons provided in the 
Phaedo. 
 
I must address these points before continuing. 
  
18 
 
Regarding the first puzzle, in the Phaedo, Plato has Socrates claim that suicide is impious 
and irrational primarily because it involves unjust “theft” from good gods (62b6-c9; 63b).  At first 
glance, this reason appears absent from the Laws.  But the reason may well be implicitly present.  
The Phaedo’s argument calls the gods “caretakers” (ἐπιμελουμένους) and human beings their 
“possessions” (κτήματα).  Plato does not abandon these titles in the Laws.  On the contrary, he 
twice has the Stranger use exactly the same language to express the same idea: humans are the 
gods’ possessions.   
Passage 1: Stranger: “And indeed we say that all living creatures are possessions 
[κτήματα] of gods, like even the whole universe.”  Kleinias: “Of course.”  Stranger: 
“So whether you argue that these possessions count for something little or much to 
the gods, in no way would it be proper for our owners to neglect us, since they are 
most careful and best” (X.902b7-c3).48 
 
Passage 2: “But gods and spirits are fighting on our side, the gods and spirits whose 
possessions [κτήματα] we are” (X.906a).49  
 
The first passage is particularly informative.  It occurs in response to Kleinias’ objection 
that the gods care nothing about human interests.  The Stranger, just as Socrates in the Phaedo, 
replies that the gods are good (X.901e; cf. Phd. 63b).  As part of their goodness, the gods neglect 
nothing, least of all their human possessions (κτήματα).  So the gods must care about humans.  The 
Stranger later calls the god a “caretaker” (ἐπιμελούμενος, X.903b5; cf. 902c3), the same title that 
applied to the gods prohibiting suicide in the Phaedo.   
The similarities between the Laws’ passages and the Phaedo’s second analogy are 
suggestive.  The Phaedo recognizes suicide as impious because the gods are good and care about 
their human possessions.  These same assumptions exist in the Laws.  Since the gods care about 
                                                          
48  Ἀθηναῖος: θεῶν γε μὴν κτήματά φαμεν εἶναι πάντα ὁπόσα θνητὰ ζῷα, ὧνπερ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον. Κλεινίας: 
πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Ἀθηναῖος: ἤδη τοίνυν σμικρὰ ἢ μεγάλα τις φάτω ταῦτα εἶναι τοῖς θεοῖς: οὐδετέρως γὰρ τοῖς κεκτημένοις 
ἡμᾶς ἀμελεῖν ἂν εἴη προσῆκον, ἐπιμελεστάτοις γε οὖσι καὶ ἀρίστοις. 
49  ξύμμαχοι δὲ ἡμῖν θεοί τε ἅμα καὶ δαίμονες, ἡμεῖς δ᾽ αὖ κτήματα θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων: 
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their human possessions in both texts, humans will have the same reasons to remain under the 
benevolent gods’ care in the Laws as they have in the Phaedo.  Thus, the Laws shares the Phaedo’s 
reasons grounding a prohibition against suicide. 
However, the second puzzle has more teeth.  In the Laws, the primary stated reason 
grounding the prohibition is that suicide harms the state.  The concept of harming the state is 
noticeably absent from the Phaedo’s explanation of the prohibition.  But I think its absence is 
explainable and, at any rate, does not lend much difficulty to the texts’ consistency.   
The absence may be explained by the fact that Plato has a narrower goal in the Phaedo than 
he has in the Laws.  Socrates in the Phaedo concerns himself with the general grounds for 
prohibiting suicide.  However, given that he is going to commit suicide at the dialogue’s 
conclusion, Socrates is ultimately interested in the particular exception that allows his own suicide 
(62c).  Because the city demands his death (Phd. 116c; Ap. 39b), he is not worried that his suicide 
is an injustice against the city.50  Any possible injustice would have to be against the gods, or 
against his friends and family.  As a result, Socrates does not consider the Laws’ reasons in the 
Phaedo.  He has no need to.  Thus, it should not trouble us that Plato does not mention the same 
legal reasons for a prohibition in the Phaedo that he does in the Laws.51  It is enough that he takes 
up the Phaedo’s theological grounds in the Laws as a common thread between the texts.  
 
  
                                                          
50  I thank Eric Brown for suggesting this response to me.  It will be objected that Socrates thinks his death is 
bad for the city (Ap. 39c-d).  But here we must distinguish between saying “X is bad for Y” and saying “X does bad 
to Y.”  To say Socrates’ death is bad for the city does not mean that Socrates treats the city unjustly. 
51  Notice that this point suggests Geddes got something right: the Laws does talk about enforcing the Phaedo’s 
prohibition against suicide. 
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1.4.2 Objection 2 
 
The emphasis I have placed on Plato’s theological prohibitions of suicide may seem 
unsatisfying.  Such arguments will be useless to those who deny that we human beings are 
possessions of a caring god.52  To alleviate such concerns, we might consider whether Plato’s 
arguments against suicide have a shared philosophical ground in both texts aside from religious 
convictions.  I think it can.  
 We can identify such grounds if we understand Plato’s reasons regarding “the gods” merely 
as reasons regarding some higher order within which we live.  What if, instead of understanding 
this idea as an explicit concern about the city’s gods, we instead took it to mean that we ought to 
live lives that respect and care for our fellow citizens?  This response is promising, for it would 
mean that we should generally not commit suicide because suicide will exhibit injustice to our 
loved ones.  On this understanding, suicide would be wrong because it would involve deliberately 
fleeing the role one has as a friend, family member, and member of society.53   
We can identify something that supports this idea implicit in the Phaedo.  Late in the 
dialogue, Plato has Socrates say that all things in the world are arranged in accordance with the 
good (97b8 ff.).  Since “all things” are arranged in accordance with the good, it would follow that 
every human being’s life is essentially good.  Suicide could be said to involve a willful departure 
from the higher order within which the human being resides, rather than as “fleeing” or “stealing 
from” the gods (62b-c).  If an agent kills herself, she takes herself away from the world or society 
                                                          
52  Cp. Bostock: the “mere fact that the gods do want us to do something cannot ever be the final answer to the 
question why we ought to do it” (1986: 19).   
53  Dorter (1982: 25) expresses a similar sentiment. 
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to which she somehow contributes an integral part.  Those around her could be made worse off 
because of her action.  So she (generally) ought not to kill herself.54 
The major strike against this argument is that Socrates may be accused of exhibiting callous 
indifference towards his friends and family as he contemplates his own suicide.55  Most notably, 
Socrates has his wife, Xanthippe, escorted away without acknowledging her concern for himself 
and his friends (Phd. 60a-b).  He also waves off his friends’ complaints that he wrongs them by 
dying (63a; Crit. 45d-e).   
However, I think the reason for Socrates’ seeming indifference is that Socrates understands 
himself as facing one of the few circumstances that allow him to discount his friends’ and family’s 
interests.  He claims that a god has sent him some necessity (Phd. 62c).  Along with that, Socrates 
never denies that his friends’ and family’s interests are important.  However, he does say that living 
well and acting justly is the most important (Crit. 53c).  Although I reserve most of this discussion 
for later,56 it will be sufficient for the current purpose to note that Plato’s account of suicide does 
not require that an agent remain alive no matter what.  Neither the Phaedo nor the Laws holds an 
absolute prohibition against suicide.  So at least some circumstances do not require an agent’s 
remaining alive out of an overweening commitment to the common good, or to the good of one’s 
friends and family.  But is what the two texts have to say about the exceptions to the prohibition 
consistent? 
 
                                                          
54  We see similar arguments against suicide raised in contemporary literature.  Some scholars note that suicide 
is impermissible if, by committing suicide, the agent reneges on some benefit she provides or some duty she holds to 
another person – especially to a friend or family member.  See Cholbi 62-64.  Occasionally, this concept is expanded 
to society as a whole. The argument takes the general form that society depends in some way on goods or services the 
individual provides, and that the individual can no longer provide those benefits if she commits suicide.  See, 
especially, Kant (6:422); Cholbi (58-60).   
55  Others have noted this seeming indifference and even rudeness.  Dorter notes that Socrates almost seems to 
“go out of his way to insult his companions” (34). 
56  See Chapter 2.5 of this dissertation. 
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1.5 The Consistent Exceptions 
 
In the Phaedo, Plato has only had Socrates provide one set of permitted circumstances 
(“necessity from god”), and one example of such circumstances (Socrates’ case).  The worry is 
that this single exception may be unable to correlate with the Laws’ four, more particularized 
exceptions.  I argue that the texts’ exceptions are consistent because the Phaedo’s single exception 
is broad enough to encompass the Laws’ exceptions.   
Consider the key text from the Phaedo:  
“Then perhaps because of this it is not unreasonable to say that a person must not 
kill himself until a god sends some necessity upon him, such as the one that has 
now come before us” (62c6-9).57   
 
Concealed within this statement is a significant phrase, specifying that the necessity from god 
occurs in cases “such as (ὥσπερ) the case that has now come before us.”  This phrase suggests that 
the case before the dialogues’ interlocutors – Socrates’ case – is an example.  More to the point, 
Socrates’ case is merely one example of necessity among all other possible cases that may exist.  
Indeed, there is little reason to indicate that Socrates’ case is “such” a case of necessity if his is the 
only example of necessity.  At the very least, this indicates that the Phaedo’s single example of 
necessity is compatible with the existence of other examples.  I suggest, as other scholars have 
assumed,58 that this includes the cases in the Laws.   
The greatest difficulty for this reading is that Plato has provided us scant information about 
what form the divine necessity takes or how it is to be recognized.  However, we do know that 
Socrates indicates to Cebes that a slave could kill himself if the master gives some “sign” that such 
                                                          
57  ἴσως τοίνυν ταύτῃ οὐκ ἄλογον μὴ πρότερον αὑτὸν ἀποκτεινύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, 
ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἡμῖν παροῦσαν. 
58  To my knowledge, no explicit argument for this claim has been presented.  The following scholars assume 
the claim without substantive argument: Warren (100); Cooper (525); Rowe (130); Geddes (224); Archer-Hind (9). 
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is his wish (62c2).  This requirement suggests that a god’s necessity might not appear in the form 
of a direct command.  Some less obvious clue or gesture may suffice, and it may very well be up 
to the individual to determine whether she has received such a sign. 
It may help to consider ancient Stoic views of suicide to elucidate this point.  The Stoics 
accepted the same claim that Socrates provides in the Phaedo.59  The Stoics thought that suicide 
was appropriate in many circumstances, and that a divine sign would appear to show when it was 
time.60  Diogenes Laërtius reports that the Stoics allowed suicide “for the sake of one’s country or 
friends, and in the case of intolerable pain, handicap, or incurable disease” (VII.130; cf. SVF 
III.768).  So, for instance, in incurable disease, the disease itself would be the divine sign of 
necessity to die.  
It is not difficult to perceive how the cases in the Laws could constitute signs of a similar 
nature.61  Consider the Laws’ first case: suicide at the state’s command.  The sign of necessity is 
the state’s decree that the person should kill herself.  Unquestionable necessity resides in this fate, 
insofar as the suicide agent could be motivated by the state’s external force. 
The second case is suicide because of grievous misfortune.  This misfortune will constitute 
the sign of necessity to die.  The Stranger also says that the suicide is “forced” (ἀναγκασθείς) to 
her action by the occasion of her unfortunate circumstances.  So necessity exists for this suicide as 
well.  The suicide is somehow motivated to commit suicide by the grievous misfortune. 
                                                          
59  It is likely that the Stoics took this passage in the Phaedo as the basis for their own thoughts on suicide’s 
permissibility.  See Griffin (1986: 72); Rist (1969: 243); Warren (100). 
60  The difference is that the Stoics explicitly claim that human reason will be able to identify that sign.  Griffin: 
“[Their] doctrine can be described as an internalization of Socrates’ divine necessity so that it becomes a dictate of 
man’s own reason, which tells him when life according to nature is no longer possible. This modification of Platonism 
was made possible by the Stoic belief that the divinity of the world is immanent” (72). 
61  Some may question the use of retroactively applying Stoic views to understand Plato’s.  But it is likely the 
Stoic views themselves came from Platonic roots.  It is also worth noting that many of the conditions listed as 
permissible occasions for suicide in D.L. (VII.130) and in the Stoics’ “Banquet List” of SVF (III.768) overlap with 
the conditions Plato has the Stranger propose in the Laws.   
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A similar story can be told about the third case, suicide under acute disgrace.  If a person 
is living well, but then falls into an irremediable and unbearable disgrace that mars her life (for 
example, if she irreversibly loses face before her city), this disgrace will itself constitute the sign 
of necessity to die.  The acute disgrace will motivate the agent to commit suicide.62 
The fourth permissible suicide is suicide to avoid performing a heinous deed such as 
treason, temple-robbing, or murder.  It is possible to view even this case as having necessity if we 
recognize that, in the event that the individual is unable to purify herself of her vicious desires, she 
will likely succumb to her urges to commit a heinous crime that requires her execution (IX.854e).  
Thus, she will die just as surely as if she had preemptively killed herself before committing the 
crime.  Death is inevitable for her, one way or the other, if she is unable to free herself from her 
vicious impulses.  The sign of necessity can be made known to her through her inability to purify 
herself of her vicious desires.   
So it is possible to understand all the Laws’ permissible suicides as more explicit 
instantiations of the Phaedo’s sign of necessity.  It remains only to clarify how these cases could 
constitute signs of necessity from a god, as the Phaedo requires (62c).   
Since the Laws’ passages do not explicitly specify anything divine about the circumstances, 
it may be objected that divine necessity is absent in these cases.  But this absence will not be 
troubling once we recall that the Laws assumes that a god is in charge of human affairs.63  If a god 
is ultimately in charge of all human things, then that god is responsible for bringing about these 
circumstances.  Any necessity facing the excused suicides in the Laws can therefore be understood 
as divine, thus satisfying the Phaedo’s requirement. 
                                                          
62  Cooper suggests that this could be understood as the result of internal coercions (525).   
63  Plato has had the Stranger remark that “a god controls everything, and chance and occasion cooperate with 
god in piloting all human affairs.” ὡς θεὸς μὲν πάντα, καὶ μετὰ θεοῦ τύχη καὶ καιρός, τἀνθρώπινα διακυβερνῶσι 
σύμπαντα (Laws IV.709b). 
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1.6 Socrates’ Suicide 
 
Finally, we are able to consider the question that prompted this essay.  How is Socrates’ 
suicide supposedly permissible?  Plato has had Socrates say that suicide is impermissible (οὐ . . . 
θεμιτόν, 61c10) except when “a god sends some necessity, such as the one that has now come 
before us” (62c7-9).64  If Plato thinks Socrates commits suicide permissibly in the Phaedo, we 
must suppose that Socrates has had some message or allowance that constitutes a sign from god.  
But what is it?  
One possibility scholars have proposed is that Socrates’ sign of necessity is something 
divine, namely, Socrates’ daimonion (a lesser divine spirit).65  Plato records that a daimonion 
would sometimes appear to Socrates to stop him from performing a task he had contemplated 
performing.   One occasion especially seems to provide evidence that the daimonion is the sign of 
necessity to die.  After Socrates is sentenced, Plato has Socrates note that the daimonion did not 
oppose him during his defense (Ap. 40b-c).  Since Socrates’ daimonion only appears to stop him 
from doing something bad,66 Socrates interprets his daimonion’s absence as a sign that his actions 
leading to his sentencing and death were right and in accordance with divine will.  From this, he 
takes it that his death is good for him.  
Since the necessity facing a permissible suicide is supposed to be divine, it may seem 
appropriate that a divine spirit would grant Socrates the permission to kill himself.  Indeed, the 
fact that Plato has Socrates call the daimonion a “sign” (σημεῖον, Ap. 40c3) may suggest an implicit 
                                                          
64  πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἡμῖν παροῦσαν. 
65  Warren expresses tentative sympathy for this view (100).  
66  Ap. 31b-c.  Compare to instances in Thaeatetus 151a, Phaedrus 242b-c, and Republic I.496c.  See Weiss 
(1998: 16-23) and Smith & Woodruff (2000: 74-88) for a discussion about the role of the daimonion in Socrates’ 
moral deliberation. 
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connection to the Phaedo’s sign of necessity from god (cf. μὴ σημήναντός σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ 
τεθνάναι, 62b-c).   
Unfortunately, the interpretation that the daimonion provides the sign of necessity has one 
glaring problem.  The Laws mentions nothing as a condition for permissible suicide that even 
remotely resembles the daimonion’s purported role in Socrates’ life.  Thus, if Socrates’ daimonion 
provides Socrates’ required sign of necessity, then it would be an occasion completely absent in 
the Laws.  To me, this is an unacceptable result. 
A better explanation would guarantee that the necessity Plato can attribute to Socrates in 
the Phaedo is one that is also mentioned in the Laws.  In other words, Socrates must kill himself 
because of extreme disgrace, a desire to avoid performing heinously vicious acts, extreme 
misfortune, or civic order (IX.854a, 873c).   
Two of these conditions are obvious non-starters.  First, it is clear that Socrates, at least as 
Plato presents him, does not suffer disgrace at his life’s end.67  Plato has Socrates claim that he has 
done no wrong worthy of punishment (Ap. 36b-d), which suggests that Socrates thinks he has done 
nothing for which he ought to feel disgrace.  Second, given Socrates’ avowed commitment to 
virtue (Ap. 32a-e, 35d; Grg. 522b-d; Phd. 69d), it seems equally unlikely that Plato would think 
Socrates is plagued with the desire to perform heinously vicious acts that would cause him to see 
death as preferable to continued life.  That leaves two serious contenders, either extreme 
misfortune or conviction by the state.  If either of these options applies to Socrates’ case, we have 
a way forward. 
                                                          
67  Although Plato has some of Socrates’ interlocutors consider it disgraceful for Socrates to practice philosophy 
(e.g., Callicles at Grg. 485a-e), it is doubtful that Plato would agree with this assessment, since he has Socrates argue 
so vehemently against it.  It may also be argued that Socrates would be disgraced if he had failed to follow the city’s 
laws.  But this statement is counterfactual.  Socrates does not fail to follow the city’s laws, so he is not disgraced in 
that way. 
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One author has suggested that Socrates’ sign of necessity is extreme misfortune.68  In 
particular, Socrates receives permission to die through the sign of being unjustly condemned to 
death.  The interpretation assumes that Socrates is innocent, and that the Athenians have 
wrongfully convicted him of impiety and corrupting the youth.69   
The interpretation has much to commend it.  After all, it could be considered unfortunate 
if someone were condemned to die unjustly.  Plato even has one of Socrates’ interlocutors in the 
Gorgias, Polus, remark about just such a case, “Surely the one who is put to death unjustly is the 
one who is both pitiable and miserable” (469b).70   
But the interpretation does not succeed.  Socrates shoots down Polus’ remark when he 
claims that being put to death unjustly does not make a person miserable.  Rather, committing 
vicious actions make a person miserable (469b-c).  Moreover, Socrates seems to deny that any 
truly good person can suffer misfortune when he claims that “you will suffer nothing terrible if 
you really are a fine and good person, one who practices virtue” (527d; cf. Ap. 41c-d).71  As long 
as Socrates practices virtue, it is unlikely that he would find extraordinary misfortune in the state’s 
condemnation, even if that condemnation were unjust.  So the interpretation that Socrates finds 
necessity in some great misfortune is untenable. 
That leaves only one serious contender for Socrates’ suicide to be consistently permissible 
under both the Phaedo’s and the Laws’ reasons: a state’s order to commit suicide.  This option 
clearly applies to Socrates’ case.  We know that the state condemned Socrates to die (Ap. 38c; Phd. 
98e-99a).  We also know that his death sentence was to drink poison by his own hand (Phd. 116d 
                                                          
68  Rowe (130). 
69  Rowe does not defend this assumption, but substantial evidence exists to suggest Socrates is innocent of the 
charges.  On the controversy here, see Burnyeat (2002) and Parker (2002). 
70  Ἦ που ὅ γε ἀποθνῄσκων ἀδίκως ἐλεεινός τε καὶ ἄθλιός ἐστιν. 
71  οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν πείσῃ, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι ᾖς καλὸς κἀγαθός, ἀσκῶν ἀρεγήν. 
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ff.).  In the Phaedo, after Socrates has already established that he has received necessity from god 
(62c), he explicitly associates his death with the Athenians’ conviction.  The reasons (αἰτίας, 98e1) 
he provides for his death are “that the Athenians decided that it was better to condemn me, and 
therefore I have decided that it was better for me to sit here and that it is just for me remaining to 
suffer whatever judgment they order” (98e2-5).72  Accordingly, Socrates chooses to commit 
suicide only after recognizing that his state has convicted him. 
The evidence suggests that the best interpretation for Socrates’ sign of necessity is that the 
state convicts him to die.  This interpretation works well with the Phaedo, because the state can 
provide a sign of necessity.  Insofar as a god is in charge of all human things (Laws IV.709b), that 
sign may be said to be from a god.73  This interpretation of the sign also fits with the Laws, because 
the Laws lists self-killing under civic order as a permissible suicide.  Finally, this interpretation 
resonates with passages in the Crito (46b) and the Phaedo (98e) where Plato has Socrates associate 
his death with the state’s conviction.  So the state’s conviction is the sign indicating to Socrates 
that he may commit suicide permissibly.   
 
1.7 Response to Objections 
 
Some may object that Socrates could not have committed suicide if the state ordered him 
to do it.  After all, we tend to think that suicide requires the agent’s own intentional and responsible 
choice, and it seems unlikely that a compelled suicide is really up to the agent.  Ancient readers 
would not have had the same response.  The Athenian speech-writer, Lysias, remarks on deaths of 
                                                          
72  ἐπειδὴ ᾿Αθηναίοις ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὖ δέδοκται 
ἐνθάδε καθῆσθαι, καὶ δικαιότερον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἣν ἂν κελεύσωσιν· 
73  This point dispenses with Rowe’s single objection against Socrates’ necessity being the state’s conviction.  
Rowe thinks the state’s conviction cannot be “from god” because the state consists of human agency and 
responsibility, not divine (130).  But since all human affairs are under god’s command (Laws IV.709b), that will not 
be a concern for Plato. 
  
29 
 
this kind.  He writes that those the Thirty Tyrants condemned to death were “forced to become 
self-murderers.”74  Here, even in circumstances where a clear compulsion for the agents to kill 
themselves exists, the agents performing the deed still receive the title “self-murderer.”  It suggests 
the ancient conception is that the agent is still somehow responsible for killing herself, even if she 
performs the deed at another’s command.  I argue elsewhere that Socrates, as Plato presents him, 
is immune to arguments that say he is not responsible for or did not intend his death.75 
Others may protest that something yet needs to be said to explain why Socrates should call 
the daimonion a “sign” (σημεῖον, Ap. 40c3), if it is indeed the case that the daimonion does not 
provide the sign of necessity to die.  I reply that the daimonion is a “sign” – as Socrates indicates.  
But it is best understood as a sign verifying or contravening a course of action that Socrates is 
thinking about performing,76 not as a sign of necessity to die.  At best, the daimonion provides 
Socrates an indication that something he is contemplating doing is bad (in which case the 
daimionion appears) or, possibly, good (in which case the daimonion is presumably absent).  It is 
not itself a sign of necessity for Socrates to do something positive, as would be required if it were 
to indicate that committing suicide was permissible.  However, the daimonion can constitute a sign 
that Socrates may interpret to mean that his decision to abide by the state’s ruling is a just and right 
decision.  So, when Socrates’ daimonion does not appear at the Apology’s conclusion or in the 
intervening time between his conviction and his death in the Phaedo, Socrates can take its absence 
                                                          
74  φονέας αὑτῶν ἠνάγκασαν γένεσθαι (Contr. Era. XII.17, 96)  
75  See Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
76  All instances when Socrates mentions his daimonic sign are cases where he is stopped from doing something.  
We have no example of the daimonion giving him a positive directive, except in the loose sense that Socrates takes 
its lack of appearance to be a sign that he should continue doing what he was already doing (Ap. 40a-c).  See Vlastos, 
et al. in Smith & Woodruff (2000: 176-204), for discussion.   
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as a further indication that the action he has already chosen (viz., killing himself) is the right action 
for him to do.77  
Finally, it may be objected that it does not make sense for Socrates’ sign of necessity from 
god to be a civic ruling that is quite possibly unjust.  As we have seen, Socrates is portrayed as just 
(118a), and Socrates himself protests that he has knowing done nothing worthy of punishment (Ap. 
36b-d).  Beyond that, Socrates himself suggests that his trial may not be optimally just since it was 
tried in only one day.78  So his conviction may seem undeserved.  How, then, could Socrates’ sign 
of necessity to die be an unjust verdict?   
I think the key here is that Socrates does not mindlessly follow the city’s ruling.  He claims 
in the Apology and the Phaedo that he follows the god above all.  The god he follows is one who 
commands him to philosophize in Athens (Ap. 22a, 23b, 29c-30a, 38a; Phd. 60e-61a).  His task is 
to exhort his fellow citizens, disabusing them of their false opinions, and encouraging them to be 
self-reflective.  The god commands humans to use reason in all circumstances.  Thus, to obey the 
god is simply to do what seems best after doing some serious reasoning, that is, philosophizing.79  
So when Socrates says he obeys the god, he does as reason bids.   
Socrates tells us of two occasions when he defied the city’s ruling.  The first time, he 
refused to partake in the trial of ten generals as a group (Ap. 32b).  The second time, he refused an 
order to arrest Leon of Salamis (32c-d).  The rationale he cites for his refusal is that the city’s 
orders did not seem just or pious.  Yet the only obvious evidence for his claim is his own reasoned 
                                                          
77  As he claims to do at the Apology’s conclusion.  In this view, I concur with Jones (2013). 
78  Ap. 37a7-b2; cf. Brickhouse & Smith (1989: 42, n. 147 and 75-76), and Shaw (2011: 195, n. 29). 
79  For a similar account of Socrates’ religion, see Weiss (15-23). 
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conviction that the order was unjust.80  If his reason had told him otherwise, he presumably would 
have seen no difficulty, and would have changed his actions accordingly. 
We have good evidence that this answer also applies to his suicide.  We saw earlier that 
Socrates sums up his reasons to carry out the death penalty by saying this:  “that the Athenians 
decided that it was better to condemn me, and therefore I have decided that it was better for me to 
sit here and that it is just for me remaining to suffer whatever judgment they order” (Phd. 98e2-
5).81  Socrates does not die simply because he recognizes the city’s conviction.  Rather, he 
“decided” to carry out that judgment after determining that that action would be the just action.  
As he claims to have done in the cases in the Apology, Socrates chooses his actions through the 
reasoned consideration of whether the proposed actions are just for him to do.  He follows the god, 
because he follows his reasoned consideration of what is right.  In that sense, the city’s conviction 
is a sign of necessity to die only because Socrates’ reason and the god verify that it is the sign.   
The events of the Crito support this interpretation.  After Crito tries to persuade Socrates 
to flee prison, Socrates summarizes his refusal by saying: “So let it be, Crito, and let us act in this 
way, since this is the way the god is leading” (54d-e).82  Socrates tells Crito to let it be, that is, to 
stop trying to convince Socrates to escape, and to act in this way, as the law commands.  But the 
reason Socrates gives is not “since this is the way the laws are leading.”  Rather, the reason he 
gives is “since this is the way the god is leading.”  The difference is crucial.83  The law requires 
that Socrates die.  But if we take Socrates at his word, he does not die solely because the law 
                                                          
80  Some scholars have argued that another reason may lie behind these refusals.  In particular, Socrates was 
ordered by a tyrannical regime to arrest Leon, and it is possible that Socrates did not recognize that regime as a 
legitimate authority.  See, esp. Brickhouse & Smith (1989). 
81  ἐπειδὴ ᾿Αθηναίοις ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὖ δέδοκται 
ἐνθάδε καθῆσθαι, καὶ δικαιότερον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἣν ἂν κελεύσωσιν· 
82  ᾿´Εα τοίνυν, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτῃ, ἐπειδὴ ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται. 
83  Weiss also points out the importance of this distinction (144). 
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commands it.  Rather he does as the god leads, and the way the god leads happens to be going the 
same way as the law.  Socrates would perhaps not go along with the city’s ruling at all if he were 
not also convinced that the god led him in that way.  He does as reason tells him is best, the same 
as he claims to have done throughout his entire life (46b).   
We may note that Socrates specifically claims that he would defy the city in one particular 
circumstance: if it commanded that he quit philosophizing.  He would refuse that order because it 
would directly contradict the divine command (Ap. 29d-e; 38a).   So the one example we have that 
Socrates would disobey this court is if it were to command him to go against the god.  Socrates 
will not go along with the court if it contradicts the god’s will.  He cares only about what is just 
for him to do, and what is just to do is simply what reason and the god lead him to do.  In that 
respect, he will commit suicide without concern for whether the city’s conviction is just or unjust, 
caring only that his own actions remain just.  It simply happens that the city’s conviction is the 
sign making him aware that his suicide is permissible.   
Naturally, we will wonder why reason and a supposedly good god would lead him that 
way.  A couple of explanations lend themselves to consideration here.  First, it might be argued 
that Socrates recognizes the city’s conviction is just by some definition, and that he is obliged to 
follow through because of his own commitments to justice.  Perhaps Socrates really was guilty of 
impiety and corrupting the youth.84  Or maybe his conviction was just because it followed proper 
legal procedure,85 or because Socrates was contractually obligated to obey the laws.86 
                                                          
84  This may be true by the city’s definition.  It is obvious how Socrates’ talking about Reason as a deity might 
not sit well in the Athenian environment of multiple deities.  See Burnyeat (2002). 
85  We know that Socrates’ trial clearly followed Athenian legal procedure, since Socrates complains about this 
in the Apology (37a-b).   
86  See Gallop (79-84); Woozley (80).  A passage in Crito may indicate that Socrates is bound to follow legal 
procedure because of an implicit agreement he has made by living in Athens for seventy years (51d-e, 52d-53a).  He 
had plenty of opportunity to evade the law before his trial.  It may well be that it was unjust for him to fail to obey the 
law now, when he simply doesn’t like what it has to say.   
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All of these explanations assume that Socrates’ commitment to justice includes a 
commitment to the city’s laws above all.  But this thesis would be problematic, given the passages 
we have seen in which Socrates claims to prefer reason and the god.  The passages suggest that, 
although Socrates recognizes the law, his own reason guides his actions more than any legal 
procedure. 
I prefer another explanation – one that better accounts for Socrates’ agency and 
commitments to reason.  Consider if, instead, Socrates’ suicide is the culmination of his 
philosophical mission.  Socrates was seventy years old at the time of his trial.  He reports that his 
death would soon come to him regardless of Athens’ sentence (Ap. 38c; cf. Crit. 53d-e).87  
Undoubtedly, a quiet death would have its advantages.  But if what we are told in the Apology is 
true, a quiet death for Socrates would have come at the cost of his giving up philosophy (38a).88  
Since Socrates pursues philosophy at the god’s command (22a, 23b, 29d-e; Phd. 60e), abandoning 
philosophy would have been unjust.  Consequently, Socrates realizes that he cannot give up 
philosophy.  Reason then leads him to see suicide as the just and better option, and to recognize 
the city’s conviction as the permission he needs to avoid a continued life in circumstances he would 
deem intolerable.   
Socrates’ action is no less suicide because he sees suicide as the better option, even if the 
alternative to suicide is a compelling disincentive to remain alive.  Many suicides are committed 
under duress of some kind, such that Option A, continuing to live, seems worse than Option B, 
committing suicide.  In those circumstances, the perceived badness of A is a good reason to view 
                                                          
87  This sentiment is echoed by Xenophon’s Socrates as well (Xen. Ap. 8-9). 
88  A passage in the Crito suggests that Socrates would have difficulty philosophizing even if he fled Athens 
(53b-d). 
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B as superior.89  In Socrates’ case, there will be little cost to him for committing suicide, since he 
is going to die soon anyway (Ap. 38c).  But there might be much for him to gain if, as he hopes, 
he gets to continue philosophizing in the afterlife (Phd. 67b-c; Ap. 40c) and he can maintain his 
own justice until his end.
                                                          
89  I show in Chapter 3 that Socrates’ intending to act as justice requires does not mean he did not also intend to 
die. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Wisest Death: 
Wisdom and Suicide in Platonic Ethics 
 
2.1 The Question 
 
At the Phaedo’s conclusion, we see Socrates calmly pick up the poison and drink (117c).  
Despite his own assertions that he is unsure what death is (66d-67a), he claims to have “great 
hope” that his death will be good for him (Phd. 67b-c; cf. Ap. 40c).  He commits suicide in apparent 
serenity, seemingly unconcerned about his action. 
Yet the Phaedo’s final words also report to us that Socrates was the wisest (φρονιμώτατος, 
118a) of all known men.1  If we take these closing words at face value, we have strong reason to 
think that Plato desires us to view Socrates as wise.2  This assessment is puzzling.  For if Plato 
thought that Socrates was really a wise man, then Plato must also have thought that Socrates’ 
committing suicide was somehow compatible with his being wise.  But how could that be?   
This question rides on more general puzzles concerning Plato’s ethics of suicide.  Plato’s 
ethics are often understood as eudaimonist, on the grounds that Plato’s Socrates sometimes 
suggests that good reasons for action must culminate in the goal of eudaimonia (happiness, 
                                                          
1  Compare to a similar attribution of wisdom to Socrates in the Apology during Socrates’ defense (21a).  The 
biographer Diogenes Laërtius also reports about Socrates’ wisdom at the point of death (II.46). 
2  Because Plato wrote in dialogue form, scholars often note that it is difficult or impossible to determine what 
Plato’s views are.  (See Press ed. [2000] for recent arguments about Plato and the dialogue form.)  In this chapter, I 
seek to construct plausible interpretations of Plato’s views and see how they fit together.  I assume that, because the 
views are included in the dialogue, we know that these are views Plato took seriously, and it is at least possible that 
Plato endorsed them.   
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success, or well-being).3  For the purposes of this essay, I will accept this assumption.4  
Understanding Plato’s ethics as eudaimonist raises two related concerns about his account of 
suicide.  First, we might worry that his ethics of suicide is too permissive, allowing too many 
people to kill themselves off at a whim.  Conversely, we might worry that his ethics are too 
exclusive, not allowing everyone to commit suicide who may be better off dead.5   
In this chapter, I address these worries.  I provide a brief background of eudaimonia 
(Section 2.2) before addressing each concern in turn (Sections 2.3 and 2.4).  I argue that Plato’s 
account of suicide coheres with a eudaimonist framework, and I explain Socrates’ suicide in light 
of that discussion (Section 2.5). 
 
2.2 Eudaimonia 
 
 Eudaimonia has no English equivalent.  In Greek, it may be translated as “having a good 
spirit,” but it is more often translated as “happiness” or “success.”  Eudaimonists believe that 
everyone wants to be eudaimōn (happy, successful).  Indeed, in the Euthydemus it is said that 
asking whether people wish to be eudaimōn is a “ridiculous” question, since the answer is self-
evident (278e).  Everyone desires to succeed in life.  Moreover, they want to succeed for its own 
sake.  Ask anyone why they want to succeed, and the answer will always be that that is the best 
                                                          
3  See, e.g., Charm. 171e-172a; Euthyd. 278e, 280b; Grg. 468b-d; Laws 864a; Meno 77c-78b; Prt. 352b-358e; 
Rep. 443e, 505e.  I discuss several of these passages below. 
4  Whether Plato’s ethics are eudaimonist is sometimes disputed.  For arguments that Plato was not a 
eudaimonist, see Moore (1903: 97-105) and White (2002: 45-81).  The majority of scholars take him to be some kind 
of eudaimonist.  See Annas (1999: 31-51), Brickhouse & Smith (1994: 73-136), Irwin (1995: 248), Price (2011: 9), 
Vasiliou (2008), Vlastos (1991: 200-232), Warren (2001).  I do not address the question of whether Plato or Socrates 
was a psychological or a rational eudaimonist.  For a good survey of the textual evidence for both positions, see 
Bobonich (2011). 
5  A few philosophers have raised the first question in passing, including Ahrensdorf (1995), Dorter (1982), 
and Eckstein (1981), but they have kept their discussion limited only to the wisdom of Socrates’ choice to die, 
dismissing the more general concern about Plato’s view of permissible suicides.  Scholars who have raised the second 
question include Battin (1993) and Warren. 
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there is (cf. Rep. II.357b; Sym. 205a).  Eudaimonia is the highest good for human beings, and 
“final” in the sense that nothing beyond it is required.  It is the ultimate end of human action (Rep. 
VI.505e).  But just what is this highest good?   
Plato often has Socrates identify eudaimonia with living well and performing virtuous 
activity.  Consider the following passage: 
“So it is most necessary, Callicles, that the prudent man, as we have shown, being 
just and brave and pious, is a completely good man, and that the good man does 
well and finely whatever he does, and that he who does well is blessed and 
successful, while the wicked man, who does badly, is miserable” (Grg. 507b-c).6  
 
The passage shows that being virtuous is the means by which a person can live well, and that in 
turn allows him to be eudaimōn.  A similar thought appears in the Charmides:  
“And so a house would be well-run and a city well-governed by means of prudence, 
and likewise for all things prudence ruled.  For with error abolished, and rightness 
leading, it would be necessary for people to do well in all they did, and doing well, 
to be successful” (171e-172a).7 
 
According to these passages, being eudaimōn is equated with doing well, and doing well 
requires doing virtuous activity.  In the Crito, Socrates clarifies that “living well and living justly 
are the same” (48b).8  Living well is the same as living virtuously.  So the good life is the same as 
the virtuous life.  In that case, “being eudaimōn” and “living virtuously” must be identical.  So 
eudaimonia just is virtuous activity.9   
                                                          
6  ὥστε πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸν σώφρονα, ὥσπερ διήλθομεν, δίκαιον ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅσιον 
ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι τελέως, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττῃ, τὸν δ᾽ εὖ πράττοντα μακάριόν τε 
καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα ἄθλιον: 
7  καὶ οὕτω δὴ ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης οἰκία τε οἰκουμένη ἔμελλεν καλῶς οἰκεῖσθαι, πόλις τε πολιτευομένη, καὶ ἄλλο 
πᾶν οὗ σωφροσύνη ἄρχοι: ἁμαρτίας γὰρ ἐξῃρημένης, ὀρθότητος δὲ ἡγουμένης, ἐν πάσῃ πράξει καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν 
ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς οὕτω διακειμένους, τοὺς δὲ εὖ πράττοντας εὐδαίμονας εἶναι. 
8  τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστιν. 
9  Other philosophers who came after Plato and Socrates say that eudaimonia is virtuous activity, including 
Aristotle and the Stoics. 
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However, some scholars10 have asserted that virtuous activity is insufficient for 
eudaimonia, claiming that other goods, such as health, wealth, or power, are also required.  In that 
case, eudaimonia would require virtuous activity plus some combination of these other goods.   
To address this argument properly would require a different project than I have undertaken 
here.  So I will only respond briefly why I think the notion is unpersuasive.  Consider the example 
of health.  Undeniably, health can be a good thing (Rep. II.357b-c).  But sometimes it isn’t good 
(Euthyd. 278c-282d; Men. 87e-88a).  If things like health are to be necessary for eudaimonia, it 
strikes me that they should be good unconditionally.  But health is not like that.  For example, a 
healthy person may be drafted to serve in an unjust tyrant’s army.11  Such service would require 
an agent to perform vicious acts, which would be detrimental to eudaimonia rather than beneficial.  
The person would be better off if she were not healthy, so that she could not be drafted to perform 
vicious acts.  In this case, health’s being a good at all is conditional upon its being used virtuously.  
Presumably similar arguments work against other goods.  Such arguments appear in Plato’s 
dialogues about health (ibid.), wealth (Men. 78e-79a; Rep. IX.589d) and ruling power (Grg. 470b-
c). 
Moreover, the fact that eudaimonia has no end beyond itself sets it apart from other goods 
like health, which do have a further end (cf. Rep. II.357b-c).  People pursue health in part because 
it leads to other ends like pleasure, or even the ability to perform more virtuous actions.  But they 
do not pursue health exclusively for its own sake as they pursue eudaimonia (VI.505e; Sym. 205a).  
For these reasons, I proceed with the assumption that virtuous activity is necessary and sufficient 
for eudaimonia. 
                                                          
10  Most notably, Vlastos. 
11  An example attributed to the Stoics by Sextus Empiricus (M IV.66). 
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2.3 Is Plato’s Account Too Permissive? 
 
Assuming that eudaimonia is an activity, we might be tempted to think that a further 
requirement should be necessary for eudaimonia, namely, “being alive.”  After all, a person cannot 
perform any activity if she is dead!  This point raises an interesting challenge for Plato’s account 
of suicide.  After all, Plato allows suicide in four circumstances, including when the state has 
ordered the agent to commit suicide, when the agent is under extreme distress or disgrace, and 
when the agent seeks to avoid performing a heinously vicious deed (Phd. 62c; Laws IX.854c-d, 
873c-d).  But how could any agent desiring eudaimonia ever reasonably choose to kill herself?  
Performing such an action would destroy any future opportunities the agent might otherwise have 
to perform virtuous actions and contribute to her eudaimonia. 
The objection is related to a standard objection that suicide is somehow irrational.  
Immanuel Kant raises the problem in his Groundwork and Lectures on Ethics.  Suicide, Kant 
thinks, is irrational because the action willfully uses one’s own agency to cut off all future 
possibilities of agency.12  The problem is not often raised for Plato’s account.13  But the concern 
exists because Plato allows suicide even though his ethics would seem to value a continued life.  
After all, a continued life seems essential in order to perform future virtuous activities. 
However, we should be careful to distinguish “living” from “living well” here.  We saw 
that “living well” and “living virtuously” are identified with eudaimonia.  Living badly or living 
                                                          
12  “[Suicide] transcends all limits on the use of free choice, for the latter is only possible insofar as the subject 
exists” (Lectures 27:370).  The argument appears somewhat differently in the Groundwork, where the choice to kill 
oneself from self-love is presented as incompatible with the universal law of nature: “It is then seen at once that a 
nature whose law it would be to destroy life itself by means of the same feeling whose destination is to impel toward 
the furtherance of life would contradict itself” (4:422). 
13  Ahrensdorf and Eckstein come closest to addressing this question, but they focus only on the wisdom of 
Socrates’ choice to die.  But even if Socrates’ choice is wise (or not, as Eckstein argues), it is another matter whether 
the suicides Plato permits are compatible with his ethics. 
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viciously is not so favored.  In the Gorgias, Socrates tells of a ship’s captain who might consider 
the lives he could save from drowning: 
“So he reasons that, if someone with great incurable illness of the body did not 
drown, this fellow is miserable because he did not die, and has not been benefitted 
by [the captain]. But if someone has many incurable diseases in what is more 
valuable than his body, his soul, life for that fellow is not worth living, and [the 
captain] will not help him if he saves him from the sea . . . But he knows that it is 
not better for the wretched man to live; for he must live badly” (512a-b).14 
 
A lot is happening in this passage, but I want to draw attention to the last part in particular.  The 
captain should reason that the person who lives badly is better off dead (cf. 507c; Crit. 48b; Rep. 
I.353e-354a).  In that case, “life” is like the earlier example of “health.”  It is open to qualification.  
Life may sometimes be a good thing, when it is lived well.  But other times, life may not be good, 
and may even be detrimental.  I argue that Plato allows suicide in some of these latter cases.  They 
are situations when a continued life can no longer benefit the agent – situations in which the agent 
is better off dead. 
To see how Plato can make this argument, it will be most helpful to consider the first 
permitted suicide in the Laws.   
“Someone may say this to a person whom an evil desire drives by day and night to 
steal some holy object: ‘Dear fellow, . . . when any of these thoughts enters your 
head, seek the rites that free from guilt, seek the shrines of curse-lifting gods and 
supplicate them, seek men who are reputed to be virtuous . . . And if it happens that 
your illness abates, that is well.  But if not, looking at death as nobler, rid yourself 
of life’ ” (IX.854a-c).15 
                                                          
14  λογίζεται οὖν ὅτι οὐκ, εἰ μέν τις μεγάλοις καὶ ἀνιάτοις νοσήμασιν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνεχόμενος μὴ ἀπεπνίγη, 
οὗτος μὲν ἄθλιός ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέθανεν, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ὠφέληται: εἰ δέ τις ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοῦ σώματος τιμιωτέρῳ, 
τῇ ψυχῇ, πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει καὶ ἀνίατα, τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὶν καὶ τοῦτον ὀνήσει, ἄντε ἐκ θαλάττης ἄντε ἐκ 
δικαστηρίου ἐάντε ἄλλοθεν ὁποθενοῦν σώσῃ, ἀλλ᾽ οἶδεν ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ζῆν τῷ μοχθηρῷ ἀνθρώπῳ: κακῶς 
γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν ζῆν. 
15  λέγοι δή τις ἂν ἐκείνῳ . . . ὃν ἐπιθυμία κακὴ παρακαλοῦσα μεθ᾽ ἡμέραν τε καὶ ἐπεγείρουσα νύκτωρ ἐπί τι 
τῶν ἱερῶν ἄγει συλήσοντα, τάδε: ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὐκ ἀνθρώπινόν σε κακὸν οὐδὲ θεῖον κινεῖ τὸ νῦν ἐπὶ τὴν ἱεροσυλίαν 
προτρέπον ἰέναι, οἶστρος δέ σέ τις ἐμφυόμενος ἐκ παλαιῶν καὶ ἀκαθάρτων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀδικημάτων, 
περιφερόμενος ἀλιτηριώδης, ὃν εὐλαβεῖσθαι χρεὼν παντὶ σθένει: τίς δ᾽ ἐστὶν εὐλάβεια, μαθέ. ὅταν σοι προσπίπτῃ τι 
τῶν τοιούτων δογμάτων, ἴθι ἐπὶ τὰς ἀποδιοπομπήσεις, ἴθι ἐπὶ θεῶν ἀποτροπαίων ἱερὰ ἱκέτης, ἴθι ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν 
λεγομένων ἀνδρῶν ὑμῖν ἀγαθῶν συνουσίας, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄκουε, τὰ δὲ πειρῶ λέγειν αὐτός, ὡς δεῖ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια 
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Plato has the Stranger ask us to consider a fellow who is constantly driven to commit a heinously 
vicious act, such as temple robbery.16  Such persons are admonished to try to rid themselves of 
their desires to commit such crimes and to purify themselves by performing mystic rites, 
worshipping the gods, and emulating virtuous people.  If these activities fail to eliminate their 
vicious desires, they are told to view suicide as the preferable alternative.  The passage suggests 
that suicide is recommended when a person’s character is so irremediably bad that she cannot 
overcome the impulse to commit vicious deeds.  Her death, the Stranger remarks, is better both for 
the individual and the state. 
It is easy to understand how it could be best for society that such individuals remove 
themselves.  Because such persons are constantly driven to commit acts that are destructive to the 
state (854c), they risk disrupting the state’s order and security.  The state will conceivably be better 
off without them.  But how could such individuals are better off dead for their own sakes as well? 
The surrounding context in the Laws illuminates this supposed “benefit.”  The Stranger 
says that performing heinous actions is destructive to the individual who does them (862e; cf. Grg. 
469b).  Persons who do such deeds, he says, are “beyond cure.”  And indeed, the person whose 
suicide is being considered is said to have an “illness” (854c).  The terminology suggests a medical 
analogy.  The person who is constantly fighting her impulses to perform vicious actions is like 
someone who has a disease.  If she cannot overcome her vicious impulses, then it would be as if 
the diseased person’s medicine or treatment regimen is ineffective.  She may in fact be too far 
gone to cure.   
                                                          
πάντα ἄνδρα τιμᾶν: τὰς δὲ τῶν κακῶν συνουσίας φεῦγε ἀμεταστρεπτί. καὶ ἐὰν μέν σοι δρῶντι ταῦτα λωφᾷ τι τὸ 
νόσημα: εἰ δὲ μή, καλλίω θάνατον σκεψάμενος ἀπαλλάττου τοῦ βίου.  
16  We have no reason to think that the following account applies only to actual deed specified in the passage, 
temple robbery.  Other examples of what Laws IX calls the most serious crimes will apply just as well (853a; 854a).  
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Those who are incurably ill are discussed in a short but difficult passage of the Republic.  
In that passage, Plato has Socrates defend rules for medical practice that would require persons 
who are incurably ill not to be medically treated, but to be allowed to die (III.405c-410a).  The 
stated reason for this harsh-sounding rule is that the person who constantly concerns herself with 
medical treatment to keep herself alive will no longer have the time, energy, or mental stamina to 
do her work within society or – more importantly – to foster her own continued virtue.  Consider 
this: if a person spends her all her waking hours undergoing painful medical treatments and fretting 
about her health, she will have no time left over to devote to virtuous activities or to helping her 
fellow citizens.  She will be too drawn out from trying to keep herself alive and functional.  As a 
result, she can no longer be productive for herself or for her society.  Socrates says that such a 
person should consider life to be of no use (406b-d).  She is better off dead, purely because she 
could not continue to live well in such circumstances.17 
Similarly, the person in Laws IX.854a-c who has incurable vicious impulses may be so 
overwhelmed by constantly trying to control her desires, that she cannot do anything else.  While 
she puts forth all her efforts into restraining her vicious desires, she cannot perform virtuous deeds.  
As a result, she is unable to live well.  But – what is worse – she may end up living badly.  If she 
is unable to expunge her vicious desires, she risks contributing negatively both to herself (by 
committing a vicious deed) and to her society (by disrupting its peace and security).  The 
suggestion that she is “better off dead” indicates no more than that she only harms herself by 
staying alive.  Her death will benefit her because it will stop her from continuing to live a life that 
                                                          
17  Note that he must have a very particular case in mind here: a chronic, incurable illness that will not improve 
over time.  Presumably, it is also an illness that requires constant medical attention.  An incurable condition that can 
be easily controlled or that is not terribly disaffecting will not count. 
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is unable to be eudaimōn.  Committing suicide is a preemptive strategy, the only possible cure if 
her own attempts at expiation and purification have failed.    
The passage suggests how Plato could think suicide is beneficial.  Suicide may benefit an 
agent when it keeps her from living a life with negative value, one in which eudaimonia could not 
possibly be achieved or maintained.  These circumstances may arise when a person becomes 
incapable of engaging in virtuous activity, or if a person faces a situation in which she can only 
perform vicious actions.  Because it would impossible or extremely difficult to live well in such 
conditions, she would be better off dead.   
The answer I am recommending is a Stoic one.  Like Plato,18 the Stoics believed that an 
agent cannot live a good life without virtue (D.L. VII.102).  So, when it happens that some adverse 
circumstance (for instance, disease or extreme shame) makes performing virtuous activity 
extremely difficult or impossible, the Stoics think suicide becomes a reasonable option.  Suicide 
is reasonable precisely because the agent’s eudaimonia is unattainable or can even be hampered 
by a continued life (SVF III.763, 765-6; D.L. VII.130; Seneca Ep. LXX).   
This response can easily apply to Plato’s other permissible suicides (at Laws IX.873c-d).  
In the first case, a person whose state has ordered her to commit suicide would conceivably be 
obligated to obey.19  Failing to obey would be unjust.  Since committing injustice is worse than 
                                                          
18  I am with Warren (100) and Rist (1969: 235 ff.), who both emphasize similarities between Plato’s and the 
Stoics’ accounts of suicide.  Indeed, it is possible that Socrates and Plato are more Stoic in their commitments than is 
often realized.  Consider Brown (2006).  Cooper (1999: 526) denies this claim, saying that Plato explicitly disregards 
the sorts of considerations that allow the Stoics to commit suicide. 
19  It is an open question whether an agent is obligated to obey an unjust command or unjust state, since Plato’s 
Laws provides a specific context that may not apply to every state everywhere.  The Laws has as its task the job to 
form a society as close to perfectly just as possible (IV.713c-718c).  Thus, the situation in which suicide is required at 
the state’s direction may only be when it is commanded within the context of an approximately-just state like the 
Laws’ Magnesia.  As I argue elsewhere, although Socrates recognizes his city’s conviction as the god’s sign of 
necessity to die, he commits suicide for reasons in addition to the state’s command (see Chapter 1.6 and Chapter 
3.2.4).  So it is at least conceivable that some state-ordered suicides might not be obligatory.   
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death (Grg. 469b), the individual is better off dead than committing injustice.  She could not be 
eudaimōn if she remained alive unjustly.   
The second case involves a person suffering “excruciating” and “unavoidable” (περιωδύνῳ 
ἀφύκτῳ, 873c) misfortune.  The qualifications indicate that Plato is considering misfortune of such 
magnitude that things could not conceivably improve enough to allow a life of continued virtue.  
We have seen how Plato has Socrates claim that a person who is incurably ill should think life is 
“no use” to her if she has to neglect her work and always be concerned with her illness.  He goes 
on to suggest that a person cannot be eudaimōn if she is overcome by her own pain or suffering.  
Such a person, he says, should either recover, or should “die and escape trouble” (Rep. III.406d).  
Presumably, he thinks that the suffering person is too concerned with her own misery to attend to 
her virtue or to aid her fellow citizens (407b).  As a result, she is incapable of performing virtuous 
actions.  She is better off dead, precisely because living well is impossible. 
This argument suggests that Plato could allow suicide to those afflicted by misfortune 
because their living well is no longer possible.  Certainly, suffering from a painful, incurable 
disease or experiencing a traumatic loss are significant impediments to living a good life.  When 
pain or grief have no prospect of alleviation, they can become all-consuming, making a good life 
difficult, if not impossible.  At the very least, it will become more difficult for the agent to perform 
virtuous activities.  For example, a significant loss of physical health makes it impossible to 
perform certain courageous acts in battle, while extreme depression may hinder living prudently.  
Committing suicide could quite possibly prevent the agent from continuing to live a life which she 
could no longer live well. 
One would do well to consider Aristotle’s thoughts on extreme misfortune to motivate this 
conclusion.  Aristotle writes: “the most prosperous may fall into great misfortunes in old age, as 
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is told of Priam in the Trojan cycle; and one who has experienced such chances and has ended 
wretchedly nobody calls eudaimōn” (E.N. 1000a).  Priam was a mythical king of Troy, blessed 
with wealth, family, and power.  He lived just long enough to watch his children butchered and his 
city destroyed.  Aristotle’s implication is that Priam is denied eudaimonia – despite his excellent 
youth and prime – purely because of the misfortunes he suffered late in life.  He might perhaps 
have achieved eudaimonia if he had died earlier, before all the good of his life was outbalanced by 
a single blow of fortune.20  For this reason, the person wishing to be eudaimōn should consider 
whether a continued life would irreparably destroy her status and hopes of being eudaimōn.  If the 
answer is “yes,” then suicide could be an option. 
A similar answer could explain the third case, a person overtaken by some “irremediable 
and unbearable” (ἀπόρου καὶ ἀβίου, Laws IX.873c) shame.  Presumably, the cases under 
consideration are cases of such magnitude that the shamed agent has irreversibly lost her dignity.  
Such persons cannot escape their shame, and they must live under stigma or guilt for the rest of 
their lives.  They may become all-consumed by the repercussions, much as the incurably ill person 
in the Republic is all-consumed.  It would be difficult for them to perform virtuous activities for 
the city or for their fellow humans.  In such cases, eudaimonia would be out of reach.  Since they 
could not live well, they would be better off dead. 
 
2.3.1 Objection 1 
 
Someone may object that I have made Plato’s account appear too permissive of suicide.21  
But the conditions clarify that Plato’s account is not overly permissive.  Rather, the situations must 
                                                          
20  It is doubtful whether Aristotle would think suicide would be a proper way for Priam to have avoided such 
circumstances.  His account of suicide is more restrictive even than Plato’s.  However, Aristotle does make the point 
very well that some circumstances can arise in which a continued life will undermine the agent’s eudaimonia. 
21  Presumably, scholars who think Plato never permits suicide hold this view.  See Geddes (1885: 224, n. 2). 
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be so extreme that an agent’s achieving or maintaining eudaimonia is impossible, given her current 
conditions and expected life trajectory.   
The Laws’ first permissible suicide clearly makes this point.  It says that a person tempted 
to perform a heinous deed should see suicide as a good option only after her attempts to purify 
herself have failed (IX.854b-c).  This qualification suggests that the number of actually permitted 
suicides is going to be quite small.  The fact that a person has to recognize her situation as 
permissible is itself a significant constraint.  Many vicious people will be incapable of recognizing 
their vice.  Of those who do recognize their vice, we can surmise that at least some attempts to 
curb their vicious desires will be moderately successful.  After all, before considering death as 
preferable, a person should first to try to eliminate her base desires by worshipping the gods, 
performing purification rites, and emulating virtuous people.  She should commit suicide only if 
those attempts fail, and she realizes that living well is completely beyond her grasp.   
If we expand this point to cover the other permissible suicides, suicide will be a legitimate 
option only when a person recognizes that the deterioration of her life is immense and completely 
irreparable.  Some situations of pain, suffering, or disgrace will go away on their own, or can be 
overcome.  Suicide will not be an option in such cases, precisely because the situations will have 
little effect on one’s eudaimonia.  But when unbearable pain or grief, loss of dignity, or certain 
psychological conditions – for example, overwhelming depression or the urge to commit a heinous 
crime – have no prospect of alleviation and are all-consuming, suicide can confer benefit.  It will 
allow the agent to leave life before these things can irreversibly cripple her eudaimonia.   
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2.3.2 Objection 2 
 
Another person may object that, because Plato thinks virtuous activity is sufficient for 
eudaimonia, it makes no sense for him to allow suicide based on externals like misfortune and 
shame – things that should only coincidentally intrude on a virtuous agent’s life.  But the account 
I have reconstructed does not say that Plato allows suicide purely because of the externals.  Rather, 
he allows suicide only when it is no longer possible to maintain one’s eudaimonia.  It may be that 
the presence of certain externals can confer a negative influence on an agent’s ability to perform 
virtuous actions.  But the real reason why suicide is permitted in those circumstances is that a 
continued life could not maintain eudaimonia, not simply that the externals exist.  
 
2.3.3 Objection 3 
 
Finally, someone might object that it would exhibit more virtue for the one who would be 
eudaimōn to continue to live, rather than to commit suicide.  Perhaps they will argue that it shows 
more courage to fight on in the face of misfortune or shame, but cowardice to give in and die.22  
However, it is far from certain that committing suicide to avoid something unwanted is 
cowardly.  We often choose to avoid things, and are not deemed “cowards” for doing so, but rather 
“prudent.”  Suppose that you are on a strict diet and know that attending an all-you-can-eat buffet 
invites disaster.  You might think you would be better off if you would avoid temptation by evading 
the buffet entirely, rather than enter the buffet in a quite possibly futile attempt to prove you can 
defeat temptation.  Similarly, it might be more prudent for an agent to avoid a part of life in which 
                                                          
22  This is a familiar argument.  Plato has Crito argue against Socrates’ suicide on these grounds (Crit. 45c-d).  
Aristotle also assumes that some acts of suicide exhibit cowardice: “But to die to escape from poverty or love or 
something distressing is not brave but rather cowardly; for it is softness to flee from what is painful, and the person 
endures death not because it is good, but to flee from evil” [E.N. 1116a13-15]). 
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she suspects her eudaimonia will be severely impinged, rather than for her to willingly endure the 
experience and hope that she might come through it unscathed.  It would be no more cowardly to 
commit suicide in this case than it would be for you to avoid a buffet with many cakes and martinis 
on offer.  It may be the real courageous choice: to protect one’s eudaimonia, even to death. 
 
2.4 Is Plato’s Account Too Exclusive? 
 
Plato permits suicide when a continued life can no longer maintain eudaimonia.  Even so, 
the circumstances in which he permits suicide are severely limited.  Presumably, many people do 
not relish performing virtuous activities (Rep. II.359a ff.), and are therefore incapable of achieving 
eudaimonia.  Vicious persons would be better off dead, Socrates says, because they cannot live 
well (Grg. 469b, 507b-c 512a-b; cf. Rep. I.354a and the Stranger at Laws IX.854c).23  Thus, we 
face a question that is the reverse of the one that we just considered.  Since most people cannot 
achieve eudaimonia anyway, why shouldn’t they all just go out and kill themselves?   
The Phaedo introduces a related puzzle about another and surprising case: that of 
philosophers.  Socrates leaves a startling message for the sophist, Evenus: “Tell these things to 
Evenus, Cebes: tell him farewell and, if he is wise, to follow me as quickly as possible” (61b9-
c1).24  The message is alarming, because it appears to invite Evenus to kill himself.  And indeed, 
Socrates claims that Evenus should be willing to die if he is a philosopher.   
                                                          
23  It is possible that the situations permitting suicide are more likely to be met for vicious persons than for 
virtuous persons.  Virtuous persons are less likely to be driven to commit heinous deeds or to do things that require 
the state to order their suicide.  The Gorgias also says that virtuous persons are untouched by terrible things (527d; cf. 
Ap. 41c-d), suggesting that misfortune is less likely for them as well.  However, I think it possible that an unavoidable 
misfortune or shame could still affect the virtuous person.  The earlier example about a healthy person being drafted 
into an unjust tyrant’s army could still apply.  The circumstance itself will not directly affect her virtue.  But it will 
make performing virtuous activities more difficult, which is what harms her eudaimonia. 
24  ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Κέβης, Εὐήνῳ φράζε, καὶ ἐρρῶσθαι καί, ἂν σωφρονῇ, ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα.  
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Socrates emphasizes that philosophers, who are literally “lovers of wisdom,” desire 
wisdom.  But true wisdom is impossible to achieve in earthly life.  While the philosopher is alive, 
she is a composite being, composed of an immaterial soul and a material body.  The body holds 
the soul until death, at which time the soul is freed from the body and the body becomes an 
inanimate corpse.  Until then, the soul is subject to the body’s physical limitations.  It relies on the 
body’s physical senses (sight, touch, etc.) to receive information about the world.  But these senses 
are unreliable and misleading.25  So information obtained through the senses is uncertain.  Only 
when the soul escapes from the body can the soul possibly obtain true wisdom.  Socrates says: 
“But it seems to us that, if we are ever to know anything purely, we must escape 
the body and observe things in themselves with the soul alone.  And then it seems 
likely that we shall, only then, when we are dead, obtain that which we desire and 
say we are lovers of, namely, wisdom, as our argument shows, not while we live.  
For if it is impossible to know anything purely with the body, then one of two things 
must follow: either it cannot be obtained at all or only when we are dead.  For then 
and not before will the soul be by itself apart from the body” (66d-67a).26 
 
According to this passage, death will benefit Evenus (if he is a philosopher) and other 
philosophers because it will possibly enable them to achieve true wisdom (61d, 62d, 64a).  
Meanwhile, death will presumably benefit vicious persons because it will keep them from living 
badly.  It is beginning to look like everyone is better off dead!27  So the question arises: why should 
                                                          
25  Consider the example given in Rep. X of something that appears bent in water and straight when out of water 
(602c).  What our eyes see in the water is deceptive, and not indicative of how things really are. 
26  ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδεικται ὅτι, εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἴσεσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ 
ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα: καὶ τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καί φαμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, 
φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζῶσιν δὲ οὔ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἷόν τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν 
καθαρῶς γνῶναι, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστιν κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ τελευτήσασιν: τότε γὰρ αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἡ 
ψυχὴ ἔσται χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος, πρότερον δ᾽ οὔ. 
27  Plato was clearly sympathetic to the ancient sentiment that being dead is better than being alive.  Consider 
Ap. 38a5-6 compared to Epicurus, Ep. Men. in D.L. (X.126-127); Homer, (Il. XXII.481); Euripides (Tro. 636-637); 
Aristotle (E.E. 1215b15-1216a10).  I am unaware of any place in the dialogues where Plato touts life’s superiority 
over death, but several places exist where he seems to place death above life.  See esp. Ap. 40b-41a, Phd. 66d-67a, 
Laws VIII.828d.  On this, see also Dorter (17-18). 
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philosophers and vicious persons not hasten their deaths by committing suicide?  Perhaps we 
should all, if we are truly wise, follow Socrates when he dies.28   
 
2.4.1 A First Stab 
 
But here Plato has Socrates introduce a possible paradox.  For Socrates follows his message 
to Evenus by saying that “perhaps” Evenus will not commit suicide, because that is not right.29  
The problem is that, even though suicide appears prudentially beneficial in some cases, suicide is 
generally a prohibited action.  But how can it be claimed both that some people are better off dead, 
and also that suicide is not right?  Shouldn’t we rather allow people to die, if death is what will 
benefit them?30   
The supposed contradiction between these views assumes a dichotomy between a 
prudential good (what is in an agent’s non-ethical best interest) and an ethical good (what an agent 
ought to do).  But Plato denies any distinction between prudential and ethical goodness.  Since 
eudaimonia just is virtuous activity, it follows that no vicious deed can help an agent achieve her 
eudaimonia – even if the action may otherwise seem prudentially beneficial (see Rep. IX.589d-e; 
Crit. 48c-d).  Indeed, vicious activity can only hinder eudaimonia.  Thus, if suicide is really unjust, 
                                                          
28  The dialogue Axiochus urges the same question.  Socrates eases the dying Axiochus’ fears of death by 
emphasizing how miserable earthly life is.  He says that we should not fear death, because the hereafter is so much 
better than our current existence.  But if the afterlife is really better for us than life on this earth, it would seem 
advisable not to remain alive.  Rather, it would behoove us to flee this life as quickly as possible by committing suicide 
(Ax. 366a-b).  
29  Both the Laws and the Phaedo argue that suicide under ordinary conditions is impious, unjust, and irrational.  
See Chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
30  This question perplexes Socrates’ interlocutors as well.  Cebes asks, “Socrates, how do you say that it is not 
right to do oneself violence, and yet that the philosopher will be willing to follow one who is dying?” (61d3-6).  How 
exactly Cebes and Simmias are puzzled about the prohibition is a matter of debate, since the following passage, 
Socrates’ response to the question at 62a, consists of a locus vexatus that has caught the interest of several scholars.  
See most notably Gallop, who provides a thorough analysis of many possible modalities in this passage (79-83).  See 
also Burger (1984: 31), Eckstein 48, Hackforth (1955: 191), Warren 95.  For my purposes in this chapter, this debate 
has no significant ramifications and would prove distracting, so I leave the puzzle aside here.   
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prohibiting it will be consistent with Plato’s eudaimonism.  No one desiring eudaimonia (which is 
everyone, see Euthyd. 278e) should ever commit suicide impermissibly, whether she is a vicious 
person, or a philosopher who desires wisdom.  It will not serve her eudaimonia to perform a vicious 
action.  
However, this response will be unsatisfactory if we are at all inclined to question Plato’s 
arguments that suicide is ordinarily vicious.  According to the Phaedo, suicide is vicious because 
it constitutes theft from the gods (62b; cf. Laws X.902b-c).  In the same way that it would be wrong 
for a slave to flee her human master, so it would be wrong for a human being to flee her divine 
caretakers by committing suicide.   
We might object to Plato’s argument, first, by claiming that the argument accepts three 
potentially false assumptions31: 
1) Gods exist. 
2) We are immortal, and will live on in an afterlife. 
3) The gods are our caretakers, and we humans are the gods’ possessions (slaves). 
Any or all of these assumptions may be questioned.  However, since I seek primarily to examine 
whether Plato’s beliefs can form a coherent whole, I leave aside questions concerning whether 
gods exist or whether we are or could be immortal.  A more interesting objection pertains to the 
final assumption.  For, even if we grant that gods exist and humans are their slaves, we might think 
that limits should exist on a slave’s obligations to remain under her master’s control.32  Even 
supposing that a well-treated slave is somehow obligated to remain subject to her master, it may 
not be the case that a mistreated slave is so obligated.  Similarly, human beings may not be 
                                                          
31  Warren also voices these objections. 
32  Margaret Pabst Battin offers this objection: “[Although] a well-treated slave might have some obligation to 
remain, a mistreated slave does not.   Analogously, the person who escapes from an unusually cruel servitude in life 
cannot be said to have done wrong” (222).   
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obligated to remain alive under their divine caretakers if their lives should become unbearable or, 
in the philosopher’s case, if life frustratingly keeps her from attaining wisdom.  After all, if life 
becomes unbearable, filled with inordinate pain and frustration, we might think that the divine 
caretakers have failed their tasks.  A person might not act viciously if she flees from cruel or inept 
gods. 
 However, even if it befits our modern sensibilities that slaves should be obligated only (if 
at all) to kind masters, it is doubtful that this idea correlates well with the institution of slavery as 
it existed in ancient Athens.33  A slave would have been equally obligated to a cruel or inept master 
as she would have been obligated to a kind one.  Analogously, a person may be just as obligated 
to cruel or inept divine caretakers as she is to kind ones.  So, whether she flees a good or bad 
situation without permission, she still exhibits vice that undermines her eudaimonia. 
 Moreover, Plato avoids the objection entirely when he has Socrates note that the gods are 
good caretakers (63b; cf. Rep. III.388c ff.; Laws X.902c).  If the gods really good, they cannot be 
unduly cruel or inept.  Such characteristics would be incompatible with their goodness.  As a result, 
human beings should have no rational reason to desire fleeing the gods’ rule.   
 Yet perhaps we should wonder whether the gods really are cruel and capricious, contrary 
to Plato’s assumption.  After all, if the gods were really good masters who cared for their human 
possessions, why would they allow situations of horrific misfortune or shame to intrude upon some 
human lives in the first place?  Why would they not allow vicious persons and philosophers to 
commit suicide without requiring such horrific signs?  It would seem that both vicious persons and 
philosophers are better off dead.  Not allowing them the benefit of suicide may impugn the gods’ 
                                                          
33  Battin also points out this objection to her argument (ibid.). 
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goodness, and make the sign of necessity to die a merely arbitrary benefit that they provide on a 
whim.34 
 This concern is troubling, but it is not insurmountable.  All Plato needs to say is that the 
gods do allow suicide if it is truly in an agent’s best interest, and that remaining alive until then is 
in the agent’s best interest.  But how might Plato say such a thing?   
 
2.4.2 Another Response 
 
 What is needed is some way to show how staying alive could work for a person’s long-
term benefit, even when it seems that immediate suicide would prudentially benefit her.  This is a 
tall order, but Plato tries to meet it for philosophers by arguing that philosophers have an alternative 
way of dying.  
First, Plato has Socrates define “death” as the “separation of the soul from the body” (Phd. 
64c).  When a person dies, her body and soul separate completely and exist apart from each other.  
The body becomes a corpse and decomposes.  The soul passes on to the afterlife.   
Plato next has Socrates expand this definition of death to allow a kind of death that can 
occur to a certain extent while one is alive.  He claims that certain pleasures are bodily – those 
having to do with food, drink, or sex, for example (66b) – and that these pleasures keep the 
philosopher from focusing on philosophy (66d).  He then claims that the philosopher will not be 
concerned with pursuing bodily pleasures, but only with her soul’s pleasure, which is obtained by 
pursuing wisdom.  The philosopher will desire to “release” her soul from association with the body 
as much as she can while alive, training herself to avoid bodily pleasures that distract her soul from 
                                                          
34  On the sign of necessity, see Chapter 1.  Warren (101) also worries about the potential arbitrariness of the 
sign of necessity. 
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pursuing wisdom (65a; 114c).  This may also constitute a kind of “death.”  For it will also involve 
separating the philosopher’s soul from her body via her own attempts to purify her soul from bodily 
influences and desires.35   
The philosopher seeks above all else to separate her soul from her body, since that 
separation is necessary to achieve wisdom.  But, because of how Plato has had Socrates define 
death, a philosopher may separate her soul from her body to some extent while she is yet alive.  
She can do this by purifying herself as much as she can of bodily pleasures and pursuing 
philosophy. 
But how can this notion help us when we consider Plato’s views of suicide?  Consider this 
passage: 
“And thusly is seems that while we live, we shall be nearest to knowledge if we 
keep ourselves as much as possible from the body and do not associate with it any 
more than it is necessary, if we are not infected with its nature but purify ourselves 
from it until the god himself releases us” (67a).36 
 
By having Socrates claim that “we purify ourselves from the body until the god releases us,” Plato 
has tied the notion of the god’s final release to the philosopher’s own attempts to purify herself.  
A philosopher desires death and prepares for the complete, final physical separation of her soul 
from her body by attempting to purify her soul of bodily concerns as much as she can while alive.  
But the argument suggests a further point.  The philosopher will not separate her soul from her 
body completely until the god releases her from life.  On one hand, the passage may mean that 
                                                          
35  Scholars disagree about how to understand these passages.  Some understand this to refer to a kind of 
asceticism, that the philosopher should train herself to avoid bodily things entirely.  For this view, see Butler (2012), 
Gallop (1975: 88) and Irwin (1977: 64).  Others understand the philosopher’s attitude to be evaluative, that the 
philosopher should simply train herself to view bodily things as not having any value.  See Woolf (2004). 
36  καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ 
σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν ἀπ᾽ 
αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς. 
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natural death frees the philosopher.  But the passage has the additional ramification that the 
philosopher will also not kill herself until the god releases her.   
This thought suggests that the philosopher’s purification is closely linked with death’s 
ability to benefit her.  A god will grant permission to die – “releasing” the person from life – after 
she has prepared herself for death.  The reason why is unstated.  But I think it is a possible 
explanation is that the philosopher’s soul can only enjoy true wisdom in the afterlife if it has been 
prepared through purification during this lifetime to receive such benefits.  If the philosopher dies 
without purification, her soul may not be ready for death to benefit her.37   
 Other Platonic evidence about purification can support this interpretation.  In the Phaedrus, 
Plato has Socrates give a speech about love that Socrates later claims is “horrible” (δεινός, Phdr. 
242d).  Because it was such a bad speech, Socrates insists that he must purify himself (καθήρασθαι, 
243a) before he can go on to give a better account.  To do otherwise would mean not only that he 
would risk impiety (given that the subject matter he is discussing is divine38), but also that he could 
not obtain the correct account of love.   
The passage suggests that purification of one’s soul from wrong ideas is necessary before 
one is ready to advance to more correct knowledge.  Purification is also necessary to avoid impiety.  
Analogously, it may be that the Phaedo is suggesting philosophers must use this earthly life to try 
to cleanse themselves from improper ideas before they can be ready to obtain true knowledge and 
wisdom in the hereafter.  They must prepare themselves for the final separation of body and soul 
by trying to purify their souls of bodily concerns as much as possible in this life.  To kill themselves 
                                                          
37  Warren (104) and Ahrensdorf (38-39) argue similarly. 
38  Cobb (1993: 147-148) emphasizes the divine nature of Socrates’ subject in this passage as grounds for 
concern that he has risked impiety by his trite treatment of love. 
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preemptively would be just as ineffective and impious as if Socrates had concluded his discussion 
of love in the Phaedrus with his horrible speech without having attempted to purify himself.   
 This argument indicates that the afterlife is really only better for the philosopher if her soul 
has been prepared for it.  Until that time, suicide under ordinary conditions is not only vicious, it 
is also ineffective.  So the gods are not being cruel when they prohibit suicide.  They are only 
keeping the philosopher from dying before she is ready for release.  The philosopher is better off 
if she continues to live, and continues to purify herself and make herself ready for death.  If she 
kills herself preemptively, before purifying herself as much as possible, then she dies not only 
impiously, but also before she is truly ready for the hereafter’s benefits.  That would only hinder 
her eudaimonia.  As such, a general prohibition against suicide is compatible with Plato’s aims.   
It may be objected that total purification is impossible and, as a result, no one will ever be 
ready to be benefitted by death.39  After all, human beings must eat and drink in order to survive.  
Since eating and drinking are bodily concerns, total purification of the soul from bodily concerns 
cannot be achieved as long as the physical body remains alive.  So how could anyone purify herself 
enough? 
 Plato protects himself well from this objection.  He never has Socrates say that a person 
must purify herself “completely” before death.  That would be impossible.  Instead, he has Socrates 
state repeatedly that a person need only purify herself “as much as possible” while she is alive 
(καθ᾽ ὅσον δύναται, Phd. 64e5, 65c5-9, 67c5).  This answer is vague about what level of 
purification counts.  But it allows that a person need not be totally pure when she dies.  It is 
sufficient that she been working towards such purification. 
                                                          
39  Ahrensdorf (46-57) raises this objection. 
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We will recall that the Laws’ first permissible suicide only allows suicide if the person 
recognizes that all her attempts to purify herself of vicious desires have utterly failed (IX.854b-c).  
Thus, this person would only kill herself if she remains impure, despite her best efforts.  But she 
still has worked at purification as much as possible, given her nature and incurable, vicious desires.   
The stipulation may suggest that suicide is only an option for people who seek purification.  
Indeed, it may be that they are the only persons who are able to recognize a divine sign of necessity 
to die.  Vicious people who do not recognize their vice must stay alive.  This response is fitting, 
for it is likely that vicious people will lack Plato’s insight to see how they are better off dead than 
pursuing a vicious life.  They should not commit suicide for two reasons.  First, performing yet 
another vicious action will not help them achieve eudaimonia.  But, second, as long as they are 
alive, some slim hope remains that they may give up their errant ways and seek virtue. 
 
2.5 How Socrates’ Suicide Was Wise 
 
But how could Socrates’ suicide have been wise?  Plato himself appears concerned about 
this question.  In both the Phaedo and the Crito, he has Socrates’ interlocutors argue that Socrates’ 
choice to die is foolish and wrong.40  In the Phaedo, Cebes suggests that Socrates is irrational.  
When Socrates asserts that the gods are good masters who care for their human possessions (62b6-
c7), Cebes counters that, if the gods truly care for humans and are the best rulers, it would be 
unwise for any human to desire to leave their care.41  Instead, a wise person should resent dying 
                                                          
40  Other philosophers have recognized a question here.  Ahrensdorf writes that the evidence of Socrates’ own 
case should make us question whether the human being “who devotes his life to the pursuit of wisdom through reason 
alone is, in truth, an unwise, unjust and impious human being” (3; 25).  Eckstein agrees, claiming that Socrates exhibits 
“fuzziness” in his thinking on his final day (46).  If these assessments are correct, then Socrates’ act of self-killing 
may have been a mistake, since it wrongly and foolishly ended his life.  
41  “It is unreasonable that the wisest of men should not resent leaving this service in which the gods, who are 
the best of masters, are guarding them.” τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας ἀπιόντας, 
ἐν ᾗ ἐπιστατοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἵπερ ἄριστοί εἰσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστάται, θεοί, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον (Phd. 62d). 
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and should seek to remain alive with these divine rulers as long as possible.  Only a fool, Cebes 
says, would rejoice at death (62d-e).   
Simmias picks up on Cebes’ challenge, and increases the stakes:   
“But now, Socrates, it seems to me as well that Cebes is right.  For why should truly 
wise men wish to flee from masters who are better than they, and be rid of them 
easily?  And I think Cebes is aiming his argument at you, because you are bearing 
leaving us so lightly and our good rulers who are, as you yourself say, gods” (63a).42 
 
While Cebes has only said that Socrates acts irrationally, Simmias implies that Socrates is vicious.  
If Socrates wrongfully leaves the gods, he acts impiously;43 and if he wrongfully leaves his friends 
(63a), he acts unjustly.44  Simmias’ challenge is concerning because, if he is right, Socrates’ 
committing suicide will work against his eudaimonia.  Because eudaimonia just is virtuous 
activity, unjust acts cannot promote eudaimonia.   
Crito expresses similar concerns in the Crito: 
“Socrates, it does not seem to me that the thing you are doing is just, to give up 
your life when you can save it, and to hasten your fate as your enemies would hasten 
it . . . Moreover, I think you are betraying your sons by going away and leaving 
them, when you could raise them and educate them. . . . But you seem to me to 
choose the laziest way, when you ought to choose as a good and courageous human 
being would choose, you who have been saying throughout your whole life that you 
care about virtue” (45c-d).45 
 
                                                          
42  καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γέ μοι δοκεῖ τι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης: τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι 
ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεσπότας ἀμείνους αὑτῶν φεύγοιεν καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀπαλλάττοιντο αὐτῶν; καί μοι δοκεῖ Κέβης 
εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὕτω ῥᾳδίως φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπων καὶ ἄρχοντας ἀγαθούς, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς, 
θεούς. 
43  On this, I agree with Stern (1993: 24).  The accusation is all the more worrisome because Socrates was 
imprisoned and convicted of impiety (Ap. 24b).  If Socrates wrongfully leaves his gods, he acts impiously when he 
kills himself. 
44  I agree with Ahrensdorf (32). 
45  ἔτι δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι, ἐξὸν σωθῆναι, καὶ 
τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτὸν γενέσθαι ἅπερ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροί σου σπεύσαιέν . . . πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοὺς ὑεῖς τοὺς 
σαυτοῦ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς προδιδόναι, οὕς σοι ἐξὸν καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεῦσαι οἰχήσῃ καταλιπών . . . σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς 
τὰ ῥᾳθυμότατα αἱρεῖσθαι. χρὴ δέ, ἅπερ ἂν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρεῖος ἕλοιτο, ταῦτα αἱρεῖσθαι, φάσκοντά γε δὴ ἀρετῆς 
διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι:  
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Crito objects that Socrates is wrong to kill himself when he has claimed throughout his life to care 
about virtue.  If Socrates really cared about virtue, he would instead choose to continue living.  
Crito’s complaint suggests that Socrates’ suicide will undermine his eudaimonia by subverting his 
virtue, and unjustly discounting his sons and his friends. 
Interestingly, none of Socrates’ interlocutors has objected that death is inherently bad.  
Their objections suggest only that death is bad for Socrates because Socrates kills himself wrongly 
and foolishly, thus subverting his eudaimonia.  If Socrates’ interlocutors had argued that death is 
inherently bad, then Socrates, as Plato has presented him, would have had a ready answer.  Socrates 
thinks death has – at worst – a neutral value.  We see this best in the Apology, when Socrates 
claims that death is either non-existence, a neutral value, or an eternity spent philosophizing with 
good gods and good human beings, a positive value (40c-41d).  If death is the former, it is neither 
good nor bad, since nothing can be good or bad about a thing that does not exist.46  If the latter, 
death is undeniably a good thing.  Thus, any objections Socrates’ interlocutors provide must 
suggest that, even if death itself has neutral or positive value, it may still have a negative value for 
Socrates.   
So this is exactly what Cebes, Simmias, and Crito argue.  From their vantage point, we can 
see many reasons for Socrates not to kill himself.  These reasons all involve virtue: specifically, 
piety and justice, and obligations to friends and family.  Their arguments invite us to wonder about 
Socrates’ wisdom in choosing to kill himself, for Socrates’ eudaimonia will be poorly served if he 
dies viciously. 
 
                                                          
46  To say “Unicorns are beautiful” only makes sense if “unicorns” exist. Similar arguments about death’s 
neutrality are offered by the Epicureans.  See Epicurus (Ep. Men. 125, KD 2); and Lucretius (DRN III.862-864). 
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2.5.1 The Phaedo’s Response 
 
 Plato has Socrates offer two very different responses to this concern.47  In the Phaedo, the 
response is simply that Socrates can reasonably kill himself because death will allow him to 
achieve his goals in the afterlife.  Socrates says: 
“For . . . if I did not believe that I should go first to other wise and good gods, and 
also to human beings who have died and are better than those humans here, I would 
be wrong not to resent death.  But now know well that I hope to go to good human 
beings – and this last thing I would not always rely on – but know well that if I 
would always rely on anything at all of these matters, it is that I will come to gods 
who are altogether good masters.  And therefore, because of these things I am not 
resentful, but I have good hope that there is something for the dead and, as has been 
said of old, it is much better for the good than for the wicked” (63b7-c9).48 
 
Socrates claims that he is not being irrational or vicious when he chooses to commit suicide, 
because dying will be better for himself than a continued life would be.  By dying, he will obtain 
a better existence and wisdom,49 as well as the ability to philosophize alongside better gods and 
human beings than those whose company he has enjoyed while alive.  Thus, Socrates denies that 
his suicide can hinder his eudaimonia.   As he sees it, his suicide will instead achieve it. 
 The argument accepts the tacit assumption that it is rational to abandon something good in 
order to acquire something better.  In the same way that a person might reasonably choose to give 
                                                          
47  One might reasonably question why the responses in the Phaedo and the Crito differ.  Probably, the texts’ 
intended audiences have something to do with it.  The Phaedo may have been written for strictly philosophical 
audiences.  These people are interested in getting knowledge and wisdom, however that is achieved.  If what the 
Phaedo says is right, they will seek knowledge even by dying.  The Crito, however, seems to have the everyday person 
(like Crito) in mind.  These people are more practically minded.  An argument about the soul’s immortality will not 
interest them nearly as much as concerns about how to live here and now.  This difference will dictate the kind of 
answer we get about suicide’s permissibility. 
48  ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ᾤμην ἥξειν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους σοφούς τε καὶ 
ἀγαθούς, ἔπειτα καὶ παρ᾽ ἀνθρώπους τετελευτηκότας ἀμείνους τῶν ἐνθάδε, ἠδίκουν ἂν οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν τῷ θανάτῳ: 
νῦν δὲ εὖ ἴστε ὅτι παρ᾽ ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθούσ—καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνυ διισχυρισαίμην—ὅτι μέντοι 
παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνυ ἀγαθοὺς ἥξειν, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων διισχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο. ὥστε 
διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀγανακτῶ, ἀλλ᾽ εὔελπίς εἰμι εἶναί τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι καί, ὥσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ 
ἄμεινον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς. 
49  “[There] is good hope that on arriving where I am going, if anywhere, I shall acquire what has been our chief 
preoccupation in our past life” (67b-c). 
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up eating a piece of chocolate cake to achieve better health, Socrates might rationally choose to 
die if what he will obtain by dying is better than what continued life has to offer him.  Better 
friends, better gods, and better knowledge would go a long way to make his afterlife superior to 
anything he could expect if he stayed alive. 
However, we have two reasons to worry about the Phaedo’s argument.  First, we might be 
concerned that the Phaedo’s response is merely “a declaration of faith”50 based on Socrates’ mere 
“hope” that better gods and knowledge await him in the afterlife.  Plato has had Socrates express 
doubt that death will provide such positive benefits.  In the Phaedo itself, Socrates admits the 
possibility that knowledge might not be attainable even in death (66d-67a).  In the Apology, too, 
Socrates expresses uncertainty about whether death involves fellowship with good gods and 
humans, or whether death involves eternal non-existence (40c-41d). If it is indeed questionable 
whether better gods, better people, and wisdom await Socrates in the afterlife, then Socrates’ 
response will appear unstable.  It would seem wiser to stay alive, rather than to risk all on some 
hoped-for but uncertain benefits in the afterlife.   
But perhaps the response is not as troubling as it first seems.  If Socrates is right, then either 
he cannot get knowledge at all, or he can get it only in the afterlife (Phd. 66d-67a).  He might then 
justify his decision to die by saying he is certain not to get knowledge if he stays alive, but he has 
a chance to get it if he dies.  This answer does not require certainty or even a high chance of 
success.  It would be enough that Socrates knows that his only possibility to get knowledge is by 
dying.  In judging possible benefits, Socrates would be better off dying, given that the alternative 
assures him of not getting what he desires.51 
                                                          
50  Hackforth (41); Ahrensdorf (35). 
51  I thank Jason Gardner for suggesting this response to me. 
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However, the second worry is more concerning.  The Phaedo’s response does not answer 
Simmias’ objection: that Socrates acts viciously by dying now.  Socrates claims that he will obtain 
better friends and different gods when he dies.  But, although saying “I go to better friends and 
gods” may go a long way to explain why death is attractive, it will not address the concern that 
Socrates subverts his eudaimonia by dying viciously.  If the afterlife’s friends and gods are “better” 
than those friends and gods Socrates has here, then it follows that they cannot be the same entities.  
Suppose that I were to move away from my closest friends, never to see them again, and attempted 
to console them by saying this: “It’s okay.  I hope to be with better people than you in my new 
home!”  Not only would this sentiment not appease my friends, I would likely hurt my friends and 
cause resentment.  Since this sentiment appears to be exactly what Socrates is claiming here, we 
may worry that Socrates’ earthly friends and gods would be similarly affronted.  So Simmias’ and 
Crito’s accusations that Socrates has acted viciously still stands.  For Socrates’ response says 
nothing about how he has treated his friends and gods in this life.   
 It is possible that Socrates thinks he has already addressed Simmias’ charge when he stated 
that he dies with divine necessity (Phd. 62c).  Perhaps he thinks his act cannot be wrong if a god 
allows it.  But, if that is his intended response, he does not make it explicit or defend that claim.  
We have to look elsewhere for a better response. 
 
2.5.2 The Crito’s Response 
 
The Crito provides us another response.  After Crito’s accusation, Socrates responds: 
“But for us, since the argument thus compels us, the only thing we should consider 
is . . . whether we would be acting justly [if I escape] . . . or, in truth, unjustly . . . 
And if it should become evident that this action is unjust, then we ought not to 
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consider the fact that by staying here I would die or suffer anything else whatever 
when the alternative is to act unjustly” (48c6-d5).52 
 
Socrates sets up the issue as being between competing goods.  On the one hand, he recognizes 
non-ethical goods, such as health, life, wealth, friends, and honor (cf. Crit. 48c1-5; Euthyd. 279a-
b).  But over all these he sets ethical goods: virtue and acting justly.  In the Crito, he accepts the 
following principle:  whenever we must decide between goods that we consider just or unjust or, 
more generally, virtuous or vicious, our recognition of them as “just” or “unjust” should decide 
our choice.  Further deliberation is pointless.  It is better to give up any number of non-ethical 
goods in preference to giving up ethical good,53 because none of the former goods could possibly 
make up for the latter’s loss.54   
Socrates goes on to say that he can only act virtuously if he kills himself in accordance 
with Athenian law and the god’s leading, and that failing to do so would make him act viciously 
(52b-53b).55  So he is not being foolish when he gives up life, friends, and family.  Rather, he 
recognizes that no number of these non-ethical goods can possibly compensate him for the loss of 
his ethical good, which requires him to act justly.  If he lives, he thinks it will be only because he 
has acted unjustly.56  Since acting unjustly is worse than anything else, including death (cf. Prt. 
                                                          
52  ἡμῖν δ᾽, ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἱρεῖ, μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ᾖ ἢ ὅπερ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια 
πράξομεν καὶ χρήματα τελοῦντες τούτοις τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε ἐξάξουσιν καὶ χάριτας, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ 
ἐξαγόμενοι, ἢ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀδικήσομεν πάντα ταῦτα ποιοῦντες: κἂν φαινώμεθα ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δέῃ 
ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὔτ᾽ εἰ ἀποθνῄσκειν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας, οὔτε ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ 
ἀδικεῖν.  
53  Cf. also Ap. 28b-d.  Virtue should be, as Vlastos puts it, “the sovereign good” in our domain of value (115). 
54  We might compare this to what is said in the Gorgias, when Socrates argues that to suffer wrong oneself is 
always better than to do wrong oneself (469b, 472e, 509e). 
55  There is a question here about whether it would indeed be unjust for Socrates not to obey the Athenians’ 
verdict.  Some evidence suggests that Socrates was unjustly convicted.  Consider, for example, his insistence in the 
Apology that he would have been released if the Athenians had tried his case over multiple days instead of during one 
day (37a7-b2); cf. Brickhouse & Smith (1989: 42, n. 147 & 75-76); Shaw (2011: 195, n. 29).  I argued in Chapter 1 
that the justice of Socrates’ action is solely due to Athenian law, but rather Socrates’ commitment to do as the god 
leads. 
56  See Chapter 1.6 for a discussion of how Socrates’ staying alive would be unjust. 
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345e, 358e; Grg. 469b, 472e, 509e; Rep. IX.591a), he is better off dying – even if that involves 
committing suicide.   
Socrates’ response suggests that committing suicide will be good for him, first, because he 
thinks it is the right thing for him to do.  But it also suggests that death will benefit him because a 
continued life – given his current conditions – could not allow him to live justly or be eudaimōn.  
So his suicide will benefit him precisely because he cannot promote his eudaimonia by staying 
alive.  Through his suicide, he will avoid living in conditions he considers intolerable, namely, 
conditions in which he has undermined all that he has done throughout his life and failed to be 
eudaimōn.  Killing himself now, in accordance with his city’s laws and a god’s sign of necessity 
(46d; Phd. 62c) allows him to avoid that awful fate.  So his death suits his goal to be eudaimōn. 
The response fails to convince Crito, who remains preoccupied with the prudential aspect 
of Socrates’ decision.  The ethical argument is beyond him.57  For that reason, Socrates adds how 
continuing to live would also be prudentially unwise both for himself and for his loved ones.58  He 
claims that escaping death would require him to be an exile in another city (53b).  As a non-citizen, 
he would be unable to participate in civic life, which would automatically exclude him from many 
benefits which promote a good life and enable some virtuous activities.  Additionally, he could not 
continue philosophizing, since he would be unable to speak convincingly about virtue if he had 
disobeyed Athens’ laws.59  His friends would be exiled or disenfranchised for helping him 
                                                          
57  Consider Weiss’ argument (1998: 80) about how dense Crito seems to be.   
58  The argument that follows is unnecessary to defend Socrates’ main case, which has already been stated.  But 
it exists to silence Crito’s more practical considerations. 
59  The personified laws prompt this suggestion: “If you do [go into exile], will your life be worth living?  Will 
you have social intercourse with [your fellow city-dwellers] and not be ashamed to talk to them?  And what will you 
say?  The same as you did here, that virtue and justice are man’s most precious possession, along with lawful behavior 
and the laws?  Would you not be laughable?” (53c-d). 
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escape.60  His children would be no better off.61  Moreover, if Socrates is correct that he could not 
convincingly philosophize in exile, he would no longer be a reliable teacher.  He could not help 
his friends and children become virtuous persons, because he would be less virtuous himself (cf. 
Crit. 53c-d).  Thus, Socrates’ continued life could not benefit and may in fact harm his friends and 
family.  His death is thus better all around, both for himself and for his loved ones. 
Socrates’ answer in the Crito thus provides a good answer for how Socrates’ death could 
be compatible with Plato’s eudaimonism.  Death would benefit Socrates because his continued life 
would not be worth living.  A continued life would betray everything he had advocated throughout 
his life, and would undermine his eudaimonia, causing him to give up his ethical good for the sake 
of a mere non-ethical good, longer life.  Since he views death as having a neutral value at worst 
(Ap. 40c-41d), it will be better for him to die than for him to continue living in conditions where 
his eudaimonia is impossible.  Such a life would confer negative value, and would only hinder his 
eudaimonia.  Committing suicide is better for him than a continued life which would surely have 
a negative value.  Moreover, because his suicide is the right thing to do, it will also contribute a 
final virtuous action to his eudaimonia.  He dies justly, and so he dies as he has lived: seeking 
always to perform the just and best action (Crit. 46b). 
  
2.6 Final Thoughts 
 
In the Gorgias, Plato writes,  
“For one who is truly a man should stop considering how long he will live and 
should not love life.  But having committed those things to the god and believing 
                                                          
60  “For consider what good you will do yourself or your friends by breaking our agreements and committing 
such a wrong.  It is pretty obvious that your friends will themselves be in danger of exile, disfranchisement, and loss 
of property” (53a-b).   
61  Socrates must either take his children with him into exile, or he must leave them behind without him in 
Athens.  Presumably, if he does the latter, his children will be raised by his friends, which is no different than what 
would happen when he dies (54a).  So Socrates’ continued life would have no positive effect on his children. 
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the women who say that no one can escape fate, he should therefore consider how 
he might live the part of his life remaining to him as well as possible” (512d-e).62 
 
Plato is committed to the idea that it is not merely living, but instead living well, that is important 
(cf. Crit. 48b).  If the part of a person’s life ahead of her can be lived well, that is good.  She can 
continue living, for being eudaimōn is still within her grasp. 
However, a point may exist beyond which the virtuous life is no longer possible.  At this 
point, those who wish to be eudaimōn may well want to cast life aside.  Plato permits this, as his 
own presentation of Socrates’ actions shows.  Socrates chooses to die when a continued life would 
undermine his virtue and would therefore not be worth living (cf. Crit. 53e).  A person is ready to 
be benefitted by death if she faces a situation in which a eudaimōn life can no longer be achieved 
or maintained.  When those circumstances are such that they threaten to make a continued life 
incapable of achieving or maintaining eudaimonia, Plato allows that the individual might do better 
not to extend her life.  Those circumstances will show themselves to the agent as a sign that living 
eudaimōn is no longer possible (Phd. 62c).  When a continued life does not allow the agent to live 
well, the agent is better off dead.
                                                          
62  μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μέν, τὸ ζῆν ὁποσονδὴ χρόνον, τόν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα ἐατέον ἐστὶν καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχητέον, 
ἀλλὰ ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ καὶ πιστεύσαντα ταῖς γυναιξὶν ὅτι τὴν εἱμαρμένην οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς ἐκφύγοι, τὸ ἐπὶ 
τούτῳ σκεπτέον τίν᾽ ἂν τρόπον τοῦτον ὃν μέλλοι χρόνον βιῶναι ὡς ἄριστα βιοίη. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Suicidal Philosopher: Plato’s Socrates 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
 I maintain that Plato thinks Socrates committed suicide.  This claim will no doubt surprise 
many readers.1  After all, Plato has Socrates declare that suicide is not permissible (θεμιτόν, Phd. 
61c10), 2 and present two reasons why suicide is impious and unjust.3  It would be strange if 
Socrates should perform an action that he regards as wrong.  However, the prohibition against 
suicide is not absolute, and Plato writes that Socrates regards his own case as an exception.  Having 
offered his reasons against suicide, Socrates claims, “Then perhaps because of this it is not 
unreasonable to say that a person must not kill himself until a god sends some necessity upon him, 
such as the one that has now come before us” (Phd. 62c6-9).4 
 However, the thesis that Plato thinks Socrates committed suicide is puzzling because Plato 
also portrays Socrates as suffering a punishment mandated by Athens (Phd. 116c; cf. Ap. 38c).  
Athens sentenced Socrates to die by drinking hemlock.  So it would seem that the city compels 
Socrates to drink the poison.  If so, isn’t the city, not Socrates, responsible?  What account of 
                                                          
1  Not all, though. See Cholbi (2011: 36); Eckstein (1981: 8-9); Frey (1978: 106-108); Gallop (1975: 85); and 
Hackforth (1955: 36 n.4).  Rowe (1993) accepts a limited sense in which Socrates committed suicide – because he 
takes the poison from the warder and drinks it (130) – but otherwise refers to Socrates as “executed” (7, 125).  Most 
scholars maintain that Socrates did not commit suicide.  See Ahrensdorf (1995: 10, 17, 19); Archer-Hind (1973: 9);  
Bluck (1955: 1); Bostock (1986: 20); Burger (1984: 9, 21, 33); Burnet (1911: 149);  Brickhouse & Smith (1989: 
passim); Doherty (1923: 19); Geddes (1885: 224); Stern (1993: 31); van Hooff (2000: 52); White (1989: 27, 30); and 
Woozley (1979: 9). 
2  Unless otherwise indicated, translations are mine, using Burnet’s Greek text. 
3  The first is that the body is a prison or guard-post from which it is forbidden to flee (Phd. 62b2-6).  The 
second is that we humans are the gods’ possessions and ought not leave life unless the gods grant us their permission 
(62b7-c9). 
4  Emphasis added: ᾿´Ισως τοίνυν ταύτῃ οὐκ  ἄλογον, μὴ πρότερον αὑτὸν ἀποκτεινύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἂν ἀνάγκην 
τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἡμῖν παροῦσαν.   
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responsibility would allow Plato to present Socrates as responsible for his own death?  Moreover, 
even if Socrates is somehow responsible, it remains unclear how Plato can think that Socrates 
intends to kill himself.  Doesn’t Socrates, as Plato presents him, intend to do what justice requires?  
If so, doesn’t he fail to kill himself intentionally, that is, to commit suicide? 
 These questions about how Plato can characterize Socrates’ death as suicide are no mere 
semantic quibbles.5  They address Plato’s account of responsible and intentional action.  In this 
essay, I show how Plato can hold the city and Socrates jointly responsible for Socrates’ death 
(Section 3.2), and I show how Plato can think Socrates’ intention is not only to do what justice 
requires, but also to kill himself (Section 3.3).   
 I must clarify a couple points before I continue.  First, when I argue that Plato thinks 
Socrates is responsible for his death, I do not mean to say that Socrates is responsible for 
intentionally bringing about all the circumstances leading to his trial and death.  Such a strong 
thesis is not necessary for my project.  Indeed, most suicides do not occur in response to 
circumstances that the agent has specifically engineered or brought to pass.  But suicide does 
frequently occur in response to circumstances over which an agent has little or no control. 
 Second, in this essay, I try to construct possible Platonic views and see how they fit 
together.  Because the views are expressed through the mouths of characters in dialogues, we do 
not know for certain that they are Plato’s views.6  However, because they are present in the 
                                                          
5  As for the semantics of the characterization, ancient Greek does not have a single exclusive word that means 
“suicide” (cf. Cooper [1999: 515]; see van Hooff, 243-246, for a list of expressions ancient Greek used for self-killing).  
Plato uses several expressions, including phrases interpreted “to kill oneself” (“ἑαυτον . . . κτείνῃ” in Laws IX.873c3-
4; “αὑτὸν ἀποκτεινύναι” in Phd. 62c7, cf. c2-3, 61e6), and a few that obliquely refer to “leaving, setting oneself free 
from” or “running from” life (“ἀπαλάττου τοῦ βίου” in Laws IX.854c5-6; “ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ’ 
ἀποδιδράσκειν” in Phd. 62b5).  Plato also refers to doing violence against oneself (βιάσεται αὑτόν, Phd. 61c10), a 
phrase which may refer to any instance of self-harm, and not only killing.  I have translated the texts literally to make 
clear where this occurs. 
6  Consider Strauss, who argues, “In none of his dialogues does Plato ever say anything.  Hence we cannot 
know from them what Plato thought” (1964: 50). 
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dialogues, we do know that they are views that Plato took seriously, and it is at least possible that 
Plato endorsed them.  The thesis that the principal character in a dialogue best represents Plato’s 
views dates back to Antiquity.7  I will accept that thesis for the purposes of this essay. 
 
3.2 The Question of Responsibility 
 
To argue that Plato can hold the city and Socrates jointly responsible for Socrates’ death, 
we must first establish what Plato’s account of responsibility is.  In particular, we must establish 
what Plato assumes about responsibility in the Phaedo.  Thus, I begin with the Phaedo, and look 
to the Gorgias to elucidate the account.8  The account rejects two beliefs that many people think 
are core components of responsibility: 1) that responsibility and voluntariness are coextensive, and 
2) that responsibility and culpability are coextensive. 
We know that “responsibility” denotes a certain relationship between agents and their 
actions.9  In the Phaedo, we have one vital clue about Plato’s view of what defines that relationship.  
Plato has Socrates say that the true causes of things are intelligence or mind (νοῦς, 98b-c).  Socrates 
                                                          
7  Aristotle suggests Plato’s views were positions taken by Socrates and the other leading speakers in the 
dialogues.  These passages are discussed in Cherniss (1944).  Diogenes Laërtius wrote that Plato’s views are 
expounded by four persons – Socrates, Timaeus, the Athenian Stranger, and the Eleatic Stranger.  He writes: “Even 
when Socrates and Timaeus are the speakers, it is Plato’s doctrines that are laid down” (III.52).  For recent discussions 
including supports and criticisms of this thesis, see Press, ed. (2000).   
8  Some scholars will question the move from the Phaedo to the Gorgias, believing that each Platonic dialogue 
must be observed independently of the others, or that some inherent risk of anachronism exists if we seek to elucidate 
one dialogue by referencing another.  But the view that the dialogues may be taken together has proponents as well.  
See, Kraut (1992: 26), who argues that although the dialogues exhibit development, variation, and “even reversals,” 
enough continuity exists that we may take the dialogues together; they all exhibit the work of one individual who 
develops his ideas over time.  For arguments that the Gorgias itself is not so far removed from the Phaedo, see Dodds 
(1959: 18-24), and Irwin (1979: 5-8).  I refer to the Gorgias because its account of responsibility aligns well with the 
Phaedo’s single tantalizing passage on the subject.  In addition, the account in the Gorgias reappears with minimal 
changes in the Laws (IX.860d ff.).  If we accept the usual assumption that the Laws is one of Plato’s latest works, it is 
not unreasonable to think that the account’s reappearance in the Laws suggests Plato stands by it for an extended 
period of his career. 
9  Cf. Feinberg (1970). 
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is speaking generally about the causes (αἰτίας) responsible for things in the universe.10  Mind is 
what brought everything to be, and it is what orders the cosmos.  But his statement also applies to 
human actions, as we see when he applies this assessment to his own activities (98c-99a).  He 
claims that he sits because he has decided to remain seated: “But to say that [bones and sinews] 
are the cause of my doing what I do, and that I do these things with my mind, but not from the 
choice of what is best, would be a most careless way of talking” (99a10-b3).11  The statement 
indicates that the causes responsible for at least some human actions are their agents’ own choices 
to do what seems “best.”12  An agent is responsible for those actions, insofar as they are attributable 
to her choices.  However, it is necessary to look outside the Phaedo to understand the finer points 
of this view.  
The Gorgias presents a more detailed presentation of this criterion for responsibility.  Like 
the Phaedo, the Gorgias focuses our attentions on what “seems best” to an agent.  A tyrant will do 
whatever he thinks is good for himself (466d).  He will, for instance, kill a political rival, believing 
that that action will benefit him, perhaps by securing his own position (468b).  However, the 
tyrant’s true goal when he acts is to benefit himself (468c).  If he is wrong about how to achieve 
that goal – if killing the rival really does not help him – then he does not achieve what he really 
wants.  Socrates says, “[If] a tyrant or an orator kills someone or exiles him or confiscates his stuff 
because he thinks that doing thusly is better for himself when really it is worse, this person, 
                                                          
10  I agree with Sedley (1998: 116).  The adjective αἴτιος followed by a genitive indicates “responsible for.”  To 
give the cause (αἴτιον) of x is to point to the thing responsible (τὸ αἴτιον) for x, and to assign responsibility to that 
thing for x.  In this passage, Plato does not seem to distinguish different senses of responsibility, such as causal or 
ethical responsibility, as is evidenced by the fact that he uses the same term to apply to both physical causes and human 
action. 
11  ὡς μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἃ ποιῶ καὶ ταῦτα νῷ πράττω, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἱρέσει, πολλὴ καὶ μακρὰ 
ῥᾳθυμία ἂν εἴη τοῦ λόγου. 
12  Incidentally, the view rejects a mechanistic view according to which bodily or mental functions are 
responsible for human activity.  For discussion of the difference between a purely mechanistic view and the view that 
Plato has Socrates expound, see Bostock (142-146). 
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perhaps, is doing what he sees fit, isn’t he?” (Grg. 468d).13  But, even though the tyrant does what 
seems good to him, he might be wrong. 
This conversation marks a shocking departure from ordinary conceptions of responsibility.  
We often think that a principal feature marking an agent’s responsibility for performing a certain 
action, X, is that the agent performed X voluntarily, that is, freely and by her own choice.  
Conversely, we think that an agent is not responsible for performing actions if she did them 
involuntarily or non-voluntarily, that is, unwillingly or accidentally.  On this view, whether I am 
responsible for going bungee-jumping very much depends on whether I wanted and chose to do 
that activity or whether my so-called “friends” strapped me in against my will.  It makes sense to 
assume that voluntary actions are coextensive with actions for which an agent is responsible, 
because we think voluntary actions reflect an agent’s subjective desires, while involuntary actions 
do not.   
But Plato has a different understanding of voluntary (ἑκών) and involuntary (ἀκών) 
activity,14 one that allows him to hold agents responsible when they act involuntarily, as well as 
when they act voluntarily.  Plato believes that voluntary activity aims only at what an agent really 
wants, rather than what she merely thinks she wants.  For him, this is the agent’s own self-
interested good, objectively considered (Grg. 468b5-9; cf. Laws I.628c; Meno 77c-78b; Prt. 352b-
358e; Rep. VI.505e).  What is objectively good for an agent does not depend on any subjective 
ideas of goodness.  So voluntary action, for Plato, includes only those actions an agent chooses to 
do that actually promote her good.   
                                                          
13  εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει τινὰ ἢ ἐκβάλλει ἐκ πόλεως ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε τύραννος ὢν εἴτε ῥήτωρ, οἰόμενος 
ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγχάνει δὲ ὂν κάκιον, οὗτος δήπου ποιεῖ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ: ἦ γάρ;  
14  On this, see Brickhouse and Smith (2010: 44); Santas (1979: 183-194). 
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But Plato knows that an agent can also choose actions in the mistaken belief that those 
actions promote her good.  Consider the statement that tyrants who do what they (merely) think is 
best do not always get what they really want (Grg. 468d).  A tyrant may misjudge what he really 
wants, or he may misjudge how to achieve it.  For instance, he may think that exiling his political 
rivals is the smart thing to do, because doing so will secure his power.  But that choice will not 
work out as planned if those exiled rivals have vengeful relatives who decide to stab the tyrant in 
retribution while he sleeps.  Consequently, what the tyrant really wants does not necessarily 
coincide with what he does.15  Indeed, by acting on mistaken beliefs about what will really benefit 
him, the tyrant may actually fail to promote his good!  Plato claims that such actions are 
“involuntary” because they do not promote the agent’s true desires (467a; Prt. 357e; Laws IX.860d 
ff.).  They are not the actions the tyrant would have chosen if he had properly understood what 
was good for him and what he should do to obtain it. 
From this discussion, it is clear that Plato believes voluntary and involuntary actions share 
one source.  They both arise from an agent’s choice to do them, believing that they “seem good” 
to do (Grg. 466d, 467b, 468b; Phd. 99a-b).  Because they are attributable to the same source, Plato 
holds agents responsible both for performing actions voluntarily and for performing actions 
involuntarily.  The difference is simply that the agent who does X voluntarily recognizes that X is 
good, while the agent who does X involuntarily merely thinks X is good.   
But Plato is not yet done disrupting ordinary views of responsibility.  We often think that 
responsibility is coextensive with culpability.16  “Culpability” denotes the relationship between 
responsible agents and others’ reactions, and a culpable agent is one who is properly subject to 
                                                          
15  To say nothing of the fact that Plato has Socrates suggest that the tyrant’s desires are also misplaced if he 
wants political power by any means rather than virtue. 
16  Strawson (1962: 10); Doris (2009: 59). 
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those reactive attitudes.  So we think that an agent who is “responsible” is appropriately subject to 
others’ reactive attitudes, for example, anger, praise, or blame.  For instance, if a murderer is 
responsible for killing, it is also appropriate to blame her for that action.   
Plato also denies this claim.  As we have seen, Plato thinks that someone can be responsible 
for an action simply because she chose to perform that action (Grg. 466c-e; Laws IX.860d ff.).  
But although the agent is responsible, Plato does not think the agent is necessarily blameworthy, 
that is, culpable for performing that action.   
 We can best appreciate Plato’s position if we consider his views on punishment.  As Plato 
sees it, no criminal or unjust activity can possibly promote an agent’s true good; it can only hinder 
it (Grg. 469b, 472c, 509e; Prt. 345e, 358e; Rep. IX.591a).  So all criminal and unjust activity must 
be involuntary, inasmuch as it does not get the agent what she really wants (Grg. 468d; Laws 
V.731c, IX.860 ff.).17  Even so, Plato holds criminals liable to punishment or correction.  The 
Phaedo itself details punishments in the afterlife for those who have performed vicious deeds 
(113d-114b).  However, Plato does not limit this sentiment to the Phaedo or to his myths.18  The 
Gorgias (472e) and the Laws (esp. IX.862e, 873a) both mention punishments that criminals should 
receive on this earth.  The Laws does so even after it is pointed out just how strange it is that people 
                                                          
17  To be sure, this is an odd-sounding claim.  After all, it appears that criminals achieve what they want when 
they commit crimes.  Consider: a thief wants money, so she steals money.  But we must contemplate the claim in 
question from Plato’s perspective.  Plato does not distinguish between an ethical good (what an agent ought to do) and 
a prudential good (what is in an agent’s non-ethical best interest).  If his taxonomy is accurate, then those who do 
wrong really will not promote their best interest.  Engaging in vicious activities will necessarily be bad for them. 
18  The Phaedo’s ideas of judgment and punishment in the afterlife are also implied in the Apology, when 
Socrates talks about what might happen to him when he arrives in Hades (41a), and the Crito, when the personified 
laws testify that Socrates will receive harsh treatment from the laws in Hades if he damages Athenian law (54c6-8).  
Other myths of punishment in the afterlife occur in the Laws (IX.870d-e), the Phaedrus (249a), and the Republic 
(X.614 ff.).  Exactly what value these myths have for explaining Plato’s philosophy may be disputed, since Socrates 
himself claims that “no sensible person” would insist that these things are as he described them (Phd. 114d; see 
Brown).   
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who act unjustly do so involuntarily (860d-e).  Evidently, Plato does not think an agent’s 
performing actions involuntarily exempts her from being held responsible and punishable. 
This account seems paradoxical.  If Plato is right, criminals do what they would rather not 
do because they are ignorant of their true good.  But in an even more bizarre twist, Plato 
specifically claims that they are not blameworthy or reproachable for their errors.  A cursory 
inspection of the texts shows why.  It is because he thinks blame (ὄνειδος, Tim. 86d) and anger 
(θυμός, Laws V.731d) are inappropriate responses.  “You may pity the unjust . . . but restrain and 
abate your anger (θυμός),” he has the Athenian say in the Laws (V.731d).19  And in the Timaeus, 
he has Timaeus add, “It is not right to blame (ὀνειδίζεται) people for doing bad things, for no one 
is willfully bad.  The bad become bad, rather, as a result of one or another corrupt condition of the 
body and an uneducated upbringing.  No one who incurs these bad conditions would will to have 
them” (86d-e).20   
Plato thinks that the erring agent has chosen her actions involuntarily (Grg. 468d), and that 
the error is not her fault.  Such errors result from disease or bad upbringing, neither of which are 
up to the agent.  No one would willingly choose to have a disease or to be raised poorly (Tim. 86d-
e, 87b).  But we might also think it is ridiculous to blame someone who acts knowing no better 
than to do as she does.  After all, we do not blame the one-year-old child who thumps her sister on 
the head, because she does not yet know any better.21  Similarly, Plato thinks it is absurd to blame 
                                                          
19  ἀλλὰ ἐλεεινὸς μὲν πάντως ὅ γε ἄδικος [. . .] καὶ ἀνείργοντα τὸν θυμὸν πραΰνειν καὶ μὴ ἀκραχολοῦντα 
γυναικείως πικραινόμενον διατελεῖν. 
20  οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὀνειδίζεται: κακὸς μὲν γὰρ ἑκὼν οὐδείς, διὰ δὲ πονηρὰν ἕξιν τινὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἀπαίδευτον 
τροφὴν ὁ κακὸς γίγνεται κακός, παντὶ δὲ ταῦτα ἐχθρὰ καὶ ἄκοντι προσγίγνεται.  Cf.: “All who become bad do so 
because of these two involuntary causes.  It is the begetters more than the begotten and the nurturers far more than the 
nurtured, that should be blamed” (ταύτῃ κακοὶ πάντες οἱ κακοὶ διὰ δύο ἀκουσιώτατα γιγνόμεθα: ὧν αἰτιατέον μὲν 
τοὺς φυτεύοντας ἀεὶ τῶν φυτευομένων μᾶλλον καὶ τοὺς τρέφοντας τῶν τρεφομένων, 87b). 
21  However, we will subsequently take pains to try to teach the child not to do such action in the future.  Similar 
thoughts are probably what ground Plato’s penology, based as it is on educating the criminal.  See Saunders (1991). 
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the involuntary agent who does wrong, because she knows no better.22  The only response Plato 
advocates is pity (Grg. 469a-b; Laws V.731d).  The agent is pitiable precisely because she does 
not get what she really wants (Grg. 468e-469b, 472e).  Yet, even though she is not an appropriate 
subject of blame or anger, she is still responsible for her involuntarily-chosen misdeeds. 
This account has the peculiar consequence that only those agents who do nothing worthy 
of blame are eligible to be blameworthy.  Indeed, on this view, the only agents who can be properly 
called “culpable” and be subject to reactive attitudes are those who do no wrong.  For Plato, this 
makes sense, since he thinks that only those agents who do no wrong can act voluntarily, knowing 
what they really want (Grg. 468b-c).  As a result, he thinks that they are the only agents who can 
be truly and sensibly held accountable for their choices.  They are culpable because they are subject 
to reactive attitudes.  But because they do no wrong, they also are not worthy of any negatively-
valenced attitudes we often associate with culpability, such as blameworthiness.  At the same time, 
those who do wrong and whom we would normally consider blameworthy are not properly subject 
to reactive attitudes; they are not blameworthy because they act involuntarily, choosing their deeds 
in error. 
This discussion suggests that agents can be related to their actions in three ways (cf. Laws 
860d ff.; see Table 1 below).23  First, are actions for which agents are responsible but not culpable.  
Agents choose these actions as “best” for themselves, but they choose wrongly.  Because they have 
chosen to perform these actions, they are responsible for them (Grg. 466c-e).  But because they 
have acted involuntarily, they are not culpable.   
                                                          
22  Plato’s psychology mandates that no one will do otherwise than as they think best.  For, if they think some 
other path is open to them that would be better for them, they would take that path instead (cf. Prt. 358c).   
23  Mackenzie (1981: 133-157), has a similar understanding. 
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Second, are actions for which agents are both responsible and culpable.  Agents choose 
these actions as best for themselves, and they really are best.  Because agents have chosen these 
actions believing them to be good, they are responsible for them.  Because the actions really are 
good, the agents are culpable and subject to reactive attitudes for them as well.  We might also 
infer that only these actions exhibit responsibility in the highest possible sense, since they are the 
only actions an agent can commit voluntarily. 
Finally, the fact that agents choose both voluntary and involuntary actions suggests that 
these actions are distinguishable from actions which agents do not choose.  Those actions are “non-
voluntary.”  Good examples include “slipping on ice” or “tumbling down the stairs.”  On Plato’s 
account, they are the only human actions for which an agent cannot be responsible.  Such actions 
are not even “the agent’s” at all.  Although these actions happen to an agent’s body, she neither 
chooses them, nor selects them as “best.”  They merely happen to her.  And, of course, she cannot 
appropriately be praised or blamed for something that merely happens to her (cf. Tim. 86d-e, 87b). 
Table 1: Agential Responsibility  
 Responsible? Culpable? Example: 
Involuntary Yes No Theft, Murder 
Voluntary Yes Yes Acts Promoting the Good 
Non-Voluntary No No Slips on Ice 
 
3.2.1 The Argument for the City’s Responsibility 
 
We are now in a position to consider whether Plato thinks Socrates committed suicide in 
Platonic terms.  Philosophers who claim Socrates did not commit suicide usually assume that Plato 
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presents the city alone as responsible for Socrates’ death.  That thesis actually comprises two 
claims: Plato thinks the city is responsible and no one else, especially Socrates, is responsible.24   
On Plato’s view of responsibility, to say that the city is responsible for Socrates’ death 
would mean that the city chooses to condemn Socrates in the belief that that action promotes its 
good (Grg. 468b5-9; Laws I.628c; Meno 77c-78b; Prt. 352b-358e; Rep. VI.505e).  Indeed, it seems 
that cities, through the actions of their civic representatives, do try to seek their good.  Consider 
the following conversation from the Gorgias: 
Socrates: “And so we put someone to death, if we do put him to death, and throw 
him out and take away his stuff, because these things seem better to us than not 
doing them?”  Polus: “Certainly.”  Socrates: “It is for the sake of the good that the 
doers of all these things do them.”  Polus: “I say so.” (Grg. 468b5-9).25 
 
If the city is to perform its work in anything like a Platonically responsible fashion, it must 
maintain its laws and enforce its punishments because it deems these actions as being better for 
the city (Grg. 468b-d).26  Accordingly, if the city is to be responsible for Socrates’ death, we should 
think the city convicted Socrates because it viewed killing Socrates as promoting its good.  In the 
Phaedo, Plato has Socrates relate that this is exactly what happened: the Athenians “decided” it 
                                                          
24  See Ahrensdorf (10, 17, 19); Archer-Hind (9); Bluck (1); Bostock (20); Burger (9, 21, 33); Burnet (149); 
Brickhouse & Smith (1989: passim); Doherty (19); Geddes (224); Stern (31); van Hooff (52); White (27, 30); and 
Woozley (9). 
25  Σωκράτης: οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτείνυμεν, εἴ τιν᾽ ἀποκτείνυμεν, καὶ ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα χρήματα, 
οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή; Πῶλος: πάνυ γε. Σωκράτης: ἕνεκ᾽ ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα 
ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες.  Πῶλος: φημί.  
26 The passage in the Gorgias I have referenced might prompt some speculation about whether the city can be 
responsible, or whether rulers acting on the city’s behalf are responsible.  The passage speaks about the rulers 
benefitting themselves with their policies rather than the city, so it may appear improper to say “the city” seeks to 
benefit itself.  However, insofar as the rulers are the city’s representatives, who make decisions on the city’s behalf, I 
assume little distinction between them in this case.  Other Platonic evidence suggests that the city’s good has 
paramount importance and that the rulers should act on the city’s good before their own.  We see this especially 
evident in the Republic (IV.420b) and Laws (I.628c).  So the inference that Plato thinks cities and rulers should seek 
their cities’ good seems well founded. 
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was better to condemn Socrates than to let him live (98e2-5).27   Thus, Plato can think that the city 
sees its good and acts to promote it in convicting Socrates.  Plato can hold the city responsible.   
However, although Plato can hold the city responsible, he may not hold the city culpable 
and subject to reactive attitudes for Socrates’ death.  To find out, we must consider whether the 
city actually promoted its good when it convicted Socrates.  For, whether the city is culpable 
depends on whether it acted voluntarily, and whether it acted voluntarily depends on whether it 
actually promoted its true good (Grg. 468e-469b).   
But Plato provides strong evidence that the city fails to promote its good when it condemns 
Socrates.  We will recall that Plato thinks all unjust activity is involuntary by definition (Grg. 469b, 
472c, 509e; Prt. 345e, 358e; Rep. IX.591a).  Thus, if the city unjustly convicts Socrates (for 
instance, if Socrates is innocent of the charges, or if Socrates’ trial was unjustly conducted), then 
the city would have acted involuntarily.  And, indeed, Plato’s dialogues do provide sizeable hints 
that Socrates was wrongly convicted.  Socrates is portrayed as just (Phd. 118a), and Socrates 
protests that he has knowingly done nothing worthy of punishment (Ap. 36b-d).28  If these hints 
echo Plato’s view of Socrates’ conviction, then Plato cannot think the city achieved its true good 
when it chose to convict Socrates. 
Moreover, Plato has Socrates indicate that the city cannot even be better off in a subjective 
sense for choosing to convict Socrates (38c; 39c-d; cf. Phd. 98e).  Socrates says that those who 
condemned him thought it would keep them from giving an account of their lives.  But another 
person, more tenacious than he, will make them give an account anyway.  So, if giving an account 
                                                          
27  Cp. in the Apology, Plato has Socrates admonish those on the jury to judge as “is best” for him and for them 
(ἐμοί τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν, 35d9-10).  As the city’s representatives, the jury makes the decision on the city’s behalf.   
28  This is not the only evidence.  See the following passages suggesting that Socrates is innocent of the charges: 
Ap. 28a, Crito 54b-c, Grg. 486a together with 521d-522a, and Phd. 116c-d.  Some scholars have also suggested that 
Plato thinks the Athenian trial of capital cases is unjust because the trials must be completed within one day (Ap. 37a7-
b2; Brickhouse & Smith [1989: 42, n.147 and 75-75]; Shaw [2011: 195, n.29]).   
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to Socrates was supposedly “bad” for the city, it would surely be worse to give an account to 
somebody more tenacious than Socrates.  Apparently, condemning Socrates does not even give 
the city what it thinks is good for itself.  Much less would the city get its true good.   
Thus, Plato shows us that the city has acted involuntarily.  When the city acts on the false 
belief that its good is served by condemning Socrates, it really acts contrary to its best interest.  
Thus, Plato cannot think the city is culpable.  It is only pitiable, not blameworthy.  Even so, because 
the city chose the action that seemed good to it, the city is responsible (Grg. 466c-e; Ap. 35d9-10).  
It follows that Plato can hold the city responsible, but not culpable, for Socrates’ death. 
 
3.2.2 Previous Arguments for Socrates’ Responsibility 
 
 A few scholars have discounted the evidence that Plato can hold the city responsible for 
Socrates’ death.29  They suggest instead thatPlato presents Socrates alone as responsible.  That 
thesis comprises two claims: Plato thinks Socrates is responsible and no one else, especially the 
city, is responsible for his death.  To make their case, scholars usually appeal to an account of 
responsibility whereby Socrates is responsible because Plato shows him choosing to die in the 
presence of other options.30  Two passages in the Platonic corpus may support this view.  In the 
first, Socrates refuses the opportunity to propose an acceptable alternate penalty besides death, 
claiming that he is not accustomed to think that he deserves anything bad.31  In the second, Socrates 
                                                          
29  See esp. Frey; also Cholbi (36); Eckstein (8-9); Gallop (85); and Hackforth (36, n.4), favor this view. 
30  We often think a necessary condition for responsible action is that the agent must perform actions freely.  
One way to ensure that a person has acted freely is if she had other options available.  See Frankfurt (1971).  
31  καὶ ἐγὼ ἅμα οὐκ εἴθισμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἀξιοῦν κακοῦ οὐδενός. (38b2-3; cf. Xenophon, Mem. IV.iv.4).  In 
Athenian law, the condemned had the chance to propose an alternate penalty.  Socrates could have stayed alive if he 
had proposed exile or imprisonment; that he chose not to provide these alternatives may be proof that he chose death 
freely. 
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rejects Crito’s offer to help him escape prison (Crito 54e).  Crito complains that Socrates is 
responsible for his death because he chooses to remain and die rather than flee (45c-d).32   
That is the usual explanation.  However, even if this argument had adequately considered 
Plato’s view of responsibility (which it does not), its textual evidence is suspect.  First, the premise 
that Plato portrays Socrates as having alternatives is disputable.  I take it that something is not a 
viable alternative if it is so unattractive that a person could never reasonably choose it.33  The first 
passage shows only that Socrates, as Plato presents him, thinks he does not deserve anything bad.34  
If he were to offer and receive an alternate penalty such as exile or imprisonment, he would suffer 
something he does not believe he deserves.  So he cannot in good conscience propose an alternate 
penalty.  Thus, we might think that he really does not have a genuine alternative to death.  The 
second passage invites a similar objection.  Socrates responds that he would indeed flee if justice 
allowed it (Crito 48b-c).  When he determines justice will not allow it (54e), he does not flee.  
Socrates’ concern to act as justice requires weighs heavily against fleeing, suggesting it is unlikely 
that Socrates – or at least Socrates as Plato presents him – has a viable alternative. 
However, even if we suppose that Socrates has viable alternatives, the argument that Plato 
thinks Socrates can be responsible as Crito says is suspect in another way.  To grant this claim, 
scholars must assume that Crito serves as Plato’s mouthpiece.  However, Plato rarely has Crito 
appear philosophically astute, so it is unlikely that he thinks Crito’s views are worth 
                                                          
32  Crito claims: “But yet, Socrates, it seems to me the thing you are trying to do is not even just, to betray 
yourself, when you might save yourself; and you are eager to bring upon yourself exactly the things that your enemies 
would wish and exactly what those were eager for who wished to destroy you . . . And you seem to me to be choosing 
the laziest way” (᾿´Ετι δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι, ἐξὸν σωθῆναι· 
καὶ τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτὸν γενέσθαι, ἅπερ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροί σου σπεύσαιέν τε καὶ ἔσπευσὰν σε διαφθεῖραι 
βουλόμενοι. . . . σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ ῥᾳθυμότατα αἱρεῖσθαι, Crito 45c5-9, d7-8).   
33  This idea is similar to Brickhouse and Smith’s (1989) argument against Socrates having committed suicide.  
According to Brickhouse and Smith, Socrates is so devoted to justice, that he has no choice but to do as he believes 
justice commands.  There really is no alternative open to Socrates as a result (passim, but see esp. 62). 
34  Note that Plato has Socrates claim that exile or imprisonment would certainly be bad for him (37c-e), while 
“great hope” exists that death is good for him (Ap. 40c-41b). 
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endorsement.35  Moreover, in no text does Plato have Socrates agree he is responsible purely 
because of alternatives available to him.  But Plato does have Socrates claim another position: that 
he does whatever “seems best” to him (Crit. 46b7; cf. Phd. 98e-99b).36  Socrates claims only that 
he makes deliberate choices.  But such an assertion does not mention whether or how alternative 
possibilities factor into Socrates’ choices, and it certainly does not entail that Plato thinks Socrates 
is responsible for his death purely because other options were available.  Thus, the usual argument 
that Plato presents Socrates as responsible for his death fails. 
 
3.2.3 The Platonic Argument for Socrates’ Responsibility 
 
A better argument that Plato thinks Socrates is responsible would take into account Plato’s 
own views of responsibility.  On Plato’s account, the only thing that would make Socrates not 
responsible is if his death was non-voluntary.  It would have to be like a slip on ice, an action not 
resulting from Socrates’ conscious choice to do what he thinks is good.   
But as Plato presents the case, death does not merely “happen” to Socrates, as if he were 
to misstep and fall to his death.  Socrates takes an active role in the trial leading to his conviction 
and death (Ap., passim, but see especially where Socrates knows he runs the risk of death: 28a-d).  
He takes the poison and drinks it without needing restraint or force (Phd. 117c).  More importantly, 
Plato presents Socrates doing these actions with repeated assertions that he does what seems best 
to him.  While imprisoned, Socrates declares that he has spent his life following the reasoning that 
                                                          
35  Consider a response typical of Plato’s presentation of Crito: “I am unable to answer your question, Socrates; 
for I do not understand it” (Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς ὃ ἐρωτᾷς· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ, Crit. 50a5-6).  Crito’s 
arguments that Socrates should stay alive are in terms of earthly interests (e.g., what others will think of Crito if 
Socrates dies), rather than philosophy.  We may notice that, even at the Phaedo’s conclusion, Crito tells Socrates he 
can wait to drink the hemlock and stay alive longer (116e5-7).  Socrates has none of it, since staying alive longer is 
not his goal (116e7-117a4).  For discussion of Crito’s unphilosophical tendencies in Plato’s presentation, see Weiss 
(1998: 80), and Harte (1999: 131).   
36  I discuss these passages below. 
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“seems best” (Crito 46b7).  Assuming that he continues the habit he claims to have established 
throughout his life, he will remain in prison, take the poison, and drink it if that seems best to him 
as well.  In the Phaedo, Plato has Socrates go a step further.  Rather than say that he merely does 
what “seems best” to him, he claims to act as is best.  He acts “from choice of the best” by 
remaining in jail, drinking the poison, and dying (98e-99b).    
This evidence is sufficient to establish that Plato can hold Socrates responsible for his own 
death.  Socrates’ claims to choose what is best for him indicate his responsibility.  He is responsible 
because his actions result from choices attributable to him (Grg. 466c-e).  These choices are what 
he believes to be best – at least as Plato presents his case. 
Two objections will arise here.  I have said that Plato presents Socrates as acting as he 
thinks is best by drinking the poison and dying.  But it may be objected that he does not choose 
drinking the poison or dying in themselves.  He is committed to being just, and “being just” entails 
drinking poison.  Socrates does not choose to die; he chooses to act justly, and death just happens 
to result.  Since this objection concerns Socrates’ intentions, I reserve it for discussion below 
(Section 3.3). 
The second objection is that Socrates’ choice to drink the poison was coerced by his 
circumstances, and that such coercion should undermine his responsibility.  Presumably, the 
argument goes, a coerced action is more like the non-voluntary action of accidentally falling down 
the stairs than it is like freely choosing an action as good for oneself.  If Socrates is forced to make 
his choice by the city, by his devotion to justice, or by his lack of viable alternatives, it may be 
doubtful whether he has really made a “choice” at all.   
Consider a case many people would consider parallel to Socrates’.  Suppose you hold a 
gun to my head and tell me that I must rob a store, or you will kill me.  Presumably, your threat 
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will strongly influence whatever “choice” I make.  At what point does such coercive influence 
undermine my responsibility for my choice on Plato’s view?  It would seem that if I rob the store, 
I have done so because of your threat.  But here is where it gets tricky.  Even in that situation, Plato 
can point out that my giving in to your coercion (or not) could very well involve a choice on my 
part.  I may choose yielding to your threat as what seems good for me.  After all, that choice is 
what will keep me alive!  But I can also choose not to rob the store as what seems good to me.  
Insofar as the situation requires my choosing what seems best to me, I will be responsible, on 
Plato’s view.  Only if I act without giving consideration to what benefits me, will I fail to be 
responsible. 
This example indicates that, for Plato, whether we are responsible or not may well depend 
on how we describe the case.  We can be responsible for actions we perform under compulsion if 
we still choose those actions as good for ourselves.  Likewise, we can be responsible for actions 
we perform in the absence of alternatives.  A glass of water may still be good and choiceworthy, 
even when we lack other options such as wine, martinis, or coffee.  As long as we choose the single 
option as good for ourselves, it does not matter that we lack other options.   
Analogously, provided that Socrates chooses the one option he has as good for him, Plato 
can hold him responsible for that choice.  What would be problematic is if Socrates had died with 
no perceivable acknowledgement that his actions were good for him.  In theory, Socrates could 
have decided that death was “not good” for him.  If so, he might have avoided death through 
various means (fleeing with Crito or offering an alternate penalty at his trial, for instance), or he 
might have at least died with other words on his lips in place of “I do what seems best to me.”  
(Sentiments like “I am innocent!” or “I drank what?” spring to mind.)  That Plato has Socrates say 
he chooses what is best suggests that Socrates is responsible, at least by Plato’s lights.  Even if 
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Socrates makes his decision in light of coercion from the city or justice, he still chooses his action 
as good for himself.   
So Plato can hold Socrates responsible for killing himself, at least according to Plato’s 
model of responsibility.  However, it is another question whether Plato can hold Socrates culpable, 
and thus liable to praise or blame for his actions.  Whether Socrates is culpable depends on whether 
Socrates acted voluntarily, and whether Socrates acted voluntarily depends on whether he chose 
what “is” best, not merely what “seemed” best.  Some texts suggest that the only way to obtain 
what is best is to know what is best.37  But Plato often has Socrates claim ignorance – especially 
of the good.38  As a result, we may worry that Socrates, lacking the requisite knowledge of the 
good, cannot choose what is really good. If so, he might not have acted voluntarily, and he cannot 
be culpable. 
This question is challenging, because it rides on issues of Socrates’ knowledge.  Here I will 
sketch out a possible response that may provide a way to address the question.  I assume, as many 
scholars do, that Socrates’ disavowals of knowledge are sincere.39  But I do not think his lack of 
knowledge entails that Socrates is unable to choose what is good for him.  Granted, having 
knowledge of the good would be sufficient for Socrates to determine his good (Prt. 352c).  But 
having such knowledge may not be necessary.  In the Gorgias, Socrates claims that one may secure 
a power or a craft to ensure that one never acts unjustly (509e-510a).  The suggestion is that, at 
times, it is enough to have some other ability to choose the right course of action.  If Socrates 
                                                          
37  See, for instance, Prt. 352c.  The Gorgias touches on the same idea when it is says that the person who acts 
without intelligence will fail to achieve her desires (467a). 
38  See Euthyphro 15e-16a; Ap. 29b-c; Meno 71a-b; Rep. I.354b.  The Phaedo itself contains a denial of 
knowledge.  Socrates claims that he cannot acquire knowledge while embodied (66e-67a). 
39  See Irwin (1977: 39-40), and Vlastos (1994: 39-66), for discussion. 
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possesses some power or craft by which he can determine how to act, then he may be off the hook.  
He could still choose correctly, even if he lacks definite knowledge of his good.40   
Plato gives us some indication that Socrates did have some “other power” in the form of a 
divine dispensation.  In particular, Socrates reportedly had a divine “sign,” the daimonion (a lesser 
divine spirit), which sometimes appeared to provide direction.41  The daimonion’s nature was 
mercurial.  It would only appear to stop Socrates from performing some action he had considered 
doing, and it would stop him because the contemplated action would have been incorrect in some 
way (Ap. 31d).  This aspect of the daimonion makes it very like the power mentioned in the 
Gorgias that ensures one never acts unjustly.  If Socrates paid attention to the daimonion’s 
appearances, he could have a way to determine the correct course of action, even when he lacked 
knowledge of the correct course.42 
But how can this help answer the question of whether Socrates is culpable for his death?  
One passage provides relevant evidence.  Socrates notes that the daimonion did not oppose him 
during his trial, even when receiving the death sentence was likely (40b-c).  So he interprets his 
daimonion’s absence as a sign that his actions must have been right and in accordance with divine 
will.  Whatever he did in his trial meets divine favor.  The god must also approve his death, since 
death is the anticipated result of Socrates’ actions there. 
Assuming that Socrates’ daimonion can provide Socrates the power to distinguish the right 
action, then Socrates will be able to act correctly if he follows its guidance. Thus, when he chooses 
                                                          
40  Shaw argues for this view, esp. 197 ff.  Cf. textual support: Grg. 509e1, 510a4; Hp. Mi. 375d8–376a4; Rep. 
VI.493a.  The Meno’s account of true belief may also support this thesis.  Socrates claims that true beliefs may be no 
less useful than knowledge (97c-98a), and that true belief can correctly guide a person, like knowledge (99a). 
41  Regarding its intervention, see Ap. 31d, 40b-c; Theat. 150d, 151a; Phdr. 242b-c; & Rep. I.496c.   
42  Since Socrates’ daimonion only stops him from doing wrong action, we may wonder how Socrates can use 
that to arrive at the right action.  See Weiss, 16-23, and Brickhouse & Smith (2000) for discussion of the difficulties 
here.  But it seems to me that even negative directions (“Don’t go this way!” or “Don’t do that thing!”) could end up 
prodding a person to the correct action, much as a shepherdess guides her flock to go the right way by using barriers 
and directing her dogs to block the flock from incorrect paths. 
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to follow the daimonion’s sign and drinks the poison (Ap. 40b-c; Phd. 117c), he may still choose 
what is good for him, even absent knowledge of the good.  In such fashion, Plato can show Socrates 
as acting voluntarily and being culpable, as well as being responsible for his death. 
 
3.2.4  The Argument for Joint Responsibility 
 
We have seen good reasons to think that Plato portrays the city as responsible for Socrates’ 
death and that Plato portrays Socrates as responsible.  It is difficult, then, to maintain that Plato 
thinks only one of these agents is independently responsible.  Is it possible to maintain that Plato 
thinks both are jointly responsible?  I think the textual evidence indicates that it is not only possible, 
but also that we must maintain this position. 
The Phaedo presents the key evidence that Plato thinks the city and Socrates share 
responsibility for Socrates’ death.  Plato has Socrates say that the real causes (αἰτίας) of his 
remaining imprisoned are these: “that the Athenians decided that it was better to condemn me, and 
therefore I have decided that it was better for me to sit here and that it is just for me remaining to 
suffer whatever judgment they order” (Phd. 98e2-5).43 
Socrates attributes his action to two intelligent choices, both of which are required for him 
to remain and die.  First is the Athenian jury’s decision to convict him.  Their choice is what they 
think is “better” (βέλτιον, 98e2).  Presumably, they think killing him is better for the city than the 
alternative, allowing him to go free.  But that alone would be insufficient for Socrates to die, were 
it not for the second choice, namely, his own decision to comply.  He could have chosen to escape 
and avoid death.  Indeed, he says later that he could have been elsewhere, had he not decided to 
                                                          
43  ἐπειδὴ ᾿Αθηναίοις ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὖ δέδοκται 
ἐνθάδε καθῆσθαι, καὶ δικαιότερον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἣν ἂν κελεύσωσιν· 
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abide by the Athenians’ sentence (99a1-3).  He claims to act “from choice of what is best” (τοῦ 
βελτίστου αἱρέσει, 99b1-2) by staying to die.44 
According to this passage, the city acts in light of what seems better to it.  It is responsible 
for the actions it performs in accordance with that choice.  Among other actions, it is responsible 
for convicting Socrates and standing by to enforce that conviction.  At the same time, Socrates acts 
on his choice of what is best, and is responsible for the actions he performs in accordance with that 
choice.  He drinks the poison himself, knowing his death will result (Phd. 117c).  If Socrates really 
chooses “what is best” when he performs this final suicidal act, then he acts voluntarily, making 
him culpable for his death as well as responsible.  But even if he merely choses what “seems best” 
to him (as he suggests at Crito 46b7), he is still responsible for his death.  His actions are 
attributable to him, because he chooses them believing that they are best for himself (Grg. 466c-
e; Phd. 99b1-2).  Thus, by Plato’s lights, Socrates is at least as responsible for his death as the city 
is, and he commits suicide.  
What may seem unconventional about my thesis is that I am committed to the following 
claim: although Socrates commits suicide, his action relies upon another agent’s actions.  I do not 
think this claim is as odd as it first appears.  We often recognize cases of shared responsibility.45  
Consider a symphony orchestra.  Each musician chooses a different action as seeming good to 
herself.  For a violinist, the action is drawing a bow across strings; for a flutist, the action is blowing 
air across the embouchure plate; for a timpanist, the action is drumming beaters against the striking 
point.  However, even though it may look like every musician performs a wildly different task 
                                                          
44  This is vitally different from the claim Crito makes (see above, sec. II.2).  Crito says Socrates is responsible 
purely because he chooses to die in the presence of other options (Crit. 45c-d).  Socrates is claiming responsibility 
only because he chooses death as best for himself.  The presence of other options does not determine which choice is 
best.  
45  On this, see a series of papers in Bratman (1999: 93-141), and (2014).  See also, Gilbert (2008: 483–514), 
and (2009: 167-187), Velleman (2000: 200-220). 
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from the next, each works toward the same goal: making music.46  But that goal relies upon every 
other musician’s actions, and each symphony member contributes individual parts to a shared, 
collective whole.  If even one musician breaks off to do her own thing, the music will become 
discordant.  The individual musicians thus share responsibility for the same task. 
I believe the city and Socrates share responsibility much as the symphony members do.  
Just as the orchestra’s individual members have different roles to play in producing their shared 
goal, Plato shows that Socrates and the city have individual roles to play in producing Socrates’ 
death.  The city chooses to condemn, and Socrates chooses to kill himself.  Both choices are 
necessary components of the same outcome, and both agents share the same task: to kill Socrates.  
Their shared responsibility is such that both agents’ commitments are required – and they are 
required together – to produce Socrates’ death.   
 
3.2.5 Objection: The Jailer 
 
One passage in the Phaedo might appear to counter the thesis that Plato thinks Socrates 
and the city share responsibility for Socrates’ death.  Near the dialogue’s conclusion, Socrates’ 
jailer says:  
“Socrates, I shall not reproach you as I do the others.  For they are angry with me 
and curse me when I tell them to drink the poison, obeying the orders of the rulers.  
During the time you have been here I have come to know you in every way as the 
noblest, gentlest and best man who has ever come here.  And now I know you will 
not be angry at me, for you know who is responsible (αἰτίους), and you will be 
angry at them.  So now – for you know what message I bring – farewell, and try to 
bear what you must as easily as possible” (Phd. 116c-d).47 
                                                          
46  To describe the symphony members in a Platonic way: each musician does as seems good to her, which will 
involve (among other actions) following the notations on her music and her conductor’s directions. 
47  ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ καταγνώσομαί γε σοῦ ὅπερ ἄλλων καταγιγνώσκω, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνουσι καὶ 
καταρῶνται ἐπειδὰν αὐτοῖς παραγγείλω πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρχόντων. σὲ δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως 
ἔγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναιότατον καὶ πρᾳότατον καὶ ἄριστον ἄνδρα ὄντα τῶν πώποτε δεῦρο ἀφικομένων, καὶ 
δὴ καὶ νῦν εὖ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνεις, γιγνώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνοις. νῦν οὖν, οἶσθα γὰρ ἃ ἦλθον 
ἀγγέλλων, χαῖρέ τε καὶ πειρῶ ὡς ῥᾷστα φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. 
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The jailer claims that he is merely following orders, so he is not responsible for Socrates’ death.  
But his sentiment implies that he does not believe Socrates is responsible either.  Only those who 
ordered the jailer to deliver the poison are responsible, and Socrates should direct his anger against 
them.  Someone may argue that Plato endorses the jailer’s sentiments.  If so, Plato would not think 
Socrates is responsible.   
However, the jailer’s statement indicates that the jailer believes responsibility and the 
appropriateness of certain reactive attitudes are coextensive.  We will recall that this is not Plato’s 
view.  Plato thinks responsibility and the appropriateness of certain reactive attitudes may 
sometimes diverge, particularly when the agent has acted involuntarily (Grg. 468d-469b; Tim. 86d; 
Laws V.731d).  If I am correct that the city has acted involuntarily when it condemned Socrates, 
then Plato cannot hold the city or its rulers culpable, even if he does hold them responsible.  
Presumably, then, Plato would not accept that the city is a fitting object for Socrates’ anger.  Thus, 
when the jailer says Socrates will direct his anger against those responsible, the jailer displays a 
non-Platonic view of responsibility.  We should not look to the jailer’s sentiments to provide 
Plato’s view on this matter. 
So why else would Plato have recounted the jailer’s comments, if not to endorse the jailer’s 
view of responsibility?  The passage serves a threefold purpose.  First, it allows Plato to praise his 
philosophical mentor through another person’s mouth.  The jailer says Socrates is “noblest, 
gentlest, and best.”  Such praise will mean more to the reader coming from the jailer than they 
would if they came directly from Plato.  This praise may also add to the reader’s general impression 
that the city wrongfully convicts Socrates.  For, if Socrates is really “good,” he is less likely to be 
guilty.  Finally, the passage sets up the dialogue’s final scene, where Plato has Socrates follow the 
jailer’s advice to die “as easily as possible.”  Since the hallmark of a philosopher is not resenting 
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death (Phd. 68c), it is important that Plato display Socrates’ equanimity about dying.  Plato uses 
the jailer’s sentiments to aid the image that Socrates maintains a philosophical disposition to the 
end.  Thus, despite the jailer’s confused view of responsibility, his comments contribute to the text. 
 
3.3 The Question of Intention 
 
Thus far, I have argued that Plato represents Socrates as sharing responsibility for his death 
with the city.  But this argument is not enough to prove that Plato thinks Socrates committed 
suicide.  Even if I am right that Socrates is responsible, his responsibility alone does not determine 
his intention.  Whether an agent commits suicide is sensitive to her intention when she acts.  For 
instance, an electrician may think it seems good to touch a certain wire, and so on Plato’s theory 
of action she is responsible for touching the wire.  But now suppose that she doesn’t know the wire 
is live, and so when she touches it, she electrocutes herself and dies.  It does not follow that the 
electrician has committed suicide, that is, intentionally chosen death as good for her.  The 
electrician would be responsible only for choosing to touch the wire, but not for choosing her 
death.  Similarly, it may be objected that Socrates chooses an action leading to his death as seeming 
good to him (as he clearly does), and yet does not intentionally choose death as good for him. 
This point requires asking another question.  Does Plato think Socrates actually intends to 
kill himself, in the sense that he intentionally chooses death as good for him?  In the very passage 
where Plato has Socrates claim to do as is best, he indicates that the choice is based on Socrates’ 
determination of what is “just” to do (Phd. 98e2-5).  It could be objected that Plato presents 
Socrates as intending only to do as justice requires, but that does not require him to intend to die.48  
The objection challenges my conclusions thus far in this essay.  If Plato does not think Socrates 
                                                          
48  Brickhouse & Smith (1989: passim), argue this. 
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intends to kill himself, then he cannot think Socrates shares the goal of “killing Socrates” with the 
city.  Furthermore, since suicide requires an intent to kill oneself,49 the objection would undermine 
the thesis that Socrates committed suicide.  
The objection requires considering Plato’s view of intentional action.  We know that on 
Plato’s view, an agent is considered responsible whenever she does what she thinks will promote 
her good (Grg. 468b-d; Laws 864a; Meno 77c-78b; Prt. 352b-358e; Rep. 443e).  Whatever the 
agent considers “good,” will thus be the intended end of her activity.  For Socrates to intend to die 
– and only to die – he must locate his good in dying, and choose to die only because death seems 
good to him.  Crucially, he must intend to die apart from any consideration of justice.  At least one 
ancient author suggests that this understanding is how we should interpret Socrates’ intentions.  In 
the Apology, Xenophon has Socrates claim: 
“If I perceive my decay and start criticizing myself, how,” [Socrates] said, “could 
I any longer live pleasantly?  Perhaps,” he added, “the god in his kindness is taking 
my part and securing me the opportunity of ending my life not only at the right 
place but also in the easiest way.  For if I am condemned now, it will clearly be 
open to me to suffer a death judged by those who have overseen this matter to be 
the easiest and least troublesome to one’s friends” (Xen. Ap. 6-7).50 
 
Xenophon has Socrates covet death even before he goes to trial because he thinks his 
intellectual powers are beginning to fade.  The city’s sentence will be a timely opportunity to kill 
himself.  He sees death itself as good for himself because it will free him from old age, senility, 
and the associated loss of philosophical ability.  He says nothing about intending to die for justice’s 
sake.   
                                                          
49  See Cooper (516).  I take it that suicide necessarily involves an intent to die, otherwise many accidental 
deaths could count as “suicide” as well. 
50  ἢν δὲ αἰσθάνωμαι χείρων γιγνόμενος καὶ καταμέμφωμαι ἐμαυτόν, πῶς ἄν, εἰπεῖν, ἐγὼ ἔτι ἂν ἡδέως 
βιοτεύοιμι· ἴσως δέ τοι, φάναι αὐτόν, καὶ ὁ θεὸς δἰ εὐμένειαν προξενεῖ μοι οὐ μόνον τὸ ἐν καιρῷ τῆς ἡλικίας καταλῦσαι 
τὸν βίον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ᾗ ῥᾷστα. ἢν γὰρ νῦν κατακριθῇ μοι, δῆλον ὅτι ἐξέσται μοι τῇ τελευτῇ χρῆσθαι ἣ ῥᾴστη μὲν ὑπὸ 
τῶν τούτου ἐπιμεληθέντων κέκριται, ἀπρογμονεστάτη δὲ τοῖς φίλοις.  
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 Could Plato’s view of Socrates’ intentions possibly accord with Xenophon’s presentation?  
One passage might appear to illustrate this view.  In Plato’s Apology, Socrates states, “I see clearly 
that it was better for me to die now and be freed from trouble” (41d4-5).  The cryptic remark might 
well suggest that death seems better to Socrates than continued life.51 
 However, further consideration of the passage suggests otherwise.  Plato has Socrates 
recognize death as “better” for himself only after Socrates has been condemned.52  The timing 
suggests that he recognizes death’s goodness as conditional on his conviction, and choiceworthy 
only because of his commitment to justice.  If so, Plato cannot think Socrates sees his death as 
good independent of justice’s dictates, and death cannot be the sole end of Socrates’ intentional 
activity. 
Indeed, the strongest Platonic evidence suggests that Socrates’ intentions must accord with 
justice’s demands.  Consider the following passage: 
“[We] agree that the thing we must examine is whether it is just for me to try to 
leave here when the Athenians have not acquitted me.  If it appears to be just, we 
will try to do it; but if it is not, we will let it be” (Crit. 48b-c).53 
 
Plato has Socrates present the question of his death as a matter of justice.  He will flee with Crito 
if he can be convinced that justice permits his flight.  Otherwise, he will die as justice dictates.  
This passage should prompt serious doubt that Plato thinks Socrates intends only to die.  It 
suggests, instead, that Socrates intends to act as justice requires.  If this thesis is correct, Socrates 
                                                          
51  Note, however, that the death sentence is “better” for a different reason than for Xenophon’s Socrates.  Plato’s 
Socrates has just related how difficult it is to outrun injustice (Ap. 39a), suggesting the “trouble” he hopes to escape 
is injustice rather than (as Xenophon’s Socrates touts) old age. 
52  In contrast, Xenophon has Socrates recognize death as “better” for him even before he goes to trial (Ap. 4).  
This suggests that, on Xenophon’s interpretation, it does not matter whether the city condemns Socrates; Socrates’ 
desire for death occurs first, and is independent of justice and the city’s ruling.  Brickhouse and Smith (1989) make a 
convincing case that Xenophon’s Socrates and Plato’s Socrates differ profoundly with respect to their motivations 
(60-62). 
53  Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τοῦτο σκεπτέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε πειρᾶσθαι ἐξιέναι μὴ 
ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων ἢ οὐ δίκαιον· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φαίνηται δίκαιον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐῶμεν. 
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locates his good only in acting as justice requires, and he does not identify death as his good.  
Socrates would die only because justice requires it, and he would not intend his death.54  
However, we should not be too quick to accept this thesis.  For the Crito passage is also 
compatible with another option: that Socrates intends two ends when he acted, both to die and to 
comply with justice.  The passage does not exclude the possibility that Socrates had other reasons 
for doing as he did besides or in addition to acting in accordance with justice.  This suggests a way 
forward for the view that Plato thinks Socrates committed suicide. 
In the Gorgias, Plato recognizes two ways an agent can act to promote her good.  Tyrants 
may act because (and only because) their good requires it.  In this way, they kill or exile someone 
only because they think that doing so will best promote their good (468b).  But tyrants may also 
kill or exile because they want to do the killing or exiling, and because their killing or exiling 
promotes their good (466d).  The first case illustrates that an agent may φ because she wants to φ 
for no other reason than that her good requires it.  This is how you might follow a doctor’s orders, 
for example (cf. Grg. 467c; Rep. II.357c).  You take prescribed medicine only because it is 
required.  You have no positive desire to take the medicine, other than that it is required for you to 
obtain your goal (viz., being healthy).  But the second case illustrates that an agent may φ because 
she wants to φ, and because φ-ing also promotes her good.  Suppose that you want to take the 
medicine your doctor prescribes, perhaps because you like the taste of medicine.55  In this case, 
when the doctor prescribes you some medicine, you want to take the medicine anyway.  Although 
taking the medicine also happens to promote your good (being healthy), you do not take it purely 
                                                          
54  Brickhouse and Smith favor this view (1989: 41 ff.). 
55  One may be tempted to think that this is not possible.  But here is an example.  My young nephew once got 
sick and was prescribed some sweet pink concoction for his cough.  Ever after, he would pretend to get sick in the 
same way, just so he could be prescribed some of the same medication.  The doctor wasn’t fooled.  But when the kid 
did eventually get sick and need that medication, he got what he wanted and he got what was conducive to his overall 
health. 
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because it promotes your good.  Notice, however, that recognizing the medicine’s healthful 
benefits will provide further reason to take it. 
The worry is that Socrates intentionally chooses death in a manner more like the first 
example.  It might seem that Socrates has no desire to die, and that his only desire is to do as justice 
requires.  However, we have good reason to think that this is not the case, and that Socrates actually 
desires death. 
The evidence for this claim is particularly strong in the Phaedo.  Plato has Socrates surmise 
that death is good – and especially good for philosophers.  Philosophers will practice for death 
throughout their lives and will always be eager to die (Phd. 61d, 64a, 65d).  Indeed, philosophers 
should want to die, because death is nothing other than a separation of soul from the body.  Once 
the soul is free of the body, it can pursue true wisdom (the philosophers’ goal) unhindered (65a 
ff.).  Since Socrates claims that he strives to be numbered among the true philosophers (69d), he 
must recognize death as a benefit.  Only death will enable his soul to separate from his body to 
pursue wisdom.  Clearly, Socrates’ having a desire for death is not ruled out by his attitudes 
towards death.  Death, in fact, seems good to him, because it is something that every true 
philosopher should want.  Moreover, it is something Socrates wants, insofar as he styles himself a 
philosopher.56   
We see a similar thought expressed in the Apology: 
“Let us consider in another way also how much hope there is that [death] is a good 
thing.  For death is one of two things.  Either it is nothing such that the dead have 
no consciousness of anything, or it is, as people say, some change and relocation of 
the soul from here to another place.  And if it is insentience, like sleep in which the 
sleeper does not even dream, death would be a marvelous gain. . . . But if death is 
a change of place from here to another place, and the things people say are true, 
that all the dead are there, what greater good could there be, oh judges? . . . I want 
                                                          
56  Compare to Socrates’ claim that the sophist, Evenus, will want to die, if Evenus is truly a philosopher (Phd. 
61b-c).  This has the odd result that all true philosophers should desire to die. 
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to die many times, if these things are true; for I would find life there marvelous” 
(40c-41b).57 
 
In this passage, Plato has Socrates construct a dilemma.  Death is one of two things.  Either it is 
nothing and the dead are annihilated, or it is some relocation of the soul to another place.  Either 
way, death is a benefit.  Moreover, Socrates thinks it benefits himself. 
  Some may object that this dilemma does not cover all the possibilities of what death is.  
Death could involve eternal punishment, which would certainly not be advantageous.58  However, 
under a more charitable reading, the argument does not fall prey to this worry.  Loosely interpreted, 
the option that death is a “relocation of the soul” could involve any relocation of the soul, whether 
it be to blissful paradise, to another living body, to eternal damnation, or elsewhere.  The real worry 
is in Socrates’ assumption that his soul must necessarily relocate to a “good” place.  Socrates feels 
secure in this assumption because he believes that the gods are good and will reward his 
philosophic life.59  Whether his assumption is correct is not at issue here, since we are now 
considering only how Plato portrays Socrates’ attitudes toward his death.  If we take Socrates at 
his word, he thinks death itself will be good for him regardless of whether it involves his 
annihilation or relocation. He claims that, especially if the latter is the case, he wants (θέλω) to die 
many times.60   
                                                          
57  ᾿Εννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῇδε, ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι· δυοῖν ηὰρ θάτερόν ἐστιν τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ 
οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδὲ αἰσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολή τις τυγχάνει 
οὖσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἀλλον τόπον. καὶ εἴτε μηδεμία αἴσθησίς ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾿ οἷον 
ὕπνος, ἐπειδάν τις καθεύδων μηδ᾿ ὄναρ μηδὲν ὁρᾷ, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος . . . εἰ δ᾿ αὖ οἷον ἀποδημῆσαί 
ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον,καὶ  ἀληθῆ ἐστιν τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς ἄρα ἐκαῖ εἰσιν ἅπαντες οἱ τεθνεῶτες,τ ί 
μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἴη ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί; . . . ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις θέλω τεθνάναι, εἰ ταῦτ᾿ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ· ἐπεὶ 
ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστὴ ἂν.  
58  Roochnik (1985: 213), argues that Socrates’ two options are not exhaustive.  The afterlife might involve 
pushing rocks up a hill for eternity, for example. 
59  Cf. Grg. 526c.  Since he denies that he has done anything worthy of punishment (Ap. 36b-d), and since he 
believes the gods are good, he assumes he will have a punishment-free afterlife.  On this claim, I agree with Jones 
(10) and Austin (2010: 47).  
60  The claim may indicate Socrates is less enthralled with the first possibility.  Yet, he still claims death as 
annihilation would be a “marvelous gain.”  But how can death as nothingness be a benefit?  For annihilation to be a 
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I suggest from this evidence that Socrates, as Plato presents him, encapsulates the Gorgias’ 
second way to promote his good.  He acts as justice requires, killing himself because that is what 
he thinks justice requires.  In that sense, it is true that he intends to act in accordance with justice.  
But Plato also presents Socrates as doing what he wants to do, killing himself also because he 
wants to die.  Socrates believes that death will itself be good for him, either because it will free his 
soul to pursue wisdom in the company of good people (Phd. 63c; Ap. 41c-d), or at least because 
good gods will ensure he comes to a good state when he dies.  So we cannot say that Socrates kills 
himself only because he desires to act in accordance with justice.  For, when he kills himself, he 
not only recognizes that acting as justice requires is good for him, but he also recognizes that death 
itself is good for him.61  His choice to kill himself thus results both from his own desire for death 
and from his desire to act as justice dictates.  Thus, Plato has Socrates commit suicide. 
What may yet remain puzzling is why Plato presents Socrates’ acting on his desire for 
death as so closely entwined with justice’s demands.  After all, Socrates’ desire for death is fulfilled 
only by following justice’s ruling (Crito 48b-c; 54e).  The fact that even Socrates’ positive 
sentiments about death are only expressed after his conviction may suggest that his desire for death 
comes secondary to justice’s demands.  Some may also wonder why Socrates does not end his life 
earlier if death is so desirable for him, instead of waiting until such time as justice also requires 
his death.62    
The reason is that Plato makes it quite clear that death will not be good for Socrates unless 
Socrates dies justly.  Plato has had Socrates recognize that committing suicide under certain 
                                                          
benefit, it is enough to show that Socrates’ continued life would be worse.  Plato does this.  He has Socrates claim that 
death is better for him than continued life (Ap. 41d), and that he will gain no benefit from a longer life (Phd. 117a).  
61  See Frankfurt (2008: 1-10), for an argument that it makes a difference if an agent is compelled to do 
something that she wants to do. 
62  Seneca, for instance, notes that Socrates could have committed suicide from fasting rather than comply with 
the law to drink the poison (Ep. LXX.9). 
  
95 
 
conditions might be vicious.63  This interpretation is borne out when Socrates invites the sophist, 
Evenus, to follow him in death.  Socrates claims that Evenus will want to die if he is truly a 
philosopher.  But, Socrates adds, “perhaps” Evenus will not commit suicide, because suicide is not 
permissible under ordinary circumstances (Phd. 61c10).  Given the prohibition against suicide, 
Socrates must wait until such time as his suicide is ethically permitted.  He cannot act on any desire 
for death unless and until he has the circumstances granting him leeway to satisfy that desire justly.  
That he believes something about his current circumstances grants him that leeway is clear.  He 
has all the permission he needs in the city’s command that he die (cf. Laws IX.873c).  But, even 
though Socrates intentionally acts in accordance with justice, he also intends his death.
                                                          
63  Socrates declares that suicide is only allowable when the god and justice permit it (Phd. 62c).  Socrates can 
only permissibly kill himself because god sends him some necessity (cf. πρὶν ἂν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς, Phd. 62c6-9).  
Thus, he can only obtain any benefit from dying when his death is in accordance with virtue and divine command. 
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